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Abstract 
MIKA TORONEN 
UNION AND DISTINCTION IN THE THOUGHT OF ST MAXIMUS THE 
CONFESSOR 
PhD, 2002 
The present study examines the principle of simultaneous unity and differentiation 
in the thought of St Maximus the Confessor (580-662). This principle pervades every 
area of Maximus' theology, and can be summarized in the following way: things unii ted 
remain distinct and without confusion in an inseparable union. 
Part one introduces the logical tools and the -metaphors by means of which 
Maximus presents his thought. Parts two and three examine the way in which Maximus 
views unity and difference in the Trinity and in Christ. The distinction between the 
universal and the particular, expressed in terms of essence (or nature) and hypostasis 
(or person), proves fundamental for a correct interpretation of Maximus' theology. 
Maximus' dyophysite Christology includes topics on natural difference and number, 
composite hypostasis, will and activity, and culminates in the notions of 'unlion without 
confusion' and 'perichoresis'. 
In part four, the common denominator is that God is the principle of unity behind 
the multiplicity in the universe, Scripture and the Church. The contingent functions as a 
prism which makes the divine accessible to human beings. There is movement, in a 
perspective of eschatological fulfilment, from and through the multiplicity of the visible 
things to the unity of the invisible. 
Finally, part five discusses Maximus' understanding of unity of virtue and 
commandments under the all-embracing generic virtue of love, and how breaking or 
keeping the twofold commandment of love affects the unity of humanity. Spiritual love, 
which results from the mind's detachment from the realm of sense-perception and its 
ascent to God, functions as an antidote to self-love (which is confounding and 
fragmenting) and effects unification both at the level of the individual and at the level of 
the humanity as a whole, a unification which is the realization of the twofold 
commandment of love. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE HOLY TRINITY, Christ, the universe, the Church, Scripture, humanity and 
virtue, each of these constitutes a reality which is at once both united and distinct. There 
is simultaneously both union and distinction; these two go hand in hand, never the one 
without the other. The present study investigates the way in which St Maximus the 
Confessor (580-662) expresses the principle of simultaneous unity and differentiation 
in these areas of reality. That Maximus' thought is characterized by unity- in-di vers I ty 
has been signalled by a number of scholars, but has never been the focal point of a 
special investigation. This study will to some extent fill the gap. 
This project started, not from St Maximus in particular, but from the idea of 
simultaneous unity and differentiation in general. I first encountered it in some modem 
Eastern Christian thought, and later in Dionysius the Areopagite who in his treatise On 
the Divine Names sets his Trinitarian theology within the framework of what he calls 
'unions and distinctions'. This was something I found fascinating in its own right and 
despite the fact that it first seemed so very abstract and too all-embracing to be the object 
of an academic study, it kept haunting me. At a time when doctoral study seemed like a 
dream beyond reach in the future, I recall saying to a fellow-student that if ever I were 
to do a doctorate this was the kind of area I should like to explore; but actually to write a 
thesis on the topic seemed to me almost entirely unrealistic. I had no real intention in 
doing so until the whole-hearted encouragement of Professor Andrew Louth at the 
University of Durham finally opened the right doors for me. I began to research into 
Dionysius and Maximus. I set off by writing a short dissertation on Dionysius and then 
continued by reading Maximus. The principle of simultaneous unity and differentiation 
presented by Dionysius in terms of 'union' and 'distinction' seemed to be equally 
applicable to Maximus, even if expressed in a different vocabulary. This urged me on. 
Also the fact that such Maximus specialists as Polycarp Sherwood and Lars Thunberg 
make a point of the importance of this kind of thinking in Maximus, and the fact that so 
far no-one had dedicated a monograph on the subject, only encouraged me to pursue the 
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project further. This has now been brought to completion and the outcome can be read 
in the pages that follow. 
Here is a survey of the contents of the present study. As I said earlier on the central 
theme of this study is the principle of simultaneous unity and differentiation. This 
principle pervades all the areas of Maximus thought: Trinitarian theology, Christology, 
cosmology, scriptural interpretation, ecclesiology, anthropology and spiritual life. Each 
of these will be studies in the light of this principle. There are, of course, individual 
themes in Maximus' thought which escape its scope and such themes do not, therefore, 
form a part of this work. 
The fundamental idea could be summarized in the following way: things united 
remain distinct and without confusion in an inseparable union. This is the starting point 
for our investigation. Not every pattern and idea in Maximus' thought matches exactly 
with it (and I have tried to avoid pushing things too far) but it still expresses the kind of 
architecture of his thought that can be traced in all these areas. If it is born in mind in 
reading some of the more technical chapters that follow, the actual coherence of the 
mosaic that is constituted by Maximus' theology as a whole will become apparent. 
Part one introduces the logical tools and settings of which Maximus makes use in 
his thought, including metaphors that express a 'union without confusion'. These are 
there to help us to understand why he theologizes in the way he does and to see how 
unity and difference work in areas where this is not that obvious. For example, the 
distinction between the universal and the particular, or essence and hypostasis, goes 
through the whole of Maximus' Trinitarian and Christological thought, and the logic 
provided by the Tree of Porphyry proves an essential tool for grasping some of 
Maximus' insights about cosmology and even such remote areas as the unity of virtues 
and the architecture of soul. 
Part two embarks on the actual theological journey. After setting the basic rules of 
Maximus' Trinitarian theology and Chnstology, there follows a more detailed 
discussion on some notions of Byzantine theology. Maximus' Trinitarian theology 
achieves a very careful balance of Monad and Triad based on the distinction between the 
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universal and the particular which the Cappadocians began to use in this context in the 
fourth century. Maximus is, however, also very careful in keeping the Trinity at a safe 
distance from Porphynan logic: logical categories are applied to God only 'in a manner 
of speaking'. In general, Maximus tends to speak of the Trinity extraordinarily 
sparingly, and when he does so, it is often in quasi -liturgical phrases. 
The concept of hypostasis is given special focus and is discussed in relation to 
some trends in modem theology and philosophy. Although this concept has received a 
fuller development in the context of Christology, especially in the sixth-century, it is 
discussed at the very outset both because it draws heavily on earlier Trinitarian doctrine 
and because its correct understanding is essential for speaking of Maximus' theology in 
general. The reason why the notion of hypostasis/person is discussed so extensively in 
chapter three arises from the need to break away from the tendency to read modem 
personalist theologies back into the patristic tradition, and to Maximus in particular. 
Several modem scholars and their views on what seems to be important in the Fathers 
are to an overwhelming extent inspired by personalist currents. A closer reading of the 
works of the Fathers reveals a rather different picture from what one might expect on 
the basis of such secondary literature. In parts two and three, a number of related issues 
are discussed so as, on the one hand, to enable the reader to approach St Maximus' 
theology in its own right, and on the one hand, to give a few thoughts as to what 
consequences a more historically sensitive reading of the Fathers may have for 
contemporary theology. 
Chapter four raises questions ansing from modern theology which are directly 
relevant to Dionysius, Maximus and Gregory Palamas. In this chapter which at first 
glance may seem a red herring, there is included an exposition of Dionysius' theology 
of 'unions and distinctions' that in many ways has been the initial starting point for this 
prOject and as such is of considerable importance for the study as a whole. Dionysius' 
theology is an illuminating case in point because his system, which, in my view, draws 
on the Cappadocian theology, describes with a remarkable coherence the structure of 
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the universal and the particular in the Trinity in itself and in its relation to creation: and 
all this is done in terms of union and distinction. 
At the end of this part is included a chapter on spirituality, as the bulk of Maximus' 
text is concerned with spiritual life. This is an account limited to the study of texts with 
Trinitarian content and its corollary is the realization of the imago Trinitatis in the soul 
(mind, reason and spirit) of the deified person as the reflection of the Monad in Triad, at 
once united and distinct. 
With part three the study moves on to Chnstology. As with the Trinity so also with 
Christ distinction between the universal and the particular is fundamental. Christ is one 
concrete and particular being incorporating two universal realities. In other words, he is 
one hypostasis in two natures. Unity goes with the hypostasis, that is, the particular, 
and difference goes with the natures, that is, the universal. This is the basic rule. 
Activities and wills belong to the realm of the universal or the natural, and therefore 
Maximus' dyophysite Christology naturally unfolds into a theology of two activities 
and wills. But that is not the whole story. The corollary here is that the two natures and 
their constituent activities and wills are united in the one particular being that Christ is, 
united in such a way which allows them to retain their integrity as natures: they are 
united 'without confusion'. 
With part four a different kind of thinking is encountered. Three successive 
chapters expound aspects on unity and differentiation in the universe, Scripture and the 
Church. The common denominator here is that God is the principle of unity behind the 
multiplicity. The contingent functions as a prism which makes the divine accessible to 
human beings, just like a prism which refracting the unified white light makes it visible 
and multicoloured to the eye. There is movement, a dynamic, in a perspective of 
eschatological fulfilment, from and through the multiplicity of the visible things to the 
unity of the invisible. 
Chapter nine discusses the connection between God and creation which in 
Maximus' view is a kind of union and distinction through the logoi and through God's 
energeiai. This is a form of participation which although it draws on Neoplatonic 
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language is significantly different from it, as I shall argue when comparing Proclus' 
understanding of union and distinction between productive causes and products with 
Maximus' view of creation. There is immanence but not emanation; there is creation but 
not God's unfolding into the beings. 
Where Maximus comes much closer to Neoplatonic thinking, even if not its 
metaphysics, is in his vision of the unconfused union of the many logoi in the one 
Logos. This is strongly reminiscent of Plotinus' theory of the Universal Intellect which 
is presented here. A reflection of the unconfused union of the logoi can be seen in the 
harmony of the universe itself. This is another kind of simultaneous union and 
distinction where wholes and parts through God's wisdom and providence make up a 
harmonious manifold. 
With Scripture the pattern becomes less obvious, and yet there is one. The simile 
of light refracted through a prism, perhaps, best describes this pattern. Here, the letter 
and the contingent is bound to multiplicity. Unity lies in the Logos himself who is 
behind the individual words of Scripture. Realizing the transparency of the words and 
syllables, their unity in the one Logos becomes apparent. This, however, entails a 
whole process of spiritual endeavour, a process of turning every type and symbol 
(whether in the Scriptures, the universe or the senses) into vehicles which carry the 
person from the fluctuating reality of the present age to the unified truth of the age to 
came. 
Chapter eleven discusses the Church as forming a hannonious unity- in-diversity 
with its hierarchically arranged ranks. The ranks are defined by a variety of gifts of the 
Holy Spirit and it is in the Spirit that they find their unity. Furthermore, just as the 
universe, so also the Church is an entity made up of diverse members, not separated by 
their differences but united without confusion by virtue of their faith in Christ. 
Finally, part five discusses the unity of virtue and commandments, the Christian 
life and the fragmentation and unification of humanity. In chapter twelve, unity of virtue 
is seen in the context of the Porphyrian Tree in which love is the all-embracing generic 
genus of virtues and of God's commandments. Keeping the commandments (united in 
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the twofold commandment of love), or failure to do so, has its implications: failure 
properly to love God and one's neighbour leads by an inexorable logic to a 
simultaneous fragmentation and confusion both of the humanity and of the individual 
soul. Here confusion is an unhealthy kind of union of the mind with the irrational parts 
of the soul and things perceived through the senses, and a cause of distortion in the 
architecture of the human being. The soul's powers need to be distinguished so that the 
hierarchical structure of the soul can be re-established. Only then can one truthfully love 
both God and one's fellow man and in this way create a unified humanity consti tuted of 
individuals with true integrity. Distinction and unification at the level of the individual, 
therefore, leads to unification at the level of the humanity as a whole, too. 
Drawing together all the different ways unity and difference feature in Maximus 
theology, it could be argued, as a general conclusion of this thesis, that simultaneous 
union and distinction, unity and difference, is nothing less than the principle of truth of 
all reality in Maximus' thought. But whether that is too much to say is a question that is 
left for the reader to decide. 
*** 
Translations of Maximus' texts are to a large extent my own. Some were wrought 
with Adam Cooper but the final versions are mine. I have freely made use of the 
existing English translations listed in the bibliography, including some extracts 
translated in a number of monographs and articles by various people such as Paul 
Blowers, Stephen Gersh and Norman Russell. Only where I have adopted a translation 
verbatim, or with some minor changes, I have acknowledged the source. I have 
followed the same principle with respect to all the other translations. The sole exception 
is the translation of the Ascetic Life and the Chapters on Love by Polycarp Sherwood 
which I have used throughout this study. 
Where an ancient authority has been quoted, the abbreviated Latin form of the fitle 
has been given in a footnote reference. This is followed by. chapter number or 
equivalent, the edition used and pagination. Where the edition provides line numbers, 
these have been included after the relevant part of the text, whether page, chapter, 
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paragraph or the treatise itself. Line numbers are always preceded by a colon. 
References are made to the editions used in this study. In the case of Mystagogia 
reference also to the edition of J. P. Migne, PG 91, is provided. The abbreviations, with 
a very few exceptions, follow those given in G. W. H. Lampe (ed. ), A Patristic Greek 
Lexicon (Oxford: OUP, 1961) and H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones and R. 
McKenzie (eds), A Greek-English Lexicon. With a Supplement (Oxford: OUP, 1940', 
supplement 1968). 
*** 
It is a long established tradition in the English academic writing to quote works 
such as Alice's Adventures in Wonderland or Winnie-the-Pooh. This study, although 
written by a non-native English speaker, is no exception. One always feels the need, 
after a spell of hard and serious thinking, to balance it with some childish nonsense, 
nonsense which sometimes manages to carry more weight than the heavy pondering 
that came before it. The quotations in this work have emerged from seeking such 
balance. 
Another source of balance for the writer has been early music which, it seems to 
me, also has a similar rhythm. In Elizabethan England, for example, the slow and grave 
pavans were always followed by the fast and bright galliards, and the melancholy 
lamentations found company in songs of courtly love. As a token of gratitude to the 
great masters of early music, a fragment from that world, too, has slipped into some of 
the later chapters. And now if the introduction has been a heavy enough 'pavan' for the 
reader, we shall end the beginning with a little 'galliard' (or perhaps it is an 'almain'). 
Some two years ago, while visiting TUbingen for a short period of time, my 
German landlady asked me over supper one evening: 'What is it exactly that you are 
studying there in England? 'Well..., ' I started, with some difficulty, 'It is about St 
Maximus -the Confessor, and about how he understands unity and differentiation, 
and... Well, how can I put it? It all sounds a bit too philosophical, I gather, but you 
know, in fact, it is quite practical in the end. Take, for example, this Gemasesuppe (= 
vegetable soup). It is a single unity of a variety of elements: carrots, potatoes, onions 
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etc. Now, if the vegetables in the soup dissolve and get blended to such a degree that 
you can no longer distinguish them, then you no longer have a real soup but a mash, or 
just a mess. That is what is called confusion in theology. If, on the other hand, you 
leave the vegetables on the chopping board rather than putting them into a casserole and 
cooking them, you will have just a heap of vegetables. This is called juxtaposition. And 
if perchance one of your more inquisitive grandchildren sneaks into the kitchen and 
treats your chopping board as a tennis racket, then, ... (oh, well) you will have what in 
theology is called separation. 
But when you want to have a real GemUsesuppe, you need to have vegetables in a 
casserole but so that you can still distinguish the carrots from the potatoes. That is 
called union without confusion and distinction without separation. So, what I am 
studying, is the logic or the principle which makes a Gemfisesuppe Gemfisesuppe. This 
I call the logic of simultaneous union and distinction. ' 'Also, ' she replied to my strange 
answer with a kind of smile which showed that my explanation had not been in vain, 
6you. are studying a Gemiisesuppe? ' 'Precisely, ' I said. 'Well, then, ' she concluded, 
'Guten Appetit! ' 
Part I 
LOGIC 
I 
Tools 
Background 
IN ALL PROBABILITY St Maximus was bom in 580 in Constantinople where he was 
also brought up. He worked as a courtier during Heraclius' reign from 610 onwards 
but left his post some three years later to enter a monastery in the vicinity of the capital 
city. After a decade he moved to a monastery in Cyzicus (modem Kapiday, on the 
southern shore of the sea of Marmara) from where he fled under the pressure of the 
Persian invasion to go via Crete to North Africa, where he settled down in a monastery 
near Carthage. During the fifteen years of his sojourn there he carried out much of his 
literary activity. Later his involvement in the Monothelete controversy took him to 
Rome where he, together with Pope Martin, played a central role in the Lateran Council 
649 which condemned the Monothelete and Monenergist heresies. This led to their 
condemnation in Constantinople, and Maximus died in exile in 662. 
The years of his secular and monastic formation gave Maximus the opportunity to 
read extensively in the church Fathers, but also in philosophy and history. He is very 
well versed in such authors as Dionysius the Areopagite and Evagnus of Pontus, but 
the great authority for him remains St Gregory Nazianzen. From the Church Fathers 
also the other two Cappadocians, Gregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great, as well as 
Clement of Alexandria, Leontius of Byzantium, Cyril of Alexandria, Nemesius of 
Emesa and Ongen, to mention the most important ones, feature in his work. 
What seem to be Neoplatonic trends in Maximus, are almost invariable themes 
which reach him filtered through the Fathers; Dionysius, Clement and Cyril come to 
mind in the first place. It is very unlikely that Maximus had read any such authors like 
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Plotinus or Damascius. Yet, with the first reading his treatment of the logoi of beings, 
for instance, appears to strike a very Neoplatonic note, and it is only when seen in 
context that it becomes clear that what Maximus is pursuing is genuinely Christian. 
Such principles as the distinction between the uncreated and the created, sanctification 
both of soul and body, and the twofold commandment of love, that are characteristic of 
the Christian faith-and not of Neoplatonism-are pivotal to Maximus' thought and 
seem never to leave his mind. 
There is, however, a philosophical tradition which stands out in Maximus' works, 
a tradition Maximus may have known directly, that of the Neoplatonic Aristotelian 
commentaries. ' Unlike Boethius or Abelard in the Latin speaking world, 2 or indeed the 
fifteenth-century Greek patriarch Gennadius ScholariUS, 3 Maximus was not an 
Aristotelian commentator himself. He, nevertheless, was acquainted with this tradition 
and made a consider-able use of it as a tool to serve his own primarily theological and 
exegetical purposes. His concern, we should not forget, was to continue, not the 
philosophical tradition of the Aristotelian commentators, but the theological one of the 
Fathers. In Opusculum 21, where he discusses the notions of property, quality and 
difference, Maximus makes a point which is characteristic of his stance: 
The meaning of these terms by the secular philosophers is very complex, and it 
would take [too] long to expound [all] their subdivisions. One would have to 
extend the account so much that it would no longer comply with letter-wn'ting but 
would become a business of book-writing. In contrast, the explanation of these 
[terms] by the divine Fathers is compact and brief, and is not done in relation to 
some substratum, that is, essence or nature, but in relation to the things that are 
considered in essence, and indeed, in hypostasis. 4 
' For general surveys on this tradition, see Richard Sorabji (ed. ), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient 
Commentators and Their Influence (London: Duckworth, f990); Klaus Oehler, 'Aristotle in 
Byzantium', in GRBS 5 (1964), pp. 133-146; and Linos G. Benakis, 'Commentaries and 
Commentators on the Logical Works of Aristotle in Byzantium' in Gedankenzeichen. Festschrift fir 
Klaus Oehler zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by R. Claussen and R. Daube-Schackat ffiibingen: 
Staufferiburg Verlag, 1988)1 pp. 3-12; and L. G. Westerink's introduction to Prol9gome)nes a la 
philosophie de Platon, edited by L. G. Westerink translated into French by J. Trouillard (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 1990). 
2 See, for example, ch. 3 'The old logic', in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 
ftom the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600, edited by N. 
K. retzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg and E. Stump (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), pp. 99-157. 
3 Much of his work consists of translations of Abelard and Aquinas. See Gennade Scholarios, Oeuvres 
compl&es, vols 6 and 8 edited by L. Petit, X. A. Sidefides and M. Jugie (Paris: Maison de la Bonne 
Presse, 1933 and 1936). 
4 Qpusc. 21, PG 91,248BC. 
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Clearly Maximus knew what the 'philosophers' were saying, although he abstains 
from expounding their doctrine. The philosophical tradition I am referring to here was 
inaugurated in the third century by Porphyry, a student of Plotinus, in the form of an 
introduction to Aristotle's Categories, known as the Isagoge, and the commentaries on 
the Organon. These texts were taught and new commentaries continued be written both 
in Athenss and in Alexandria well into the sixth century. In Alexandria, some of the 
67 latest representatives of the school were Christians, notably, John Philoponus, Elias, 
David' and Stephen. 
The last of them, Stephen of Alexandria presents more immediate interest to us 
since he is the only one who was still alive and teaching in the early seventh century 
(died sometime after 6 10). He has been identified with a number of people: Stephen of 
Athens, Stephen the Sophist (mentioned by John Moschus) and Pseudo-Elias. ' Stephen 
was summoned by the Emperor Herachus to teach philosophy in the capital at a time 
when Maximus was still in office at the imperial court. We also know this same 
Stephen from a Christological. controversy within the Jacobite community caused by his 
' On the date of the closing of the Academy at Athens see H. J. Blumenthal, '529 and its Sequel: What 
Happened to the AcademyT, in Byzantion 48/2 (1978), pp. 369-358. 
' See Richard Sorabji, 'The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle', in Aristotle Transformed. The 
Ancient Commentators and their Influence, edited by R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1990), p. 14; 
andL. G. Westerink, 'Elias on the Prior Analytics', in Mnemosyne, ser. 4, vol. 14 (1961), pp. 126- 
133; and his 'The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to their Commentaries', in 
Aristotle Transformed, pp. 338-341. 
' H. -D. Saffrey, 'Le Chrdtien Jean Philopon et la survivance de 
1'6cole d'Alexandrie au Vl` si6cle', in 
REG 67 (1954), pp. 396-410. 
' David's works were translated into Armenian at an early stage and played an important role in 
introducing this tradition to the Armenian speaking world. See Avedis K. Sanjian (ed. ) David Anhaght' 
The Invinsible Philosopher (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1986). 
' See the article of Wanda Wolska-Conus, 'Wphanos d'Athenes et St6phanos d'Alexandrie. Essai 
d'identification et de Biographie', in REB 47 (1989), pp. 5-89. Mossman Rouech6 has expressed some 
reservations concerning this identification. See his 'The Definitions of Philosophy and a New Fragment 
of Stephamis the Philosopher', in J6B 40 (1990), pp. 107-128. If Stephen and Pseudo-Elias are indeed 
one and the same person then the following two items will be of interest: Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David), 
Lectures on Porphyry's Isagoge, introduced and edited by L. G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Company, 1967); and H. J. Blumenthal, "Pseudo-Elias and the Isagoge Commentaries 
again', in RMPh 124 (1981), pp. 188-192; Stephen seems to have played a role at the beginnings of 
the Armenian story, too. See Jean-Pierre MaM, 'Quadrivium et cursus d'6tudes au V11' si6cle en 
Armeni6 et dans le monde Byzantin, d'apr6s le "K'nnikon" d'Anania Sirakac'i' in Travaux et Miýmoires 
10 (1987), pp. 159-206. 
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opinions on 'difference' and 'nature', with the result that two of his students converted 
into Chalcedonian orthodoxy. 'O 
It is very likely that Maximus knew Stephen, but whether Maximus actually 
studied with him or read his works, is a question far more difficult to answer. That 
Maximus had read some of the later commentaries on Aristotle's logical works, remains 
still highly plausible. The connection, however, with the second-century Porphyry and 
his Isagoge is much stronger and to this we shall now turn. 
Genus and Species 
In his Isagoge, " Porphyry wants to fumish his reader with the necessary means 
needed for studying Aristotle. Porphyry does this by discussing what he calls the 'five 
terms': genus, difference, species, property and accident. Out of these five terms the 
first and the third, that is, genus and species, make up a framework within which all the 
beings that constitute the universe can be considered. " The hierarchy of genera and 
species is commonly known as the Porphyrian Tree. Its description as a tree is not 
Porphyry's own idea but it does convey in a tangible way the idea of hierarchy of 
predication which Porphyry presents in his treatise. The Porphyrian Tree is, however, 
rather an unusual tree, for it grows downwards, and one might, in actual fact, think of 
its ramifications as the roots rather than the branches. After all, the things that are being 
predicated with the help of this structure, lie right at the end of each subdivision. 
(Maximus is explicit about the fact that reality consists of the particulars, and that if all 
the particulars are destroyed, the universals are destroyed with them. ) 13 
" See Albert van Roey, 'Une controverse christologique sous le patriarcat de Pierre de Callinique', in 
Symposium Syriacum 1976 (OCA 205, Roma: PIOS, 1978), pp. 349-357; and below, ch. 6: 'A 
Sixth-century Controversy over Natural Difference'. 
11 CAG 4/ 1. On Maximus and the Isagoge see the discussion of Torstein Tollefsen in his thesis The 
Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor-A Study of His Metaphysical Principles 
(Oslo: University of Oslo, 1999). pp. 104-134; and below, ch. 9: 'The Universe and the Tree of 
Porphyry'. 
12 The pair expansion-contraction in relation to genera and species will be discussed in ch. 9. Maximus 
also makes use of another 'telescope' logic, mainly in his Scriptural exegesis, that of 
Pythagorean 
procession of numbers, the notion of tetrad being a good example. 
"See Ambig. 10.42, PG 91,1189CD. 
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However one wishes to imagine this tree, whether as a kind of a weeping willow 
or as the roots of an ancient oak, in terms of logic, what is generic, is at the top and 
what is specific, is at the bottom. At the very top, then, we have what Porphyry calls 
the 'most generic genus'. This 'most generic genus' is divided or differentiated by 
'dividing/constitutive differences' into species. The same differences are called, both 
'dividing', because they divide the genus into species, and 'constitutive', because they 
are the particular ingredient that makes the species what they are qua species. Every 
species which has other species subordinate to it is by the same token regarded as a 
genus. Thus all the intermediary classes are in fact species/genera. Only the very last 
species, which Porphyry calls 'most specific species', do not have the status of genus; 
instead, these 'most specific species' include the actual 'individuals'. In summary, from 
the top to the bottom the Porphynan Tree has: 'the most generic genus', 
cspecies/gencra' and 'the most specific species' which include 'the individuals'. 
The fundamental rule of predication in this pattern is that the higher ones, that is , 
the more generic ones, are predicated of the lower ones, and never the reverse. The 
other rule is that the higher ones 'contain' the lower ones, and the lower ones are 
'contained' by the higher ones. For example, the species 'human being' 'belongs to the 
genus 'living being', but the reverse is not true since also 'eat' or 'elephant' is 'living 
being'. Thus the genus 'living being' includes and is predicated of the species 'human 
being', 'cat', 'elephant', and so on. Similarly the 'most specific species' is predicated 
of the individuals that it includes. The species 'human being', for example, is 
predicated of 'John', 'Anna' or any other 'human individual'. We find Maximus to be a 
faithful adherent to these principles of predication when he, in Ambiguum 17, says: 
The particular things are never predicated of the universal, or the species of the 
genera, or the contained of the containing, and for this reason the universal things 
do not relate conversely to the particular, or the genera to the species, or the 
common to the individual, or, in summary, the containing to the contained. 14 
14 Ambig. 17, PG 91,1225BC. 
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One of the five terms particularly rich in the Isagoge 15 IS the notion of 'difference, ' 
and of the several kinds of difference Porphyry expounds the one which seems to have 
the greatest importance for theology is the so called ULCLýT(ITCI-difference' or 'the most 
specific 16 difference'. This is a difference which makes a difference in species. In 
Porphyry's terms it makes something dAo, " and 61W, as is well known, is a technical 
term particularly reminiscent of the Cappadocian theology. 
This raises the question of a possible patristic interpretation of the '(6LCt[TC(TC(- 
difference'. Is there an expression in the Fathers denoting a difference constitutive of a 
particular nature that would correspond to this notion? In a Middle Byzantine Handbook 
of Logic Terminology"' (dating just after Maximus) following some sentences which 
draw heavily on the Isagoge it says: ' "Difference" is a logos in accordance with which 
the substrata differ one from another, and which is indicative of the "how it is", in other 
words, it is indicative of the flesh being by nature and essence what it is. ' (&CtýOpd 
6(7TL X6, yos, KaO'bv dXXýXcL)v 8L(1ý6PEL Td i)1TOKEIREM, KCL'L TOD IT(ý3 El VCt L 
61JXWTLK63" TOVTeGTL T6 ETVCtL TqV GCIPKCI Tfl- KC(I Tý OýG[Ct OTrEP 6CrTU The ýýCVCL 
author, then, clarifies which difference it is that he is speaking of by saying that 
'difference is what is called [&CtýTCLTa by the philosophers, which also is essential. ' 
(&MýOpd bJTLV ý 1MO T613 (ýLXoa&ýOL3 KCtXOV[Len L&CLITCtTCL, , TITL3 KCLI OfKTL66Tj3 
i)TrdPXEL). '9 
This confirms two things. Firstly, that the 18MýTwra-difference (one of the many 
in the Neoplatonic school) was indeed identified with the 'essential difference' of the 
Christian theology and, secondly, as a consequence of this, that the 'species' (C L603), I 
and more precisely 'the most specific species', of the Aristotelian commentaries 
" See 3a: 13ff., CAG 4/1,8-12. Tollefsen gives a useful diagram in The Christocentric Cosmology, p, 
126, fn. 417. 
" Although this is an adverb in the original, I have renderedit as an adjective. 
17 Isag., 3a: 26, CAG 14/1,8. 
" Mossman Rouech6, 'Middle Byzantine Handbook of Logic Terminology', in J6B 29 (1980), pp. 71- 
98. This and a number of other short texts published by Rouech6 in 'Byzantine Philosophical Texts of 
the Seventh Century', in J6B 23 (1974), pp. 61-76, are attributed to Maximus in the manuscripts. I 
have not treated them as authentic. Although it is not entirely unlikely that they were written by 
Maximus himself, they nevertheless remain notebook summaries of the Isagoge, of Aristotle's 
categories and of some other logical works, with a very few comments. 
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corresponds to the notion of 'essence' or 'nature' in Byzantine theology. 20 All this 
features strongly in the Christological debates of the sixth and seventh centuries. 
Curiously enough, the first part of our quotation is taken verbatim from Maximus' 
21 Letterl. 21. Its context, as one might expect, is Christological. However, Maximus is 
also aware of the patristic usage of 'constitutive difference'. In the Opusculum 21, 
already referred to, he points out that 'the Fathers say that "difference" is constitutive 
and defining of beings. Whence also they name it thus, calling it a "constitutive 
difference". ý22 
In the same Opusculum, Maximus summarizes the patristic interpretation of the 
terms 'quality', 'property' and 'difference'. He regards themas virtually synonymous 
making only some very fine points as to their difference. 
Consequently, the Fathers say that these, I mean 'quality', 'property' and 
'difference', are identical one with another, and that they hold the logos of 
accidents, but not that of a substratum, that is of an essence. They [also] say that 
these terms differ in the sense that 'quality' is more universal, and is applied to all 
beings, since no being-God excepted-is without quality (being not 
incomparable) or formless; and in the sense that 'property' is more particular, 
being said of a certain essence and not of every essence, it is said of a certain kind 
of essence, of this one essence and not of another. 23 
Maximus makes two further distinctions which are essential for the exposition of 
the Christian doctrine. The first is the distinction between essential and hypostatic 
differences. (In Porphyry there is the distinction between species and Individual, but in 
the Isagoge he deals only with terms which, as he puts it, 'are predicated of many'. )" 
The Fathers, then, say that an 'essential quality', in the case of the human being, 
for instance, is rationality, and in the case of horse, neighing. A 'hypostatic 
quality', on the other hand, of a particular human being is, [for instance], being 
snub-nosed or hook-nosed, and that of a particular horse, being dapple-grey or 
chestnut. Similarly, 'quality' is considered in all the other created essences and 
hypostases, commonly and individually, that is, in general and in particular, and 
by it the difference, that exists between species and between individuals, is made 
known, as it clarifies the truth of things. " 
" Rouech6, 'Nfiddle Byzantine', p. 91,37-4 1. There is a similar case in the seventh-century Doctrina 
patrum, p. 255: 8-10. 
' Lambros Siasos makes the same observation in relation to John Damascene's Dialectica. See his 
TlaTEPLKý KPLTLKý Týg (ýLXOUO(ýLKýý ýLE0680U (Thessalonica: T1o1jpvctpd! 3,1989), p. 47 where he gives 
two elucidating diagrams. 
21 Ep. 12, PG 91,469AB. 
22 Opusc. 21, PG 91,248C. 
23 Opusc. 21, PG 91,249BC. 
24 Isag. 4a, CAG 4/1,13. 
2' Opusc. 2 1, PG 91,248C-249A. 
25 
The second distinction is that between the created and the uncreated. The question here 
is: Can these concepts be applied to the uncreated God? Maximus qualifies his Position 
by saying that qualities or differences are applied to the created order 'properly 
speaking' but to God only 'in a manner of speaking' (KCITCtXPTI(TTL K(j, ý; ). 
Now, with regards to the uncreated and monarchic nature, 'quality' cannot be 
said, properly speaking-if at all. For the divine is not out of an essence and 
accidents, since it would [in such case] be created, being composite and 
compounded of these. Instead, 'quality' is made use of, with regards to the divine, 
in a manner of speaking (KCLTCtXPTj07LK6ý; ) and to the extent we are able to 
conjecture what is beyond us from what is within the scope of our capacities; since 
we are in any case scarcely capable of taking in knowledge of them even faintly, 
and of explaining this in some measure at least, even if not completely. 26 
He, then, says what the essential and hypostatic differences in God are, even if only in 
a manner of speaking. 
Natural qualities' are God's being: all-holy, omnipotent, all-perfect, more than 
complete, self-sufficient, self-ruling, all-ruling, and the like natural and divine 
things that are said, things proper to God alone as being beyond being. 
'Hypostatic qualities' are: that of the Father, unbegottenness; that of the Son, 
begottenness; and that of the Holy Spirit, procession. [Both kinds of qualities] are 
also called 'properties', on the grounds that they naturally or hypostatically 
belong to this one [nature or hypostasis] and not to another. Out of these 
[qualities] are put together essential and hypostatic differences, and as I said, they 
are applied properly speaking to all created beings by nature, but only in a 
manner of speaking to God. 28 
The Universal and the Particular 
These distinctions brings us to one of the most fundamental principles in Maximus' 
theology: the distinction between the universal (T6 KOLv6v) and the particular(T6 L8LOV). 
Maximus derives his understanding of the universal (or common) and the particular 
from the Cappadocians following their theological distinction between essence and 
hypostasis. In Letter 15, Maximus says: 'Common and universal, that is to say generic, 
is, according to the Fathers, the essence and nature, for they say that these two are 
identical with each other. Individual and particular is the hypostasis and person, for 
these too are identical with each other. "' He then goes on to quote a whole sequence of 
texts from the Cappadocians illustrating this principle. 
Opusc. 21, PG 91,249A. 
In the singular in the text. 
Opusc. 21, PG 91,249AB. 
Ep. 15, PG 91,545A. 
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The question that anses is, how far does Maximus want to take the identification of 
the universal with essence and the particular with hypostasis, and how far does he want 
to take the distinction between essence and hypostasis which this pattern implies? 
Maximus begins with the created order and argues that the particular instances of 
created natures differ according to hypostasis, not according to nature: 
[B]eings that are united according to one and the same nature or essence (that is, beings that are of one and the same nature) are distinguished from one another 
according to hypostasis or person, as is the case with angels and men, and with all 
the created beings that are considered in species (E18o3) and in genus (-y6vo3). 30 
Porphyry's logic is lurking at the back here. And as we saw above, Maximus is 
reluctant to apply such logical categories to God but only in a manner of speaking. Here 
he only just dares to attribute to God the distinction between the universal and the 
particular, or better that between essence and hypostasis, but only after quoting Basil 
who reminds his reader that this distinction between essence and hypostasis in God is 
like that between the universal and the particular. " 
And our account will dare to say something much greater, which is, that even in 
the case of the first creative and beginningless cause of beings we do not regard 
nature and hypostasis to be identical with each other, since we recognize one 
essence and nature of the Godhead, which exists in three hypostases different 
from one another in particularities, and three hypostases in one and the same 
essence or nature of the Godhead. For that which we worship is a Monad in Triad 
and a Triad in Monad: " Father, Son and Holy Spirit, one God. 33 
How Aristotelian this understanding of the universal and the particular is, is not the 
question to ask in relation to Maximus. For him it is a Christian formulation concerning 
questions in Christian theology; a theology which makes use of commonly accepted 
ten-ninology. Having said that, it should be noted that Maximus never speaks in ternis 
of the first and the second ousia of Aristotle's Categories. 
A6yoS, -Tp6, Tro, -. An extension of the universal and the particular is the pair logos- 
tropos. The Cappadocian distinction between the logos of nature and the tropos, or the 
mode, of existence within the Trinitarian theology is well known and needs no further 
comments. In Maximus' thought, however, the pair obtains a very wide ranging usage. 
30Ep. 15, PG 91,549C. 
31 See Ep. 15, PG 91,545AB. 
32 
ýLOVdý ýV TpLd8L KdL TpLdg 
b 
Trinity in Unity'. 
' Ep. 15, PG 91,549CD-552A. 
pvd8L. An alternative translation would be 'a Unity in Trinity and a 
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It is there in the Trinitarian theology as well as in Christology, including the questions 
on activities and wills, but it can also be found in contexts such as the knowledge of 
God, the gospel commandments, the differentiation of virtues, the consequences of the 
Fall, and so on. 
Tropos very often expresses the individual aspect, that which differentiates the 
particular from the general, whereas logos stands for the universal. With rational beings 
endowed with freewill, this differentiation can be viewed also within the moral context. 
Sin and virtue are a matter of what one makes of one's natural capacities; they are the 
tropoi of the application of one's logos. Although the usage of tropos in Trinitarian 
theology, on the one hand, and in the moral context, on the other, are closely related, it 
can be very misleading to take Tp6Tro3 as a straightforward synonym Of Tpfto3 
iMdPEE(013. This becomes more evident when speaking of tropos more 'ontologically', 
for example, in the case of the Fall where the tropos represents the state or the condition 
of a nature. 
Union and Distinction 
In his understanding of the structure of reality Maximus regards integrity to be of 
the greatest importance. The question of integrity arises when things are united or are 
regarded in unity, and this can take place either at the level of the particular or at the 
level of the universal. For example, the way in which the basic ontological divide 
between the created and the uncreated is bridged in Christ represents a union at the level 
of the particular, and the way in which the logoi of beings are united in the one Logos 
represents a union at the level of the universal. In both cases there is a simultaneous 
union and distinction. 
At the level of the universal, integrity is seen in the nature or the essence of the 
things united. This becomes evident especially in Christology, but also in the doctrine 
of the deification of man. Concepts such as 'union without confusion', applied by 
Porphyry to discuss the union of body and soul, and 'difference', a particularly 
significant notion in the Isagoge, became the basic tools for Christian theologians, in 
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particular St Cyril of Alexandria and Maximus, to express the fact that in Christ, after K- - 
the union, the natures did not lose that natural difference which made them what they 
were qua natures. The natures are united and distinguished simultaneously. They are 
united but not confused, distinguished but not separated. 
Although we here encounter a kind of logic which is strongly reminiscent of the 
four adverbs of the Chalcedonian definition, it should not be regarded as a 
Chalcedoman monopoly. After all, this logic had been clearly articulated long before 
Chalcedon by the Cappadocians, CynI of Alexandria and (in Maximus' understanding) 
Dionysius the Areopagite, but also-and perhaps more importantly-by the 
Neoplatonists. It appears in a variety of contexts, and it would be wrong to think that if 
one discovers the phrase 'without confusion' in a cosmological context, for instance, 
that this cosmology is per se 'Chalcedoruan' simply because this adverb was used in the 
Chalcedonlan definition: Plotinus and Syrianus, for example, have an understanding of 
the Intelligible Universe (or the Universal Intellect) which presents an intriguing case 
of 'union without confusion'. Having said that, there is, of course, no doubt that 
Chalcedon heavily influenced the subsequent Chnstology and in the course of time also 
other areas of theology. 
In a union between natures or essences, if the natural integrity is to be preserved, 
the 'essential difference' of each constituent must necessarily remain. As we shall see 
later, there is in such a case union according to one and the same hypostasis or person, 
but differentiation according to nature. The logos of nature, its essential difference and 
its integrity go hand in hand. This is true not only of the union between the created and 
the uncreatod but also, in Maximus' words, of the 'union of the mind with the senses, 
and the union of the heaven with the earth, and the union of the sensible things with the 
intelligible, and the union of the nature with the logos. 73' All these are unions within the 
realm of the created. 
If we now move from the level of the universal to that of the particular, we shall 
see that where there is union of things retaining their particularity, there, too, 
34Qu. Thal. 48: 188-189, CCSG 7,341. See also below, part 4. 
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simultaneous distinction is required. For example, Maximus speaks of the logoi of 
beings that are united in the one Logos without confusion: 'Who would not consider the 
many logoi as one, through the relationship of all things to him, existing unconfusedly 
in himself? 135 Each logos remains distinct from the other logoi even in their supreme 
union. The logoi retain their individual particularity and do not cease to be particular 
logoi: "Who ... would not recognize that the one Logos is many logoi distinguished in 
the undivided difference of created things through their unconfused individuality in 
relation to each other and themselves? "' 
One might think that the logoi are always those of natures only, but in fact there is 
a logos of particularity, too, in Maximus' thinking. In the context of Christological 
anthropology he makes this explicit. 
According to this logos the properties, that separate all others from the 
community which exists according to its own essence, are made the distinguishing 
marks of the single hypostasis constituted of them, according to their union with 
one another which is simultaneous to their coming into being. And it is according 
to this single hypostasis that between them is considered an identity which admits 
no difference whatsoever, as is, for instance, with a human soul and body. For the 
particularities, which differentiate someone's body from other bodies and which 
differentiate someone's soul from other souls, when they concur in union, at once 
both characterize the hypostasis (constituted of body and soul) of Peter or Paul, 
for instance, and, by the same token, differentiate it from the rest of men. But they 
do not differentiate the soul of Peter or Paul from his own body. 37 
Very similar picture to that of the union of the logoi in the One Logos can be found 
among the Neoplatonists in their description of the world of Forms. For example 
Synanus says 'that the divine and intellectual Forms are united with one another and 
pervade one another in a pure and unconfused fashion. 138 What Synanus describes here 
is a very sublime reality, but it still is not the ultimate. For a Neoplatonist (as well as for 
an Ongenist) the ultimate is where all differentiation, and therefore all multiplicity, 
disappears. For an orthodox Christian, however, the integrity of the particular forms 
the criterion of a true union, of an undivided union within which there is also 
differentiation. 
Ambig. 7, PG 91,1077C. 
Ambig. 7, PG 91,1077C. 
37Ep. 15, PG 91,552CD. 
11 In Metaph. 119: 27-30; quotedin Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of 
the Prehistory andEvolution of the Pseudo -Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), p. 95. 
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One and Many 
The question of the One and the many, which for the Neoplatonists was pivotal, 
for Maximus is both a mystery and a vision. God's absolute singleness and his 
simultaneous immanence in the universe as a whole and in each of its constituents 
separately is not a puzzling dilemma for Maximus but rather a cause for wonder and for 
the acknowledgement of limitations of the human intelligence. " 
Oneness and multiplicity is also developed as a dialectic between the one Logos 
and the many logoi. Using the Neoplatonic imagery of a centre and radii, Maximus 
argues that the one Logos is the many logoi and the many logoi are the One Logos: 
The one Locos is the many logoi according to the benevolent creative and 
preserving procession of the One towards beings. And the many logoi are the one 
Logos as bringing them all together according to the reference and providence t) 4D b 
which returns and guides the many into the One, like as into an all-governing 
principle or a centre which contains the beginnings of the radii that derive from 40 
When viewed from the perspective of the creation, something similar can be found 
in the context of participation. The Neoplatonic Scala naturae, a kind of hierarchy of 
participation, is transformed in Maximus into the one Logos, who is, as it were, filtered 
through a sieve with variable sizes of holes. 
And the same (Logos) is revealed and multiplied benevolently in all things 
derived from him according to the analogy of each ... and everything participates 
in God by coming to be from him analogously either according to intellect, 41 
reason, sense, or vital motion, or according to essential and habitual fitness. 
The creation, although by essence radically different from the uncreated God, 
functions as a prism that makes God visible and manifest. God's unified manifestation 
spreads out in multiple colours through the prism of the creatures which he himself has 
made. Their multiplicity need not be in any contrast to the unity of their cause, as long 
as they exist in accordance with their natural logoi without confusing them. There is a 
hierarchy in the universe and there is a harmony, too, realized through the logoi by the 
providence of the one Logos. This harmony is again a simultaneous union and 
distinction of the different creatures. 
39 Cf. Ambig. 22, PG 91,1257AB. 
' Amb ig. 7, PG 91,108 1 C. 
4'Ambig. 7, PG 91,1080B; quotedin Gersh, From Iamblichus, p. 162; cf. Dionysius, D. n. 5.5, PTS 
33,183-184 andD. n. 1.5, PTS 33,117-118. 
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Wholes and Parts 
One more tool which Maximus uses to discuss union and distinction in a variety of 
contexts is the pair whole and parts. He has a fascinating, if dense, discussion of the 
creation in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium 2 where the structure wholes/parts overlaps 
with Porphyrian logic. The question presented to Maximus runs as follows: 'If God in 
six days created all the species which constitute the universe, why does the Father 
continue to work after this? For the Saviour says My Father works still, and I work. " 
Is he not, perhaps, referring to the preservation of species once created? 143 In one 
sentence (in the original Greek), Maximus captures a whole cosmology. Time, 
providence, freewill, universal substances, parts, harmony, movement, well-being and 
deification, all find their place in his answer-a good example of how Maximus can be 
at once both immensely demanding and rewarding to his reader. 
God, having completed the first logoi of creatures and the universal substances of 
all beings at one time (as he himself knows how), still works not only their 
preservation to keep them in existence, but also the actual creation, coming-forth 
and constitution of the parts potentially in them. Moreover, he through 
providence works also the assimilation of the particular parts to the universal 
wholes. This he does until such time as he unites the self-willed urge of the 
particular parts to the more generic natural logos of rational substance through 
their movement towards well-being, and thus makes them harmonious and of 
identical movement with one another and with the whole, so that the particular 
beings have no difference of will from universal beings, but that in all one and the 
same logos becomes apparent; a logos that is not severed by the modes [of action] 
of those of whom to an equal measure it is predicated. And in this way he 
demonstrates as effective the grace that delfies all. 44 
Parts, as the individual instances of the universal substances, that is, the wholes, are 
created by God in due time. He directs his providence to the parts of the universal 
rational substance, that is, to the particular human individuals with a view to creating a 
harmonious world. Here the parts conform to the universal and by the same token 
maintain a harmonious unity among themselves. 
A different case is that of the human being as a composite of body and soul. Body 
and soul are the essential parts which constitute every instance of the human species, or 
which constitute the human eidos. Neither part on its own can be the eidos which the 
human being is: both are needed. The whole, a concrete individual composed of body 
' Jn 5: 17. 
Qu. Thal. 2: 2-6, CCSG 7,51. 
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and soul, possesses the eidos and can be predicated of as a human being. In Ambiguum 
7, " where he argues against the Origenist doctrine of pre-existence of souls, Maximus 
makes a very subtle point about this. There can be no pre-existence of souls, for a 
particular human being comes-into-being only when the human eidos or form comes 
into existence, and for this both body and soul are needed. The parts, body and soul, 
can be spoken of only in relation to the whole, that is, a particular human individual, 
John or Anna, for example. Therefore, when speaking even of the dead body of John, 
we speak of it as the body of John, which is to say that we predicate it of the whole, 
because the body is a constitutive part of it. Similarly, the soul can be predicated of only 
of the whole which possesses the eidos, and this cannot be the case with a pre-existent 
soul. Maximus, therefore, maintains that both body and soul come into being 
simultaneously at the moment of their union. 
Let me take one last example of whole and parts, from Chnstology this time, 
where it plays a role of some importance. For Maximus, it is essential to maintain that 
Christ is one hypostasis, that is, one concrete and particular being. It is equally 
important for him that Christ incorporates two different natures within this concrete and 
particular being, for through the natures Christ is in an essential communion with his 
Father and his mother. The parts, then, that constitute the one Christ are his two 
natures, and the whole is, not a new composite nature, but a composite hypostasis or 
person. We shall return to Christology in chapter six but before that, here, as a 
foretaste, is a long and challenging quotation illustrating whole and parts. 
He, one and the same, remained unchanged, undivided and unconfused in the 
permanence of the parts of which he was constituted, so that he might mediate 
according to the hypostasis between the parts of which he was composed, closing 
in himself the distance between the extremities, making peace and reconciling, 
through the Spirit, the human nature with the God and Father, as he in truth was 
God by essence and as in truth he became man by nature in the Dispensation, 
neither being divided because of the natural difference of his parts, nor confused 
because of their hypostatic unity. But, on the one hand, being united according to 
nature with [his] Father and mother by virtue of the principle (logos) of the 
essential community of his constituent parts, he proved to have preserved the 
difference between the parts of which he was constituted. On the other hand, by 
virtue of the hypostatic particularity of his own parts, he was distinguished from 
his extremities, I mean from his Father and mother, and he proved to have kept 
the oneness of his own hypostasis totally undifferentiated and always unified in 
44Qu. Thal. 2: 7-22, CCSG 7,51. 
' Ambig. 7, PG 91,1 IOOA-1 101C. 
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the extreme personal identity of his own parts one with another. For the essential 
community of one of the parts with the extremities in the unity of the one 
hypostasis, preserves unconfused the differentriess of the other part's nature. Now, 
this rationale does not teach to the devote faithful that from the union one nature 
of both should be known-lest the coming-into-being of the one nature, the 
whole, by composition of them, become a total passing-away of the parts by 
essence, because [such one nature would] not have the capacity (the 'how') to 
guard the natural kinship of the extremities with the parts for not preserving, after 
the union, the natural difference which the constituent parts had between each 
other. Instead it teaches the devout faithful to behold one composite hypostasis 
from the union; a hypostasis preserved by virtue of the existence by nature of its 
constituent parts. " 
I Ep. 15, PG 91,556A-C. 
2 
Metaphors 
WHEN ONE has to put into words something that eludes verbal description, one 
immediately feels the need to turn to other forms of artistic expression, such as 
painting, music or dance. But as one, say, paints a picture of the indescribable, one 
then begins to see how one, eventually, might try and put it into words. The process of 
searching for metaphors, to make the invisible visible or the unthinkable thinkable, is 
very similar. In Maximus' theology the ideas of 'union without confusion' and 
'perichoresis', for instance, are especially among those which require 'images' for their 
meaning to be conveyed to the reader. ' Maximus has made use of a number of such 
metaphors for portraying realities of simultaneous union and distinction, oneness and 
multiplicity, and it is these that we shall briefly introduce in the present chapter. 
Fire and Light 
St Cyril of Alexandria, in his Conunentary on Isaiah, says that '[i]t is customary in 
the inspired Scriptures to compare the divine nature to fire. 
2 Cyril relates how God was 
seen by the ancient Isruelites as fire on Mount Horeb on the day of assembly, ' and how 
4 
he appeared in the form of the burning bush to Moses in the desert. Cynil, then, goes 
on to interpret the biblical image of a burning coal from Isaiah 6: 6: 5 
Now the coal is by nature wood, only it is entirely filled with fire and acquires its 
power and energy. Our Lord Jesus Christ himself, in my view, may very 
appropriately be conceived of in the same way. For the Word became flesh and 
dwelt among US. 6 But although he was seen by us as a man, in accordance with the 
Dispensation of the Incarnation, the fullness of the Godhead nevertheless dwelt in 
These two notions will be discussed below, in ch. 8. 
In Is. 1.4, PG 70,18 1 B; translated by Norman Russell in hi s Cyril of Alexandria (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000), p. 77. 
I Cf. Deut. 4: 10-11. 
4 Cf. Ex. 3: 1-6. 
5 See Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 2, part 2, translated by J. Cawte and P. 
Allen (London: Mowbray, 1995; original German edition 1989), pp. 39-40. 
' Jn 1: 14. 
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him, by means, I would emphasize, of the union. Thus it may be seen that he has 
the energies most appropriate to God operating through his own flesh. ' 
Maximus does not have exactly these same imagery of burning bush or coal, but 'fire' 
remains t1w metaphor of God for him, too. He prefers the metaphor of incandescent 
iron, and in some cases, not just any iron, but a sword (as in Ambiguum 5, for 
instance). ' 
The choice of red-hot sword as a Chfistological metaphor is very likely because of 
its usefulness in proving natural activity or operation. One can say that a sword does 
something, whereas it is not so easy to say that of a piece of coal. A red-hot sword 
possesses activity simultaneously at two different levels, in other words it both cuts and 
bums, and this provides a very practical tool for discussing two activities in Christ. In 
contrast, the 'burning coal' metaphor, for instance, could hardly serve a similar 
purpose. 
In Ambiguum 7, speaking of deification, Maximus develops a sequence of the 
rational being's movement towards God, and the final union where he finds himself 
'wholly in the whole desired one'. One of the two metaphors used here is precisely that 
the deified person becomes 'like an iron wholly penneated by the whole of the fire'. ' 
The other metaphor used is that of 'air wholly illuminated by light', a metaphor which 
can be found only twice in the surviving Maximian corpus. 10 However, John Scotus 
Enugena, drawing heavily on Maximus, has developed the metaphor in an interesting 
way. While Maximus only speaks of the overwhelming presence of God in the deified 
man which he illustrates with the metaphor of light and air, " Enugena develops the use 
of the metaphor, and his interpretation is worth quoting: 
For just as air illuminated by the sun seems to be nothing else but light, not 
because it loses its own nature but because light predominates in it so that it is 
believed itself to be light, thus human nature united with God is said to be God 
Cyril of Alexandria, In Is. 1.4, PG 70,18 IBC; translation in Russell, Cyril, p. 77. 
See Ambig. 5, CCSG 48,33. See also Pyrr., PG 91,337C-340A. 
'Whole in whole' (Uo3 & 8X(ý)) is a very widespread theme in Maximus. Here are only a few 
references: Ambig. 7, PG 91,1073D-1076A, 1076C, 1088A-C; Ambig. 33,12851); Ambig. 47, 
1361A; Myst. Prol., Soteropoulos, 146: 12-13 [= PG 91,661C]; 2,158 [= 669BC]; 21,210 [= 697A]; 
Or. dom., CCSG 23, lines 392 and 779. Cf. Porphyry, Sent. 33, Lamberz, 35-38. 
'0 Ambig. 7, PG 91,1076A and 1088D. 
II Maximus does have the idea that the light of the rising sun overpowers the light of stars, but this 
appears in a entirely different context (Myst. 1, Soteropoulos, 150: 22-24 [=PG 91,665AB]). 
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totally, not because its nature ceases to be, but because it achieves participation in 
divinity so that God alone appears within it. Likewise the air is dark when there is 
no light, while the light of the sun is comprehended by no bodily sense when it 
exists through itself. Yet when sunlight blends with air it begins to appear, so that 
in itself it is incomprehensible to the senses, but when mingled with air it can be 
comprehended. 11 
It is worth noticing that, as Stephen Gersh has pointed out, in these texts of 
Maximus and Enugena, 'the blending involves no loss of the original separate 
identities, ' and 'that each of the two natures blends as a whole with the other. ' 13 Again, 
integrity is of an immence importance. 
To go to another metaphor, Maximus has a rather unusual case of the fire-metaphor 
in Quaestiones et dubia 5. He is asked to explain, and to illustrate by an example, what 
is meant when St Gregory says that the apostles received perfection through three gifts, 
the final stage being the reception of 'the Spirit itself, essentially, in the form of fiery 
tongues'. " In particular, the question refers to the adverb 'essentially' for which 
Maximus provides an example: 
It is like with a piece of wood placed in a frying-pan (Tý'YCLVOV). When a fire is 
kindled underneath it, the piece of wood partakes of the warmth of the fire by the 
mediation of the frying-pan. This is how the Spirit operated in the saints faintly 
earlier on. If, now-to use the same simile-one removes the frying-pan from the 
middle, and the wood is grasped by the fire without any intermediary, it 
straightaway assimilates the wood to its own nature. 15 
Gersh refers to one more light-metaphor which was popular among the 
Neoplatonists, that of several lights forming a single illumination. This was taken over 
by Dionysius the Areopagite who applies it to the Trinitarian context. 16 As a Trinitarian 
image it is one of the very rare examples before John of Damascus which contains the 
idea (even if not the word itself) Of ITEPLX6P-q(TL3. 
[Elven as the lights of lamps being in one house and wholly interpenetrating one 
another, severally possess a clear and absolute distinction each from each, and are 
united in distinction and distinct in union. Even so do we see, when there are 
many lamps in a house, how that the lights of them all are unified into one 
undifferentiated light, so that there shines forth from them one indivisible 
brightness. ... 
And even if any one takes out of the dwelling one of the burning 
lamps, all its particular light will therewith depart from the place ... . 
For as I said, 
12 Periph. 1: 331-340, CCCM 161,14; quoted in Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus, p. 195.1 have 
drawn on his illuminating discussion on these metaphors on pp. 193-203. 
13 Gersh, From Iamblichus, pp. 196-197. 
14 Or. 41, PG 36,444C. 
15 Qu. dub. 5: 19-26, CCSG 10,5. 
16 See Ysabel de Andia, Ta Th6ologie trinitaire de Denys I'Ar6opagite', in SP, 32 (1997), pp. 290-295. 
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the entire and complete union of lights one with another brought no commixture in any of the parts. " 
Dionysius' source of inspiration may well have been Synanus who says that 
immaterial things are like the illuminations given off by different lamps which pervade 
the whole of a dwelling and intermingle with each other in an unconfused and 
indivisible manner. "' 
Body and Soul 
To emphasize the fact that in Christ, divinity permeates the whole of his human 
nature without confusion, Maximus utilizes the metaphor of body and soul. He says, 
for example, in Ambiguum 42 that 'it is impossible for God himself who has become 
flesh-in the way the soul is united with the body, wholly but without confusion 
penneating it at the moment of the union-to fall away from deification. '19 In a different 
context he illustrates the capacity of the soul to remain one and at the same time 
penetrate the diversity of members of the body. 
The 
i 
whole soul penetrates through the whole of the body and gives it life and 
motion. Being simple and incorporeal by nature it is not severed into pieces or cut 
off witlithe body ... but is wholly present in the whole of the body and in each of 
its members. ' 
What is common to all of the metaphors" we have seen so far, is that they can 
accommodate different realities where two essentially different natures are brought into 
union. They can express a union which respects the integrity of the constituent parts 
and which for that reason can be called a 'union without confusion'. Union and 
distinction exist simultaneously in the realities they denote, and in particular a reality of 
a union between the created and the uncreated. which does not annul the essential 
difference between the two realms but preserves their fundamental distinction. 
17 D. n. 2.4, PTS 33,127: 4-9,13-14,127: 15-128: 1. 
Metaph. 85.19-22, quoted in Gersh, From lamblichus, p. 197. 
'9 Ambig. 42, PG 91,1320B. 
2' Ambig. 7, PG 9 1,1 lOOAB. 
21 An odd one, not included here, is the metaphor of 'reason and concept' which appears only once in 
Maximus' works. It is used in a Christological context (Pyrr., PG 91,337CD). 
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Circle, Centre and Radii 
The imagery of a central point with radii extending from it, belongs to another 
category of metaphors and is one which Maximus uses for reconciling oneness and 
multiplicity. " As this was a major question in Neoplatonism, it is not surprising that we 
find it in Plotinus" and in Proclus. For example, Proclus in his commentary on Euclid 
writes: 
Let us conceive the centre among them as a totally unified, undivided, and 
steadfast transcendence, the distances from the centre as the processions from this 
unity towards infinite plurality according to its potency, and the circumference of 
the circle as the reversion towards the centre of those things which have 
proceeded. 2' 
After the pagan Neoplatonists we find it twice in Dionysius' On the Divine Names, " 
where the second instance is connected with the theme of the logoi. Maximus follows in 
this line. In Ambiguum 7, he uses our metaphor to describe the unity of the many logoi 
in the one Logos with reference to Gregory's problematic phrase 'we are a portion of 
God'. 26 
And the many logoi are the one Logos as bringing them all together accordino, to 
the reference and providence which returns and guides the many into the One, 
like as into an all-governing principle or a centre which contains the beginnings 
of the radii that derive from it. Thus, we are and are called 'a portion of God' on 
account of the fact that the logoi of our being pre-exist in God. Again, we are said 
to be 'fallen from above' because we have not moved in accord with the logos 
that pre-exists in God and according to which we were created. ' 
In Centuries on Theology and the Incarnate Dispensation 11.4, he again refers to the 
logoi and their unity in God, but this time in the context of spiritual knowledge. 
The centre of a circle is regarded as the indivisible source of all the radii 
extending from it; similarly, by means of a certain simple and indivisible act of 
spiritual knowledge, the person found worthy to dwell in God will perceive pre- 
existing in God all the logoi of created beings. ' 
' See the discussion of this metaphor in Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, pp. 86-104, and in 
Gersh, From Iamblichus, pp. 251-253; 72-74. For metaphors describing the unity and diversity of 
virtue, see below, ch. 12. 
' See Enn. 1.7.1, V. 1.11, VI. 4.7, VI. 8.18 and VI. 9.8. 
24In Eucl. 153.21ff; quoted in Gersh, From Iamblichus, P. 74. 
25D. n. 2.5, PTS 33,129: 6-7 and D. n. 5.6,185: 4-11. 
' Or. 14.7, PG 35,865C. 
27Ambig. 7, PG 91,1081C. 
2' Cap. theol. 11.4, PG 90,1125D-1128A, translation in The Philokalia. The Complete Text, vol. 2, 
compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth, edited and translated by 
G. E. H. Palmer, Ph. Sherrard, and K. Ware (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 198 1), p. 13 8. 
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This metaphor is also utilized in an ecclestological context, in connection with the 
biblical metaphor of body and members. The fragmenting effect of difference and 
diversity of the members of the Church is overcome by the reference and relation of all 
to the one source. Maximus, in actual fact, adds one more metaphor to the list to 
describe the reality of the Church body: the manifold universe, or more precisely, God 
as the creator of a manifold universe in which unity, harmony and diversity coexist in 
peace. 29 
Stone and Colours 
Lastly, an entirely different metaphor for discussing simultaneous oneness and 
multiplicity can be found in one of Maximus' Christological Letters. Here he 
demonstrates how a particular object can be at once one and many, at different levels no 
doubt. He takes the example of a stone, in which one can observe different colours, and 
concludes that the multiplicity of colours does not make the stone to be many stones. 30 
Number neither unites nor divides, is his basic rule. Here is his argumentation. 
When we speak of a two-coloured or five-coloured stone (or of any multi- 
coloured one) we do not divide the one stone into two or five stones. Nor do we 
sever the colours that exist in the stone one from another, but without confusing 
them we indicate their being this many around the stone and in the stone as the 
subject. And there neither has come about, nor can be, any division or cutting of 
the stone on account of the continuous quantity of colours counted with respect to 
it , just as there is no confusion or mingling of the colours on account of the 
stone's being one subject. For this shows the singleness of the subject which the 
stone possesses, and the quantity of colours which it has without division. 
In a similar way also, the colours of the same stone, as they differ one from 
another in respect of quality and [thus] possess quantity, they again have 
singleness without confusion by virtue of their constituting by composition the 
subýject of the stone: the stone remains one and the same, neither being divided by 
the quantity of the colours nor confounded by the singleness of the sub . 
ject. The 
stone possesses existence that is defined by different logoi, and with respect to one 31 logos it admits number, with respect to the other it does not . 
See Myst. 1, Soteropoulos, 150- 154; in particular for the metaphor of circle and radii see 154: 4-6. 
He extends it to flowers and animals, too, Ep. 12, PG 91,476D. 
31 Ep. 12, PG 91,476A-C. 
Part 11 
TRINITY 
3 
Monad and Triad 
The Principles 
IN ORDER fully to appreciate St Maximus' understanding of the Trinity, or Christol- 
m ', it is important to make clear the basic principles, or 'rules' as Maximus calls 
them, ' concerning the key concepts in Byzantine theology, such as essence and hy- 
postasis. Although relatively simple these rules are of such an importance that a failure 
to give due attention to them will inevitably result in misunderstanding and distorting 
not only Maximus' theology but also that of the whole of the Byzantine tradition. It is 
of an equal, if not perhaps even greater, importance not to confuse the patristic notion 
of 'person' (or 'hypostasis') with those of the modem times. 
By the time of Maximus, within the Chalcedonian tradition to which he adhered, 
there had emerged a fairly clearly defined structure of theology with its own terminol- 
ogy. The actual story how this emerged is long and arduous, but a few glimpses from it 
will give us an idea of the principles and the structure that I wish to highlight here. 
The fundamental question in both Trinitarian theology and Christology was how to 
reconcile simultaneous unity and difference. If Christ was God and the Father was 
God, how, then, could there be only one God and not two Gods, (or even three when 
the Holy Spint was included in the disputes)? And if Chnst was both God and man, 
how could it be explained that he was one and not two? 
Some of the early solutions to the Trinitanan dilemma were attempts to secure unity 
in God by compromising the concrete and distinct reality of the Son and the Spirit. 
These trends are conventionally gathered under the title monarchianism. One such solu- 
tion was promoted by Sabellius in the third century who maintained that God was one 
' Maximus speaks of 'rules'in this sense in Opusc. 10, PG 91,136CD and in PG 91,316A. 
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single person acting, as it were, three different roles in history. ' The next century 
brought with it Arianism which in its various forms saw the solution in radically differ- 
entiating between the Father, who alone was God by essence properly speaking, and 
the Son and the Spirit. In the Anan perspective, as R. P. C. Hanson puts it: 'There is no 
common nature shared by Father, Son and Spirit, no divine "substance" which they all 
possess. ... The Three are not equal, their difference of nature entails a difference of 
degree. " 
In the latter half of the fourth century, the Cappadocian Fathers made an attempt to 
sail between these two tendencies, and although their theology was to become norma- 
tive, it did not pass without reactions: they were charged with Tnthelsm. As the erudite 
men of their time they cast their counter-arguments in the form of commonly accepted 
notions. They argued that as with human beings there can be observed unity at the level 
of the universal and differentiation at the level of the particular, so also with God 
something analogous can be perceived. Unity and differentiation could, then, be viewed 
as simultaneous at different levels or, one might say, from different aspects. God could 
be said to be absolutely one at the level of the universal and, at the same time, three, or 
a triad, at the level of the particular. 
Terminology denoting the different aspects was not established and the Cappado- 
cian settlement was an attempt to establish one. There were dangers. Virtually any ex- 
pression could be misinterpreted by one or another party. Sabellianism and Arianism 
were for the theologian the Scylla and Charybdis of the time, and the Cappadocians 
proposed terms and distinctions which could function as the true via media. 
What was the choice of ten-ninology, then? With regard to the universal, the term 
cessence' presented no ambiguities. It was a cognate of the verb 'to be' thus signifying 
being in general but also corresponding to the revelation of God to Moses as 'He Who 
I 'Thus the one godheadregardedas creator and law-giver was the Father; for redemption it was projected 
like a ray of sun, and was then withdrawn; then, thirdly, the same godhead operated as Spirit to inspire 
and bestow grace. ' J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1977, 
f1fth and revized edition), p. 122. 
3 R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God. The Arian Controversy 318-381 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), p. 104. See also Manlio Simonetti, La crisi Ariana nel IV secolo 
(Rome: Institatum. Patristicum "Augustinianum", 1975). 
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lsý (6 WV). 4 Latin had no such word and thus essentia was, according to St Augustine, 
coined from the verb esse on the basis of the Greek ovalct. 5AIso the Nicene anti-Arian 
6 key concept 6ýLooýmov was based on this word. 
Another term which could serve for the same purpose was ý1TOUTCKTV;, the literal 
Latin translation of which was substantia. In Tertullian's formulation, for example, 
God was una substantia, tres personae. 7 But in GreekbTr6GTCt9L3was beginning to 
have the meaning of the particular, and thus things were not that straightforward. To 
say in Greek oneb1T6(JTCt()'L3, three Trp6awiTa -which corresponded literally to the Latin 
una substantia, tres personae of Tertullian- sounded, at least in St Basil's time, dan- 
gerously Sabellian. The terin 1Tp6crwTrov meant 'mask' or 'face'and lacked somehow the 
requisite concreteness .8 
It was therefore too easy to take the formula 'one bTr6cv-raUL3 
and three -rrp6aw-rrcC in a Sabellian way to mean one God with three different faces or 
roles. 
For this reason Basil insisted that the only way out was to distinguish between 
ovala and im6UTCLUL3. These corresponded to the universal and the particular respec- 
tively: 'Those who say that essence and hypostasis are identical are compelled to con- 
fess that there are only different masks (1Tp6uwiTa). '9 Basil maintained that the creed of 
the council of Nicaea 325 A. D. distinguishes between hypostasis and essence when it 
declares anathema on 'those who allege that the Son of God is of another hypostasis 
(iru69TCt9L3) or essence (oýuf a) "0 [than that of the Father]. 'For it is not said therein, ' 
Basil argues, 'that essence and hypostasis are the same thing. For if the words revealed 
one and the same meaning, what was the need of each separately? "' And yet, these 
terms had been identical at the time of the council-for St Athanasius, for example- 
4 Ex. 3: 14. 
5 De civ. Dei 12.2, CCSL 48,357. 
6 See Basil Studer, Trinity andIncarnation. The Faith of the Early Church, translated by M. Westerhoff 
and editedby A. Louth (Collegeville, Nfinnesota: The Liturgical press, 1993; original German edition 
1985), p. 104. 
7 Adversus Prawas 11 - 12, PL 2,1670D. 
' The term &-uTr6(7TaTOVwas first used precisely in this context to emphasize the concrete reality of the 
divine persons as opposed to accidental reality. 
' Ep. 23 6, Deferrari 3,402. 
10 Degrees of the Ecunwnical Councils, Tariner, 5: 22-25. 
11 Ep. 125, Defeffari2,262. 
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and they still were so in the minds of the so-called Old Nicenes. " Basil's distinction, 
therefore, was met with objection. 
But what Basil was trying to do was to find a way of expressing the distinction and 
true subsistence of the three divine 'somethings' without falling into Sabellianism, on 
the one hand, or to Tritheism or Arianism, on the other hand. Saying that God was one 
essence and three Trp6(yw-rra was what Sabellius had said and was clearly a dangerous 
thing to do. The Anan, or Eunomian, line of thinking maintained that there where three 
different essences, and consequently, identifying hypostasis with essence and thus 
speaking of three hypostases (= essences) meant falling into the other trap. Distin- 
guishing between oýala and 
ý76GTCtGL3was the only way out.. 
Although he could distinguish between these two terms, Basil was not happy iden- 
tifying ý769TCIGL3 and -rrp6ammv, as Andr6 de Halleux has convincingly argued. " 
Again, this was owing to the danger of Sabellianism. It was Basil's friend Gregory 
Nazianzen and his younger brother Gregory of Nyssa who established this correspon- 
dence. The former is somewhat tentative when he says that 'God is three in regard to 
distinctive properties, or hypostases, or, if you like, persons (TTp6awiTa); for we shall 
not quarrel about the names, as long as the terms lead to the same conception. 14 Greg- 
ory of Nyssa, in contrast, states plainly that 'the Scripture ... safeguards the identity of 
the godhead in the particularity of the three hypostases, that is to say, persons 
(Trp6crwTra). 15 He does not stop there, however, but makes another identification: 
'When we say particular(ýLEPLKý 0ý07M)or individual essence(ý& Kh ovlg[a), we do not 
wish to denote anything else than individual (dTo[Lov), which is person. 116 Thus, in ac- 
tual fact, for Gregory of Nyssa all the three notions- hypostasis, person and individ- 
ual -are identical, and this identification will in 
due time become the standard in the 
Chalcedoman theological tradition. In Institutio elementaris, a treatise attributed to St 
" See the article by Andr6 de Halleux, "'Hypostase" et "Personne" dans la formation du dogme trinitaire 
(at 375-381)', (reprinted) in Patrologie et Oecuminisme. Recued d'itudes (Leuven: Leuven UMv. 
Press, 1990), pp. 113-214. 
" See de Halleux, "'Hypostase" et "Personne"', pp. 114-130. 
14 Or. 39.11, SC 358ý 170-17 1. 
11 Comm. not., GNO 3, part 1,26. 
16 Comm. not., GNO 3, part 1,23. 
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John of Damascus (8th c. ), the author summarizes this by saying that 'hypostasis, per- 
son and individual are the same thing. 117 There may, of course, be some nuances to the 
individual notions, and clearly their etymologies are entirely different, but their basic 
usage in the context of theology becomes identical from this time onwards. " 
What I wish to demonstrate with this brief sketch, is that the Trinitarian mystery 
was discussed, or began to be discussed, by the Cappadocians within the framework of 
the universal and the particular, and that as a result of their labours certain terms, which 
henceforth became standard, were designated to the one or the other of these two 
realms. 'The mystery of the Trinity, however, remained a mystery: these distinctions 
were not pressed very far; they simply provided terms in which the oneness of the 
Godhead and the threeness of the Father, Son, and Spirit could be expressed, "' As 
Andrew Louth in his latest book has observed. 
The kind of ambivalence that the term 'hypostasis' presented in the Trinitarian dis- 
putes, the term 'nature' continued to have in Christology. Chalcedon and its aftermath 
is an obvious case in point. In the Chalcedonian tradition 'nature' was identified with 
'essence', and thus by the time of Maximus Trinitarian and Christological languages 
could be discussed within a unified theological framework. Maximus sums up the ter- 
minology in a sentence: 
Common and universal, that is to say generic, is, according to the Fathers, the 
essence and nature, for they say that these two are identical with each other. 
Individual and particular is the hypostasis and person, for these too are identical 
with each other. " 
This for Maximus is the tradition of the Fathers, and these are the principles ac- 
cording to which he argues. To spell out what the rule is: that which is common to cer- 
tain beings is their essence or nature, or an essential property; and thus common, uni- 
versal and essential go together. That, again, which is particular to one individual be- 
ing, something which it does not share with other members of its kind, is what charac- 
terizes the hypostasis or person; therefore, particular, individual, personal and hypos- 
Inst. el. a: 3, PTS 7, p. 21. 
For such nuances see Doctrinapatrum 6.16-2 1, Diekamp, 39-46. 
19 Andrew Louth, St John Damascene. Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford: OUP, 
2002), p. 97. 
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tatic go together. Any confusion between the universal and the particular, that is, the 
essential and the personal (in the patristic sense) leads to problems in doctrine. 
Hypostasis 
Let us then examine a little closer what the Fathers mean by 'hypostasis', bearing 
in mind that this is an immensely weighty term. 2' We have seen that St Basil established 
its place as denoting the particular. Here is his own statement, as quoted by St Maximus 
at the beginning of Letter 15. 
If we, too, are to express briefly what we think, we shall say that what the universal 
is in relation to the particular, this the essence is in relation to the hypostasis. For 
each one of us both participates in being -by virtue o'f the common principle (logos) of essence, and is so-and-so by virtue of the particularities which are 
around the principle (logos) of essence. In the same way there too the principle of 
essence is common, like goodness, godhead, or any other concept, but the 
hypostasis is considered in the property of fatherhood, sonship or sanctifying 
power. 
The principle of essence is what is common to all the particulars but the particulars 
have some characteristic features of their own which individuate them in relation to each 
other. If we look at some other definitions of 'hypostasis', coming from Chnstological 
context this time, we shall see that they all make the same point. Leontius of Byzantium 
(6th c. ), for exwnple, says the following. 
Nature admits of the predication of being, but hypostasis also of being-by-oneself, 
and the former presents the character of genus, the latter expresses individual 
identity. The one brings out what is peculiar to something universal, the other 
distinguishes the particular from the general. To put it concisely, things sharing 
the same essence and things whose structure of being is common are properly said 
to be of one nature; but we can define as 'hypostasis' either things which share a 
nature but differ in number, or things which are put together from different 
natures, but which share reciprocally in a common being. ' 
Maximus moves along the same lines in his definition in Letter 15: "'Hypostasis" is that 
which exists distinctly and by-itself, since they say that "hypostasis" is an essence to- 
20 Ep. 15, PG 91,545A. 
" Marcel Richard in his article T'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la thdologie de l'Incarnation', 
in OperaMinora, vol. 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1977), article 42, p, 5, says characteristically: 'Des mots 
consacr6s par la th6ologie un des plus importants est sans contredit le mot grec ýTT&TT(aCFL9. Son emploi 
par I'tglise dans les d6finitions des dogmes de la Trinit6 et de I'Incarnation l'ont rendu si lourd de sens 
qu'il est devenu pratiquemant intraduisible et tr6s malais6ment d6finissable. Des pages et des pages lui 
ont &6 consacr6s du IV' si6cle A nos j ours qui, reUnIes, formeraient plurieurs gros volumes. ' 
St Basil, Ep. 214, Deferrari3,234; Maximus, Ep. 15, PG 91,545A. 
Nest. et Eut., PG 86,1280A; quotedin Brian E. Daley, "'A Richer Union": Leontius of Byzantium 
and the Relationship of Human and Divine in Christ', in SP 24 (1993), p. 247. 
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gether with particular properties and it differs from other members of the same genus in 
number. ' (To' 'Ydlp KGO' aýT6 6LC0PLG[lýVW3 GVVOJTOý3 E(TTLV ýTrOCYTC(GL3* EiLTrEp 
bIT6(YTCt(JLV EiVCtL ýCtGLV 0ý(T[CLV RETdt 16LWRdTWV, CtPLO[lo T(ýV 6ýWyEV(ýV &Ckt)ýPOtr 
actv. )2' This definition is virtually identical with that of Leontius. One could add a whole 
host of similar definitions from the sixth and seventh centuries only to come to the same 
conclusion that the term 'hypostasis' denotes the particular. " 
From these we could draw the conclusion that a hypostasis is an instance of a na- 
ture, distinguished in number from other individual instances of the same nature by its 
particular properties. It shares with the other instances of the same essence their essen- 
tial properties but is differentiated from them in its particular personal properties. It is, 
therefore, not something opposed to essence but a concrete and particular instance of it 
can essence with particular properties'. 
Can a mouse be a person? 
But here arises a question: If hypostasis Is simply a particular, an essence with 
particular properties-and since for St Maximus hypostasis is the same thing as per- 
son- we may ask: can simply any particular being be a hypostasis or a person? Can, 
for example, a particular mouse be a person? (Asking this question, I quite deliberately 
use the two terms as synonyms, and for Maximus they are such. 'Hypostasis' is the 
more common of the two terms in the Fathers, whereas the tern 'person' is brought 
into the discussion because of its strong modem overtones which the present chapter 
attempts to shake off. ) 
This question about the personhood of a mouse must have been in the mind of a 
once-upon-a-time Durham student who, perhaps like myself, had sought inspiration in 
a well-thumbed library copy of Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. He 
had made an interesting annotation on one of its pages. This was in chapter three, 
24Ep. 15, PG 91,557D. 
'5 For example, 'Pamphilus', Solutio 1, CCSG 19,127-133; Anastasius of Antioch, Philosophical 
Chapters 54-61, Uthemann, 350-352; Anastasius the Sinaite, Viae dux 11.3, CCSG 8,50-79; Theodore 
of Raithu, Praeparatio, in Franz Diekamp, Analectapatristica (OCA 117, Rome: 1938), pp. 204-206 
Doctrinapatrum, 6.17, Diekamp, pp. 41-42). 
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where Alice has just survived from the flood caused by her own tears, and where she 
finds herself with an odd party of animals on the river bank holding a consultation as to 
how to get dry again-there, I noticed an annotation in pencil: The words 'Mouse' and 
'person' had been drawn a circle around them, and the words 'seemed to be' were un- 
N, derlined. Here is a rough reproduction: 'At last theý4ouse , '; who seemed to be a person I 
of... "' The phrase 'Mouse seemed to be a person"' stood out. The anonymous anno- 
tator was obviously puzzled by Car-roll's claim that a mouse could be (or could at least 
seem to be) a person, albeit in a Wonderland. After all, mouse is an animal and animals 
are not persons. So, at least, we think today. 
But can a mouse be a person? This is a question that brings us to a point where 
modem and early thought meet but do not necessarily coincide. It is, however, a crucial 
point and discussing it will prove helpful when we come to examine Nbximus' theol- 
ogy. We have already seen that when the Fathers speak about these concepts they refer 
mostly to human beings or to God. The question we want to ask first is whether the 
same notion of person or hypostasis can be extended to include other beings too, and if 
so, why? The purpose of asking such a question is not so much to make 'animal theol- 
ogy' but rather to clarify further the patristic concept of hypostasis, especially in relation 
to modem thinking. 
One example can be found in Gregory of Nyssa who quite clearly makes a point 
suggesting that individual animals also are hypostases. 
One thing is distinguished from another either by essence or by hypostasis, or 
both by essence and hypostasis. On the one hand, a man is distinguished from a 
horse by essence, and Peter is distinguished from Paul by hypostasis. On the other 
hand, such-and-such a hypostasis of man is distinguished from such-and-such a 
hypostasis qf horse both by essence and hypostasis. 2" 
Would Maximus then agree with such a statement? As the following text shows, he in 
fact would not only agree with it but would also further develop it. 
Beings that are united according to one and the same nature or essence (i. e. 
beings that are of one and the same nature) are distinguished from one another by 
hypostasis or person, as is the case with angels and men, and with all the created 
beings that are considered in species (El8o3) and in genus (-yývo3). For an angel is 
26 1 have used the edition of Roger L. Green with illustrations by John Tenniel (London: OUP, 1971). 
The annotation is on p. 24. 
27The phrase is, of course, taken out of context. 
28Comm. not., GNO 3 part 1,29. Italics mine. 
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distinguished from an angel, a man from a man, an ox from an ox and a dog from a dog, not according to nature or essence, but according to hypostasis. " 
For Maximus, then, the individual instances of 'all the created beings that are consid- 
ered in species (66oýý) and in genus (, yývo3)' are hypostases or persons. 'O (This no 
doubt includes Alice's Mouse, too; not to mention the Lory and the Rabbit. ) 
What I wish to make clear here is that for the Greek Fathers the terms 'hypostasis' 
(as well as 'person') simply denotes the particular. To put it bluntly, 'hypostasis' as a 
technical term is a logical tool which characterizes particularity and concrete reality, and 
little else beyond that. Particularity in turn consists in differences which may be of vari- 
ous kinds. 
And yet, the modem reader will surely object if we say that a mouse is a person. 
The obvious reason for this is that our contemporary understanding of the notion of 
person includes something which excludes mice from this category. Of the various 
theories of personhood, the kind of personalist theology that has been popular during 
the last century concentrates, it seems to me, on four notions which are most commonly 
linked with being a 'person'. These are rationality, freedom, relatedness and self- 
consciousness. " If we consider these concepts in the light of the patristic tradition, we 
shall soon realize that they all are, directly or indirectly, connected with, not the per- 
sonal, but the common and universal. ('Relation' is the only exception when taken as a 
personal difference. ) 
Rationality is perhaps the most conspicuous feature which distinguishes human 
beings from animals. Among created beings only angels and men have this property, 
animals being regarded as irrational. Rationality is a property that resides in our intellect 
or reason, and as such it is a faculty within the structure of the human soul. Rationality, 
therefore, is a part of human nature. 
29EP. 15, PG 91,549C. 1talics mine. 
See also Opusc. 21, PG 91,24813-249A. 
I am not referring to any work or wri ter in particular, but the line of thought which I wish to address 
here could be found in, for example, Colin E. Gunton The Promise of Trinitarian Theology 2 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997 , first published in 1991). Also a very lucid presentation of the issue 
can be found in the article of Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia, 'The human person as an icon of the Trin- 
ity', in Sobornost 8: 2 (1986), pp. 6-23. 
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The seat of freedom, in turn, lies within our rational capacities, the voDýý or the 
X6, yo3. And the patristic concept for free-will or self-determination, CWTCýOVGLOV '32 IS 
closely related to that ofXO'YL K6v and is even identified with that of 'will' (06XTIýLa) by St 
33 Maximus. All these are faculties which make up the human soul. Here again we may 
note that rationality and freedom are characteristic features of the human (as well as of 
the divine) nature, that is, of the human being qua human being, rather than qua person, 
that is, qua John or Ji 
11.34 They are essential properties; properties which all divine and 
human persons share; and properties without which God is not God nor a man, man. 
As Maximus so strikingly states in the Dispute with Pyrrhus: 'If, therefore, man is an 
image of the divine nature; and the divine nature is autexousios [self-governed, en- 
dowed with free-will], then also the image, since it preserves the likeness to the arche- 
type, is autexousios by nature. ' (El OVV CýK(ýV 6 dVOPWTrO3 Tý3 OE[Ct3 ýý(JEC03' 
aijTcýOi)GL03 Rý OCICt (ý63L9* C'LpCt KCII ý E[K6V* EiLTrEp TýV TrP63 T6 dPXETUTrOV 
CT6CEL 6ý10[0-Mv, aýTdOýGL03 (ýý(TEL TU'YXdVEL . 
)35 Consequently, rationality and free- 
dom, in patristic terms, are not personal properties. Nor are they constitutive of per- 
sons, as features common and not particular to many individuals: They are constitutive 
of rational and free natures of which individual human persons are instances. 
In the modem 'dialogist' perspective only a person, endowed with freedom and 
rationality, can relate. And relationship is seen as constitutive of personhood. There is 
no 'I' where there is no 'Thou'. Relationship makes us persons. But when we speak of 
personal relations today we in fact mean a certain kind of relatedness; relatedness which 
is governed by freedom, rationality and psychological and emotional aspects peculiar to 
human beings. What this implies is that there are, I would argue, different kinds of re- 
latedness conditioned by the natural capacities of each subject. Human beings relate 
humanly, mice in a mouse-kind-of-way, trees in a tree-kind-of-way, and so on. 
In Maximus also self-determined movement, aýTEýOýGLOý KIVTICFL3. See Pyrr., PG 91,301C, 304CD. 
Pyrr., PG 91,324D. 
Cf. Opusc. 10, PG 91,137A. 
Pyrr., PG 91,324D. See also George C. Berdiold, 'The Cappadocian Roots of Maximus', in Sym- 
posium, p. 53. 
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I was once told by a micro-biologist, a student of bacterial behaviour, that even 
bacteria relate to one another and their environment. They do so, as Maximus would put 
it, according to their logos of essence. Yet, and here is an important point, we human 
beings, too, relate in accordance with the logos of our essence. That is, we relate in 
freedom, for 'the natural things of intelligent/intellective natureS36 are not under neces- 
si t, ý , 137 as St Maximus says. (This is why human beings can also act against their natu- I 
ral logos. ) 
Moreover, 'relationship' (Trp6,3 TL, GXýGP3) in the ancient sense meant more than 
anything else a relationship of comparison: what one thing or person is in relation to 
another. Say, for example, this stone is twice as big as that stone, or Aristotle is the 
student of Plato, or the Earth is a part of the Solar System .3 
8This, as I said earlier, can 
be regarded as a personal difference. 
Lastly, what makes us think that we are persons, is our awareness of our own ex- 
istence and uniqueness. We observe a certain centre of self-consciousness somewhere 
deep inside us-something which we cannot really determine but which at the same 
time makes us feel that we are persons, and that'l am F and nobody else. Yet, here too 
we ought to point out (even if it sounds odd) that even self-consciousness is a part of 
the human nature; it is an ingredient of our essence. There is no human being without 
this property and thus it is common to all humans. Therefore, from the stand-point of 
Byzantine thought, as I have presented it here, self-consciousness is not constitutive of 
the personal but of the essential. 
If at this point we look at these four ingredients, we notice that they are all directly 
or indirectly linked with essence or nature (when understood in the light of the patristic 
rules). In fact, it Is rationality as the seat of free-will which is at the heart of all these 
qualifications. It is interesting to note then that the only Late Antique definition of per- 
son which limits it to rational beings alone- namely the famous definition of Boethius 
' This refers to the rational part of the soul which is to govern the irrational, animal part of the am- 
phibian human being. 
37 P. Yrr., PG 91,293C. 
31 Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 7, Loeb 325,6a: 37ff. 
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(5th-6th c. ) persona est naturae radonalis individua substantia"- makes it explicit that 
we are speaking of a natural quality. Early Greek theology, however, never made this 
delimitation. (Boethius thinks otherwise when he a little after this definition says that 
the Greeks use the wordi)Tr6UTCLULýý for persona and that they never apply it to irrational 
animals. ) 40 
The only real qualification for person/hypostasis that remains, and which we have 
not yet discussed, is particularity. This is where an existentialist type of personalism 
and Greek patristic theology coincide. Particulanty and its integhty is for both of 'in- 
mense importance. Unity which annihilates the particularity of those united cannot be 
true unity. The common unites the particulars, but without confusion. And yet, par- 
ticularity is not a psychological entity. Otherness does not depend on our ability or dis- 
ability to observe or to be conscious of it. In St Maximus' vision of the cosmos this is a 
matter of difference: 
If the beings which have come-to-be are many, they necessarily are also different 
(if indeed they are many). For it is not possible that the many are not also 
different. And if the many are different, then, also the logoi by means of which 
they exist in substance are to be understood as being different. [It is ] by means of 
these logoi, and even more so because of them, that the different beings differ 
[from one another]. For the different beings would not differ from one another, 
had the logoi by means of which they have come-into-being no difference. " 
But let us return to the Mouse. It will have become clear by now that the reason 
why a mouse cannot be regarded as a person in the modem view, is because it does not 
possess the above-mentioned ingredients: it has no rationality by nature, therefore it 
cannot act or relate freely, let alone be conscious of its own personality. But every 
mouse is a particular mouse, as unique as any other particular being in the universe, 
and, as we have seen, the only characteristics that a person or hypostasis has in Byzan- 
tine theology are concreteness and particularity. These every mouse does possess. Con- 
sequently, in that sense, every particular mouse is a hypostasis. (I must underline here 
that I am not attempting to underestimate rational beings nor am I trying to attribute 
properties of rational beings to irrational. Rational beings are ontologically infinitely 
Contra Eutychem, 3, PL 64,1343CD. 
Contra Eutychem, 3, PL 64,1343D and 1344D. 
4'Ambig. 22, PG 91,1256D. 
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higher than irrational; and mice are and remain irrational beings, except perhaps in 
Wonderland. ) Why was it then that the Mouse Alice met 'seemed to be a person' ? 42 The 
answer is, of course, very simple: the Mouse seemed to possess rationality and free- 
will. It or he could relate and be related to as a rational being, as an 'animal person'. 
But thus only in Wonderland. 
One conclusion we can draw from this is that when we say 'person' or 
'hypostasis' today we tend to mean much more than when the Fathers' used the same 
words. We have seen that in the modern understanding of the notion we attribute fea- 
tures to it which (apart from particularity) belong to the essence, that is, to the realm of 
the universal, and when we speak of these features we speak of them as being 
4personal' or 'hypostatic'. 44There is a shift from the universal to the particular. 
The development of the concept of person is of course very complex, as, for ex- 
ample, the article of Adolf Trendelenburg 'A Contribution to the History of the Word 
Person"' clearly demonstrates. For our purposes here, limited to a specific area, there 
is one point in this development that is of significance and which Trendelenburg brings 
out. From his analysis it becomes apparent that there was a shift from the universal to 
the particular and that it probably was Emmanuel Kant who first made it explicit. How- 
ever the case may be, this gives us a certain direction. And same direction can be seen 
in Samuel M. Powell's recent study The Trinity in German Thought where he remarks 
that '[i]t was ... in Germany that the contemporary understanding of the self finds its 
roots. "' Powell's study also shows that the anxieties about confusing ancient concepts 
with modem ones are not new. They have already been expressed in the 20th-century 
German theology, and this may well be a reaction to the shift which had taken place 
some time earlier. 
Taking the verb 'seemed'out of context in accordancewith the annotation. 
Even if we include Boethius with them. 
441t is, perhaps, not out of place here to point out that in Greek there is no word which corresponds to 
'personhood'. In Modem Greek the phrase 'notion of person' (ý &VOLa TOD Trpoc&rov) is used instead. 
Also the form with the Germanic ending -hood (heit) suggests a universal quality rather than a differen- 
tiating one. 
45 published in Germanin 1908, andin English two years laterin Monist 20 (1910), pp. 336-363. 
" The Trinity in Gennan Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), p. 2. 
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The emphasis on the singularity of God's selfhood appears also in Barth's 
strictures against the word 'person' when discussing the three Trinitarian persons. Barth exhibited on this issue a remarkable anxiety that modern personalistic 
connotations would be carried over and applied to each of the three persons. Hence his repeated and ardent insistence that personality and personal 
characteristics pertain to the singular essence of God, not individually to the three 
persons. 47 
Where this might lead in Barth's understanding becomes clear from the following 
In addition to being anxious over possible misunderstanding of 'person', Barth 
was convinced that this concept was to blame for the bane of modern theology - Sabellianism. As he saw it, nineteenth-century theologians, recognizing that 
personality had come in the modern era to be associated with self-consciousness 
and individuality, drew the correct conclusion that tritheism loomed with such use 
and fled instead in the direction of Sabellianism. In this way, they were able to 
preserve the one personality of God, but at the cost of making the Trinitarian 
persons mere epiphenomena. 48 
Two Problems 
a) Person-Nature Dichotomy 
I shall not delve any more deeply into German thought but shall instead bring in 
two aspects in modem theology- probably inspired by German thought-which re- 
quire a brief discussion before we move on to Maximus. The first is a tendency in some 
modem theology to drive a wedge between nature and person. A text from Vladimir 
Lossky on the Trinitarian doctrine provides a startýng-point. 
Trinitarian theology thus opens to us a new aspect of the human reality: that of 
personhood. Ancient philosophy was indeed ignorant of the meaning of 
personhood. ... Only the revelation of the Trinity, unique foundation of Christian 
anthropology, could situate personhood in an absolute manner. For the Fathers, 
indeed, personhood is freedom in relation to nature. 49 
For Lossky, then, the comer-stone of the patnstic Trinitarian doctrine is that 
'personhood is freedom in relation to nature. , 50 A charitable reading of this claim 
would take it to mean that the fallen man who comes to know the living Trinitarian God 
in a close relationship with Him will experience an absolute freedom from his passions, 
that is, from the fallenness of his nature. Freedom from nature is, in such a case, free- 
'7 The Trinity, p. 22 1. Powell's references are to Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/ 1, translated by G. T, 
Thomson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), pp. 402ff. 
' The Trinity, pp. 219-220. 'Ironically, they [Pannenberg and Moltmann] fault Barth for the same ten- 
dency, Sabellianism (i. e. failing to concede full reality to the Trinitarian persons), for which he criti- 
cized nineteenth-century theology' (p. 220). 
' Orthodox Theology: An Introduction (Crestwood, New York: SVSP, 1989), p. 42. This book con- 
sists of translations of articles published in French in 1964-65. 
10 It must be noted that in In the Image and Likeness of God (Crestwood, New York: SVSP, 1985; 
original French edition 1967) Lossky says: 'I must admit that until now I have not found what one 
might call an elaborated doctrine of the human person in patristic theology' (p. 112). 
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dom of the rational part of the soul from its attachment to the irrational which owing to 
the Fall has blurred the former. This freedom is gained through one's relationship with 
God in the Holy Spirit and involves an ecstasy of the voD, ý; out of the senses into the 
realm of the intelligible, and ultimately to God. " It may well be that this is what Lossky 
had at the back of his mind. 
A less charitable reading, however, will see in Lossky's position an opposition 
between nature and person (both in man and in God), an opposition which draws di- 
rectly on the Sartrean principle 'existence [or subject] precedes essence', 52 and which 
takes for granted that nature or essence is bound to necessity and that personhood func- 
tions as the redeeming principle of freedom from this necessity. A certain nature- 
person dichotomy is apparent here. Lossky goes on to say that 
[p]ersonal uniqueness is what remains when one takes away all cosmic context, 
social and individual-all, indeed, that may be conceptualized. Eluding concepts, 
personhood cannot be defined. It is the incomparable, the wholly-other. ... For that which remains irreducible to every nature cannot be defined, but only designated. 
What seems to lie behind all this is, on the one hand, an existentialist uneasiness 
with respect to nature, and, on the other hand, an idealist understanding of selfhood. 
The tendency I wish to avoid in bringing out these views is the attribution of necessity 
to intelligent, rational or, indeed, divine natures which results in distancing nature from 
person; as we have said earlier 'the natural things of intelligent beings are not under ne- 
cessity, 153 according to St Maximus. 
In the patristic understanding, we are not free because we are persons; we are free 
because we are rational by nature, that is, by essence. Freedom resides in our rationality 
rather than in an indeterminate principle of personhood. We human beings (let alone 
God) are not in want of some extra principle of liberty which is not already part of our 
essential being. Human nature is after all an extremely fine and complex fabric which as 
such is already a supreme mystery. It is another matter how the Fall has affected hu- 
manity and how its results have limited our natural freedom. 
" Cf. Ambig. 6, PG 91,1068C and Qu. Thal. 54, CCSG 7,443ff. 
52 jean-Paul Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme (Paris: Les ýditions Nagel, 1970), p. 21. 
1 Pyrr., PG 91,293C. 
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b) Person and Individual 
The other problem I wish to address here is the distinction made in modern thought 
between person and individual. Here a comment of Colin Gunton on P. F. Strawson's 
book Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive MetaphysiCS51 Can fumish a beginning: 'To 
treat the person and the individual as the same thing-to define the person as an indi- 
vidual-is to lose both person and individual. 55 
Here we need to place the question in context. As we have seen, the challenge the 
Fathers were facing was how to explain absolute unity and real difference in God. How 
could the One God be three truly divine and distinct 'somethings' and still not be three 
Gods? To explicate this they made use of the current logical tools. They distinguished 
between the universal and the particular and spoke of these two dimensions in terms of 
contemporary logic. In that context, the ten-n 'individual' was correctly used as a syno- 
nym of person and hypostasis. When the terms 'Individual' and 'species' were not 
made use of in theologia, this was not because 'Individual' could not express the 
'personal', but because the ' genus- species- individual' -structure (that is, the Por- 
phynan Tree) was regarded as inapplicable to the uncreated realm. 
The modern context is altogether different. We live in a sad world of disintegration 
and fragmentation. People suffer from desperate loneliness albeit in the midst of nul- 
lions of others. Societies are only forms; they lack every notion of true community. 
Happiness is sought within the framework of satisfying everyone's individual needs 
(too often dictated by the passions and created by the mass-media). On the whole, de- 
structive individualism prevails. In such a context anything which promotes commun- 
ion with others, personal care and social integration is more than welcome. And it is 
precisely to this challenge that so much modem theology and philosophy is responding, 
and rightly so. Gunton's statement belongs to this category. But it becomes problematic 
when read against or back into the patristic tradition. Characteristically Gunton regards 
Boethius as an 'individualist' for the simple reason that he makes use of the word 
, individual' in his definition of 'person'. (Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus and John Dam- 
141jondon: Macmillan, 1982; first published in 1959. 
56 
ascene would have had the same condemnation. ) What our situation is all about and 
what difficulties it creates in understanding words and concepts, even common ones, is 
perhaps what another passage from Alice in Wonderland could teach us- especially if 
we bear in mind the trend of defining personhood in terms of love. 
"Tis so, ' said the Duchess: 'and the moral of that is-"Oh, 'tis love, 'tis love, 
that makes the world go round! "' 
'Somebody said, ' Alice whispered, 'that it's done by everybody minding their 
own business! ' 
'Ali, well! It means much the same thing, ' said the Duchess, digging her sharp little chin into Alice's shoulder as she added 'and the moral of that is-"Take 
care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves. "' 56 
In other words, we are in a muddle. Even when we want to define 'person' in terms of 
love, we then do not really know what 'love' means. 
The Duchess' last point is what we need here: to 'take care of the sense'. In the 
present context, person and individual are no longer logical terms. They are terms 
which designate a certain, one might say, spiritual state and attitude, and a certain kind 
of relatedness to which this state corresponds, whether at the level of personal relations 
or that of society. The questions we are asking today are, in fact, what it is to be truly 
human, and what it is to be a true human community or society. And in the various re- 
sponses given to these questions, 'individual' stands for what 'to be truly human' is 
not, that is, fragmentation, self-sufficiency, egocentrism, disintegration, inability to re- 
late and so on; whereas 'person' (and in some theologies 'hypostasis') stands for what 
it is, that is, relatedness in love, communion, sharing, self-emptying, humility and so 
on. One could almost say that the modern understanding of individual-in some the- 
ologies, at any rate-signifies nothing less than the state of fallen man, and per- 
son/hypostasis signifies the state of the man deified in the image and likeness of God. 57 
Person/hypostasis is, one might argue, he who in the truest sense realizes the twofold 
commandment of love. If we wanted to avoid the confusion we would rather speak in 
the patristic terms of the man after the transgression and the man restored in the image 
and likeness of God than in terms of individuals and persons. 
" The Promise, p. 85. 
'6AIice's Adventures, p. 80. 
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In any case, considering the present unfortunate context one can easily understand 
and accept the distinction between person and individual, as long as we 'take care of the 
sense' so that 'the sounds can take care of themselves, ' that is, as long as these terms 
are duly explained and understood in each particular context, and as long as the distinc- 
tion between person and individual, non-existent in Late Antiquity, is not read into the 
works of authors of that period. 
Monad in Triad and Triad in Monad 
Let us now move on to St Maximus and his understanding of the Trinity. 'How 
does extreme union possess both identity and otherness, that. is to say, identity of es- 
sences and otherness of persons or vice versaT Maximus asks. 'For instance, in the 
Holy Trinity, there is identity of essence and otherness of persons; for we confess one 
essence and three hypostases. 5" As we have seen above, the Cappadocians spoke of 
unity and difference in God in terms of the universal and the particular. This logic 
forms also the foundation for St Maximus' Trinitarian theology. The most obvious ex- 
ample can be found in his Letter to Cosmas, On the universal and the particular, that is, 
on essence and hypostasis59which we have already quoted earlier. There, after identi- 
fying the universal with essence and nature, and the particular with hypostasis and per- 
son, Maximus goes on to speak of the distinction between essence and hypostasis first 
in the created order" and then also in the Trim ty. 
6' The conclusion Maximus draws 
from this gives him a logical pattern for unity and differentiation of consubstantial be- 
ings, the Holy Thnity being the most sublime example. 
Therefore, beings that are united according to one and the same essence of nature 
(i. e. beings that are of one and the same essence or nature) are necessarily 
consubstantial with one another and of different hypostases (E'TEpoVTr69TaTa). 
They are, on the one hand, consubstantial by virtue of the logos of the essential 
community which is considered in them unalterably in their natural identity. 
According to this logos no one being is more that which it is than another, and no 
one being is more what it is called than another, but they all admit one and the 
I See, for example, Archim. Zacharias Zacharou, Ava0pd 07ý eEoAoy(a TOO 
FýPOVTOS- ZWýPOV(Ou 
(Tolleshunt Knights: Stavropegic Monastery of St John the Baptist, 2000), pp. 23-47. 
Opusc. 13.2, PG 91,145B. 
EP. 15, PG 91,544C. 
61 Ep. 15, PG 91,549Bff. 
11 Ep. 15, PG 91,549CD. 
58 
62 
same definition (O'po3) and logos of essence. On the other hand, they are of different hypostases (ý-rEpovTT69TaTa) by virtue of the logos of personal otherness 
which distinguishes them, one from another. The hypostases do not coincide in 
their characteristic distinguishing marks, but each one by virtue of the sum of its 
characteristic properties bears a most particular logos of its own hypostasis, and in 
accordance with this logos it admits no community with those that are colinatural 
and consubstantial with it. ' 
Although Maximus discusses the doctrine in logical concepts, his favounte terms 
for the Trinity are Monad and Triad which he ultimately finds in the context of worship, 
and it is worship that forms the basis for the correct understanding of God: 'For that 
which Nve worship is Monad in Triad and Triad in Monad: 6' Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, one God. 165 One might also say that correct formulation of doctrine forms the 
basis of true worship. The two texts in which Maximus expounds in some length his 
understanding of Monad and Triad, On the Lord's Prayer 66 and Mystagogia 23,67 are 
both associated with liturgical prayer and an elevated state of spiritual knowledge. In the 
former, Maximus speaks of how 'mystical theology teaches us, who through faith have 
been adopted by grace and brought to the knowledge of truth, to recognize one nature 
and power of the divinity, that is to say, one God contemplated in Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. "68 And in the latter, he says: 'Now as the soul by a simple and indivisible 
power through its instruction, has already encompassed by knowledge the principles of 
both sensible and intelligible things, the Word then leads it to the knowledge of theol- 
ogy... "' Theology here is, of course, theologia in the strict sense of the word: the 
knowledge of the Trinity, which Maximus specifies as knowing 'one God; one es- 
sence, three hypostases; tri-hypostatic Monad of essence and consubstantial Triad of 
hypostases; Monad in Triad and Triad in Monad. 170 
How Monad and Triad, essence and the hypostases, relate to each other is carefully 
presented. Maximus makes it clear that we are dealing with a single reality. God, one 
62Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 5, Lk)eb 325,3b-4a. 
63Ep. 15, PG 91,552BC. 
64 
[IOVdg & TpLd8L K(II TPLd3 & ýLovd&. An alternative translation would be 'a Unity in Trinity and a 
Trinity in Unity'. 
65Ep. 15, PG 91,549D-552A. 
660r. dom.: 414-467, CCSG 23,51-54. 
6' Myst. 23, Soteropoulos, 216: 12 -218: 10 [= PG 91,70OC-701B]. 
680r. dom.: 439-442, CCSG 23,53. 
69Myst. 23, Soteropoulos, 216: 12-17 [= PG 91,700C]. 
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and the same, is simultaneously both Monad and Triad. In Ambiguum 67, contemplat- 
ing on number twelve and its factors, he very interestingly says that 'the divine essence 
is expressed through number three, as it is triadically praised for the sake of its tri- 
hypostatic existence. For the Monad is Triad as being complete in three complete hy- 
postases, that is to say, by mode of existence; and the Triad is truly Monad by the logos 
of its essence or being. 17 ' Neither the Monad nor the Triad has any 'ontological prior- 
ity' over the other but both are aspects of a single reality and are in balance with each 
other. God is Monad in Triad and Triad in Monad, 
not one thing and another thing-, but the same 
nor one above the other, in itself and 
nor one [existing] through the other; by itself, . nor one in the other, upon itself, 
nor one [derived] ftom the other; by virtue of itself. " 
This perhaps slightly enigmatic sequence of statements from the Mystagogia finds some 
explanation in On the Lord's Prayer. Here, too, we have a similar sequence of state- 
ments as above. In this case each statement is followed by an explanatory comment. 
The order also is slightly different: in the text here below statement four, which speaks 
of 'quality', comes first. The reason for this is probably the fact that the excerpt comes 
from a context where Maximus speaks of the theological errors in the Greek and the 
Jewish religions. And with the latter, he says, God 'only possesses word and spirit as 
qualities, without itself being Intellect, Word and Spirit. '73 For the Christian, God is 
Triad of 'essentially subsistent' Intellect, Word and Spirit, as opposed to mere quali- 
ties . 
74 He, therefore, starts off from quality and accident. 
It [mystical theology] teaches us to recognize God as Triad in Monad and Monad 
in Triad, 
not, however, as one in the other: 
for the Triad is not in the Monad as an accident is in a substance, or vice 
versa, since God is without qualities, 
nor as one thing and another thing: 
for the Monad does not differ from the Triad by otherness of nature, be- 
ing a simple and single nature-, 
nor as one being above the other: 
for the Triad is not distinguished from the Monad by inferiority of power, 
or vice versa, 
or like as something which is common and generic, considered merely 
conceptually, from the particulars subordinate to it: it is a self-existent es- 
sence par excellence and a truly self-empowered power. 
nor as one [existing] through the other: 
for that which is altogether the same and non-relative has no such medi- 
ating relationship as an effect has with its cause; 
' Myst. 23, Soteropoulos, 216: 17-19 [= PG 91,700D]. 
71 Ambig. 67, PG 91,140OD-1401A. 
72 Myst. 23, Soteropoulos, 216: 19-22 P PG 91,700D]. 
73 Or. dom.: 436-438, CCSG 23,52-53. 
' Or. dom.: 443ff., CCSG 23,53. 
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nor as one derived. fi-om the other: 
for the Triad is not derived from the Monad by production or by bringing 
forth, since it is ungenerated and self shown-forth. " 
Here Maximus is first and foremost underlining consubstantiality within the divine be- 
ing, but he is also drawing the line between the created and the uncreated, so crucial to 
his theology as a whole. Monad and Triad are both on the side of the uncreated. They 
are neither two different natures or beings in union, nor subordinate to each other, nor 
deriving one from or through the other in such a way which would introduce otherness 
of essence within the divine, or, indeed, any kind of otherness which would cause 
separation between the Monad and the Triad. 
Differences and accidents play a significant role in the context of the Porphyrian 
Tree within which Maximus often discusses the created order. Since these have no 
place in the divine, he makes it plain that Monad and Triad are not accidental qualities. 
Also the generic is something substantial in God rather than simply a conceptual idea 
realized in the subordinate individuals, as can be observed within the Porphyrian Tree. 
The corollary of Mystagogia 23 brings us to the heart of this study: 'The same ý[1s] 
both Monad and Triad, possessing union (EVWCTL3) uncompounded and without confu- 
776 
sion, and possessing distinction (6LdKPL9L3) undivided and without parts. In God 
there is observed a simultaneous union/unity and distinction which, on the one hand, 
avoids composition and confusion, and, on the other hand, division, separation and 
partition. God is, Maximus continues, 'Monad according to the logos of essence or 
being (not, however, by synthesis, conflation or confusion of any kind); Triad accord- 
ing to the logos of how it exists and subsists (nevertheless not by separation, alienation 
or any kind of division). "' 
Deviations 
What happens if there is confusion or separation? Maximus' heresiology has pre- 
cisely to do with this side of the question. Arius and Macedonius rejecting the consub- 
75 Or. dom. -. 446-4-61, CCSG 23,53-54. 
76 Alyst. 23, Soteropoulos, 216: 22-23 PG 91,700D]. 
77 Alyst. 23, Soteropoulos, 216: 23-27 PG 91,70OD-701A]. See also Ambig. 40, PG 91,1304A. 
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stantiality within the Triad break the Monad. [W]e anathematize Anus, not for pro- 
claiming the hypostatic difference in the Trinity, but for not declaring the natural un- 
ion. ' 79Here the Triad causes a split in the Monad. Sabellius, on the contrary, professes 
80 4 the Monad but regarding it as uni-personal rejects the Triad. [W]e anathematize Sa 
bellius, not for proclaiming the natural unity in the Holy Trinity, but for not declaring 
the hypostatic difference. '8' The Monad here confuses the Triad. Finally, Tntheism" 
represents a more subtle type of separation. 
The Tritheists who separate the Father from the Son, go off the deep end either 
way. For they either say that the Son is coeternal with the Father, but separate one from the other and so are forced to say that He was not bom of Him and to go off 
the deep end-that there are three Gods and three origins; or else ... [: Arianism]. 
83 
Maximus ar ( gues that 'when the Lord says: I in the Father and the Father in me, " He 
shows the inseparableness of the persons, ' and that there is in God (according to St 
Gregory) a certain wondrous undivided division and a conjunction with distinction. 
'Therefore, he concludes, both the division and the union are extraordinary. But what is 
there extraordinary, if as one man with another, so likewise the Son and the Father, is 
both united and separate and nothing more? "' 
Today 
In the modern context there has emerged a question as to whether the Greek Fa- 
thers (in particular the Cappadocians) in their Trinitarian theology are personalists or 
essentialists. It is a question to which the present chapter may have already given a par- 
tial answer. Nevertheless, I should like to refer to an article of Andi-6 de Halleux 86 de- 
Opusc. 13.1, PG 91,145A. 
Opusc. 13.4, PG 91,148B. 
Opusc. 13.1, PG 91,145A. 
Opusc. 13.5, PG 91,148B. 
Polycarp Sherwood argues that the tritheism Maximus has in view here is that of John Philoponus, a 
sixth-century Monophysite and Aristotelian commentator. See his St Maximus the Confessor. The 
Ascetic Life. The Four Centuries on Charity (ACW 2 1, New York: Newman Press, 1955), p. 255, n. 
104. 
Carit. 11.29, PG 90,993A. 
Jn. 10: 38. 
Carit. 11.29, PG 90,993AB. 
86 'Personnalisme ou essentialisine trinitaire chez les P&es cappadociens? ' (reprinted as article 6) in 
Patrologie et Oecuminisme. Recued d'itudes (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), pp. 215-268 
[= R TL 17 (1986), pp - 129-155,265-292]. 
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voted to this issue, and to present some of his main conclusions. De Halleux concen- 
trates on the Cappadocian Fathers, and on the claim by modem Eastern theologians that 
the Cappadocians have made a personalist revolution in ontology by introducing the 
distinction between hypostasis and essence. He also discusses the accusation by some 
Western theologians that these same Fathers are essentialists. Our interest lies in the 
former. 
According to de Halleux the Cappadocians did not wish to give priority to either 
the Monad or the Triad, since both possess an equal importance. 87 (The same is true of 
St Maximus. ) In that sense the Fathers were, at once, both personalists and essential- 
ists. But these notions, de Halleux argues, bear too strong modem connotations to be 
applied to the patristic era. The promotion of the subjectivihý de Vesprit into the category 
of ontology, let alone the philosophy of the intersubjecfivitiý de la personne, are very 
recent phenomena. The risk, therefore, of anachronism, when reading existentialist val- 
ues into the Fathers, is great. Subjectivity and dialogism in the modem sense were 
hardly issues in their agenda. What was at stake then, de Halleux maintains, was 'the 
paradox of distinction and union of a God considered as the Transcendent rather than 
of a God considered as the absolute Subject. ' 'The "ontological revolution", too gener- 
ously attributed to the Cappadocian Fathers, does not inaugurate personalism in the 
modem sense of the word. '88 In one sentence de Halleux captures the central themes of 
the personalist current. 
A ceux qui interpr6tent la theologie cappadocienne comme une ontologie 
existentielle et communionnelle, allergique au langage de Fessence, 11 faut 
rappeler que Basile et les deux Gregoire parlaient de l'ousie et du consubstantiel 
aussi volontiers que des hypostases et de la 'monarchie' du P6re, et que ce qu'lls 
designaient par le terme de koinonia intradivine 6tait la nature commune, et non 
des relations dialogales interpersonnelles. ' 
It is interesting to notice that what de Halleux says about the monarchia of the Fa- 
ther versus essence finds a striking parallel in Maximus. In chapter four of the Capita 
xv, he says: 'One God, [is] Father, the begetter of one Son and the source of one Spirit; 
Monad without confusion and Thad without division; Mind without beginning, the only 
Cf. 'Persomalisme', pp. 265ff, 
'Personnalisme', P. 266. 
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begetter by essence of the only Logos without beginning, and the source of the only 
everlasting Life, that is, of the Holy Spirit. "' In the immediately following chapter, he 
says: 'God [is] one, for there is one godhead, a Monad without beginning, simple, be- 
yond being, without parts and undivided. '9' In the fon-ner Maximus would appear to be 
more of a personalist and in the latter more of an essentialist. But as de Halleux empha- 
sizes, these terms are not applicable to patristic theology. 
Maximus professes the nwnarchia of the Father without being allergic to the lan- 
guage of essence. The doctrine of the Father's monarchy is in no way opposed to that 
of the one essence or, indeed, vice versa. In God there is unity 'for there is one god- 
head', the only source of which, that is the [L6v-q dpXý of which, is the Father. 'The 
Father's oýalct is the dpXý of the Son' and of the Spint. 92 Essence and person are dis- 
tinguished but not opposed to each other. The universal, the common essence, never 
stands alone, of course. As St Basil says, 'we must add the particular to the universal 
and thus confess the faith. The godhead is universal, the paternity particular, and com- 
bining these we should say: "I believe in God the Father". 03 Or as Gregory Nazianzen 
puts it: 'The godhead is one in the three, and the three are one, in whom the godhead is 
or, to speak more accurately, who are the godhead. '9' Or again St Maximus: 
Neither is the Son Father, but he is what the Father is, nor is the Spirit Son, but he 
is what the Son is; for the Son is all that the Father is, apart from unbegottenness, 
since he is begotten; and the Holy Spirit is all that the Son is, apart from 
begottenness, since he proceeds; while the unbegottenness, begottenness and 
procession do not sever the one nature and power of the inexpressible godhead 
into three unequal or equal essences or natures, but characterize the persons or 
hypostases, in which or which the one godhead (i. e. the essence and nature) is. " 
Consequently, balance between the Monad and the Triad should be kept now as in 
the time of the Cappadocians and of St Maximus. Modem anxieties must be responded 
"9 'Personnalisme', P. 266. 
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Peter Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of Godftom Origen to Athanasius (Oxford: OUP, second and 
revized edition 2000, first published in 1994), p. 174. 
' Ep. 23 6, Deferrari HI, 402. 
940r. 39.11, SC 358,172. See also Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church 
(Cambridge & London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd, 1957; original French edition 1944), pp. 52-53. 
95 Ep. 15, PG 91,549D-552A. 
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to but not at the cost of losing or misrepresenting the patristic theological legacy which 
still has a lot to offer to us today. 
4 
Trinity and Activity 
Essential Activity and the Trinity 
ANOTHER QUESTION which has occupied the minds of theologians for the last 
twenty years or so is whether the activity of God is essential or personal. ' This is 
basically a question of the way in which the union and distinction of God as Trinity is 
made manifest in his relation to us. Links between Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the 
Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor and Gregory PalamaS2 have been drawn by some 
and disowned by others. ' Palamas' theology of the divine activities (or energies) has 
been presented as 'the defeat of Trinitarian theology', ' and this has been responded to 
by advancing the idea of God's personal activ, ti CS. 5 
To discuss this issue I should like to examine the Trinitarian theology of Dionysius 
the Areopagite which, I believe, will shed some light on the problem as a whole. In his 
work On the Divine Names, Dionysius expounds the Trinitarian theology in terms of 
union and distinction of the Thearchy. His understanding of union and distinction, as 
found in chapter two of the treatise On the Divine Names, ' could be presented in a 
cross-shaped plan such as this: 
' For a comprehensive and perceptive discussion of the question in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean 
see Cbrysostomos A. Stamoules, Tkpl 
OU)TC5S. 17POUWTRKýý ý OVULKýý 6VýP'IELCS; XVJI&Aý OrTý 
u6yXpovi7 7Tcpt 'Ay(a, - Tptd6os- 7TpooAqgaTLKý UTbv 'OpO&5oýo XtZpo (Ibessalonica: T6 11(WpýTjaTOv, 
1999), pp. 13-44. See also Jacques Lison, 'L'6nergie des trois hypostases divines selon Gr6goire 
Palamas', in ScE 44/1 (1992), pp. 67-77. 
2 See, for example, Vladinidr Lossky, Mystical Theology, pp. 67-90. 
' See, for example, Stephen Gersh, 'Ideas and Energies in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite'in SP IS/ 1 
(TU 128,1984), pp. 297-300. 
4 See the article of Dorothea Wendebourg, 'From the Cappadocian Fathers to Gregory Palamas. The 
Defeat of Trinitarian Theology' in SP 17/1 (1982), pp. 194-197. 
' See Stamoules, lkpý OWTdS', pp. 29-32. 
6 D. n. 2, PTS 33,122-137. See also Jean-Claude Larchet, 'Nature et fonction de la. theologie negative 
selon Denys I'Areopagite', in MO 166 (1991/ 1), pp. 3-16; Isabel de Andia, Henosis: L'union ez Dieu 
chez Denys IArgopagite (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 29-48, and her article 'La Th6ologie trinitaire 
Denys I'Ar6opagite', in SP 32 (1997), pp. 278-301. 
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(X) TA I-IN92MENA I 
b) unions of unions I 
a) unions of 
distinctions 
d) distinctions of 
distinctions 
Starting from the horizontal bar, above it we have God in himself, the Thearchy as 
he is in his 'existence beyond being' according to which he is totally unknowable to us. 
This is called in the plural 'the unions' (1). 7 Below the horizontal cross bar we have 
God as he is in his manifestations towards the creation, and as such knowable. This is 
called, again in the plural, 'the distinctions' (II). ' 'Unions', then, are more or less 
equivalent to what we call theologia, and 'distinctions. ' to what we call the oikonomia. 
Then the vertical bar. ' On the left hand side (x) we have what is common to all the 
three divine hypostases, whether in their 'beyond beingness' or in their manifestations. 
These are called 'the things united'. These can also be taken separately as particular 
Cunions' at the two levels across the horizontal bar; as (a) 'unions of unions' and (b) 
'unions of distinctions'. Then, on the right hand side (-*. -) we have what is particular to 
each individual hypostasis: 'the things distinct'. 'o This again can be taken as the 
particular (c) 'distinctions of unions' ('The narne and fact of Father, Son and Spirit 
beyond being') and (d) 'distinctions of distinctions' (The Incamation). 
What Dionysius presents in the treatise are the names of God which are common to 
all the hypostases, that is, names which are common to the entire Thearchy. " These are 
names which the 'theologians', the biblical authors, have given to God on the basis of 
God's manifestations to them. Dionysius is, then, dealing with the unified 
manifestations of the Trinity to the creation; manifestations which he also calls 
7 D. n. 2.4, PTS 33,126-128. 
'D. n. 2.5, PTS 33,128-129. 
'D. n. 2.3, PTS 33,125: 13-19. 
" D. n. 2, PTS 33,125: 19-126: 2. 
" D. n. 2.11, PTS 33,135-137. 
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4processions', 'illuminations', 'powers', 'benevolent gifts"' and, as said above, 
4 unions of distinctions'. 
But why does he call them 'unions' of distinctions? First of all he says that 'all the 
names proper to God are always praised by the Scriptures not in particular but referring 
to the whole, entire, complete and full godhead. "' He, therefore, endeavours 
to praise the common and unified distinctions or benevolent processions of the 
whole of godhead as they are made manifest in the Scriptures by the divine 
names, it being taken for granted that every good-working divine name, upon whichever of the three thearchic hypostases it lies, applies to the whole of the thearchic wholeness without discrimination. 14 
They are called 'unions' because they are something the hypostases have in common, 
something which unites them. The names are not names which have nothing to do with 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. On the contrary, they are names made known through 
each and all of them. Nevertheless, they are not names in particular of any of the three. 
The Father, as well as the Son and the Holy Spirit, all three, are Being, Good, Lord, 
Life, and so on. These names are therefore common to all the three, that is to say, they 
are universal names of the godhead. Rorem and Lamoreaux make a point in this 
direction in their discussion on Dionysius' commentator. 
When Dionysius named God with the general term 'divinity', John [of 
Scythopolis] drew on considerable patristic precedent in noting that this was a 
reference to the Trinity: 'He customarily calls the revered Trinity the "entire" 
divinity. "' ... The Areopagite's most characteristic term for God 'Thearchy', is also an orthodox synonym for the Trinity. " 
Since the names are universal, do they then reveal the essence of God to us? After 
all, as we have seen above, universal and essential go hand in hand. Here we come to 
the point where we need to distinguish between the unknowable essence of God and his 
knowable, yet essential, manifestations. What do the Fathers call this aspect of God? 
We have already found a host of terms in Dionysius for it above, 'distinctions' being 
11 'Illuminations' (D. n. 1.2, PTS 33,110: 13); 'processions' (D. n. 1.4, PTS 33,112: 9); 'benevolent 
gifts' (D. n. 2.3, PTS 33,125: 18); 'manifestations' (D. n. 2.4, PTS 33,126: 11); 'participafions' (D. n. 
2.7, PTS 33,131: 5); and'powers'(D. n. 2.7, PTS 33,131: 9). 
13 D. n. 2.1, P`TS 33,122: 6-8. 
14 D. n. 2.11, IYTS 33,137: 8-13. 
" Schol., PG 4,209A. 
16 Paul Rorem. andJohn C. Lamoreaux, John of Scythopolis andthe Dionysian Corpus. Annotating the 
Areopagite (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 69. 
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only one of them. Gregory of Nyssa 
17 
and Basil of Caesarea" call it God's activities 
(ýVep'YELM). A less known fifth-century Alexandrian Presbyter, Ammonius, does the 
same. 19 Also Cyril of Alexandria speaks of the ýV6P'YELCIL of the Holy Spirit. " 
M&XIMUS21 follows St Cyril but speaks also of 'the works which God did not begin to 
do' . 
22 Finally, Gregory Palamas-In a treatise entitled On the number of ways there is 
divine union and distinction in which he discusses Dionysius' D. n. 2-identifies 
Dionysius' processions, manifestations, and so on, with the ýVýP'YELCR. 
23 He, in fact, 
after quoting D. n. 2.5 and 2.7 argues against Barlaam. that it is the uncreated God 
himself who is both united and distinguished, and therefore the distinctions, that is, the 
activi des must be uncreated. 
Thus spoke the great Dionysius, and adding to what was said above he says 'thus 
Nve in our minds strive after both uniting and di IIIi ine, even as the the divi divine things themselves are both united and distiguished. ' But Barlaam and Akindynos do not say so. They do not say that the divine things are united and 
distinguished in a way the God-bearing theologians declare. Instead, just as Anus, 
Eunomius and Macedonius who on account of the distinction of hypostases 
severed God into uncreated and created, so also now these on account of the 
distinction according to the common processions split God into created and 
uncreated. ' 
If we now draw together some of these threads, we shall have God who remaining 
unknowable in his inner-most essence makes himself known through his manifestations 
or activities common to all the three hypostases: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Maximus 
expresses this same principle at the very end of one of the 'Monad and Triad' texts we 
have quoted earlier on. 
[O]ne and sole godhead, undivided and without confusion, simple, undiminished 
and unchangeable, completely the same, one thing and the other in different ways, 
... , being all Monad according to the essence and the same 25 
being all Triad in 
hypostases, uniformly shining forth one ray of threefold light. 
The Triad in Monad and Monad in Tnad communicates itself to us by 'uniformly 
shining forth one ray of threefold light. ' It is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit by 
'7 See Trin., GNO 3, part 1,14- 15; Tres dii, GNO 3, paft 1,52-53. 
'8 Ep. 234, Deferrari 111,370-376. 
'9 Fragmenta in Joannem 4.13 -14, PG 85,142 1 AB. 
' In Isaiah 2A, PG 70,316A. 
21 Qu. Thal. 29, CCS G 7,21 L 
22 Cap. theol. 1.48, PG 90,1 1OOC-1 101A. 
" See Syggr., Mantzarides, 69ff. 
24Syggr., Mantmides, 70: 11-20. 
25 Myst. 23, Soteropoulos, 218: 5-10 [= PG 91,701AB]. 
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nature shining forth a uniform essential ray of light. Consequently, the activity of God 
is-and this will become even clearer when we come to Christology- essential. It is a 
natural property common to Father, Son and Holy Spirit because it is natural or 
essential both to the Father as well as to the Son and to the Holy Spirit to be active. In 
Maximus much of God's activity refers to creation, providence and Judgement, and in 
that context he says to the point that 'it is common both to the Father and to the Son and 
to the Holy Spirit to create as well as to judge and wisely to provide for the creatures. 726 
But does Maximus actually call It ýVýP'YEM in this context? In Ambiguum 67, he 
explicitly does SO. 
27 
The effective activity is disclosed by the number six, because the effective activity 
[of God] is the only perfect activity, activity which forms and guards perfect 
beings as they are in accordance with their logoi, and also because the number six rn 
is the onýý' perfect and complete number between one and ten; ' it is made up of 
its parts, I and includes both universal and uneven numbers, that is to say, even and 
odd numbers. For uneven are those things which move together with the 
extremities according to their ever-moving rest. ... While the extremities and the 
middle are uneven ... the divine activity creates and includes them 
both. And it is 
this activity, I think, in which the most wise Moses was mystically initiated and 
which he benevolently indicated to the rest of men when he wrote that God 
created the universe in six days. 30 
In various other contexts, such as Christology and ecclesiology, the term appears 
frequently. He says, for example, that the Prophet Isaiah 'calls the activities of the one 
and the same Holy Spirit "spirits", ' and that the Apostle Paul 'calls the different 
activities of this same one Holy Spirit different gifts of grace. "' He also says that 
God's 'eternal power and divine majesty is the providence which preserves beings and 
the activity which in accordance with providence deifies the objects of providence. "' 
At this point, we shall make a brief digression to discuss the links between 
Dionysius and Gregory Palamas. In his article 'Ideas and Energies in Pseudo- 
' Qu. Thal. 28: 88-90, CCSG 7,207. 
27See also the discussion on the divine energies in Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, pp. 174- 
238. 
'A 'perfect number' in Greek arithmetic is a number which is the sum of its factors. 
' The constituents of 6 are, of course, 1,2 and 3. 
' Ambig. 67, PG 91,1401AB. 
31 QU. Thal. 29: 5-10,12-13, CCSG 7,211. Cf. I Cor. 12: 4. See also Qu. dub. 188 and 189, CCSG 
10,1288- 129. 
32 Qu. Thal. 13: 15-17, CCSG 7,95. 
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Dionysius the Areopagite', " Stephen Gersh challenges Vladimir Lossky for drawing 
the kind of connections I have presented above. Gersh bases his discussion on an 
epoch-making study of Eugenio Corsini on the Neoplatonic commentaries on the 
Pannenides and Dionysius the Areopagite. Gersh argues, following Corsini, " that 
Dionysius' presentation of the unions and distinctions can only be understood against 
the Neoplatonic background where they refer to the first (negative) and the second 
(affirmative) hypotheses of the Parmenides respectively. Dionysius, he says again 
drawing on Corsini, 'engineers a complete transformation by applying both hypotheses 
(negative and affirmative) to the Christian God"' and by so doing undercuts the 
Procline and lamblichian doctrine of mediating henads. 36 On this basis Gersh argues 
against Lossky in the following way. 
Lossky's interpretation of Gregory Palamas is not in itself controversial, but he 
goes on to argue that the same distinction is found in earlier theologians and 
especially in Ps. -Dionysius. Referring to the second chapter of the DN, he 
interprets the so-called 'unions' and 'distinctions' of the Thearchy, a dichotomy 
upon which the writer ostensibly constructs the - 
theory of the divine attributes, as 
representing the contrasting elements within the Palamite doctrine, and argues that 
the same notions also underlie much of the speculation of Ps. -Dionysius' followers and especially St Maximus the Confessor. " 
Corsini's argument, taken up by Gersh, is convincing from a philosophical angle, 
and in that respect Gersh, no doubt, is right. But he is not right in blaming Lossky for 
drawing a link between Palamas and Dionysius. Indeed, Palamas himself is quite 
explicit that Dionysius (alongside MaxiMUS)38 is one of his main authorities, as also the 
text Cited above shows. Palamas extensively both quotes and comments on the second 
chapter of the On the Divine Names, clearly basing his argument on its principle of 
33 In SP 15/1 (IFU 128,1984), pp. 297-300. 
34 See his Il trattato 'De divinis nominibus' dello pseudo-Dionigi ei commenti neoplatonici al 
Pannenide (Torino: G. Giappicelli, 1962). 
Gersh, 'Ideas and Energies', p. 298. 
See Endre von Ivinka, 'La signification historique du "Corpus areopageticum"' in RevSR 36 (1949), 
pp. 23-24. 
37 'Ideas and Energies', p. 297. Gersh finds support in Endre von lvdnka ('I-a Signification', pp. 22-24), 
Polycarp Sherwood (The EarlierAmbigua, p. 179) and Eugenio Corsini (Il trattato). For the other 
party see Vladimir Lossky, 'La Notion des "Analogies" chez Denys le Pseudo-Ardopagite', in AHDL 5 
(193 1), pp. 279-309; and his Mystical Theology, pp. 69ff. Also Alexander Golitzin, Et Introibo Ad 
Altare Dei. The Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with Special Reference to Its Predecessors in the 
Eastern Christian Tradition (Analecta Vlatadon 59, Thessalonica: IICLTPLCLPXLKbv "18PI)VCL TICLTEPLK(ZV 
MEXET(ZU, 1994), p. 45. 
313 See, for example, Triads 111.2.7 and 9, Meyendorff, 655-657,659-66 1. 
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union and distinction. This is the way in which Palamas himself read Dionysius, and it 
is a plausible reading, to say the least. Lossky in turn simply reads Palamas as it stands. 
What Gersh seems to be saying is that one cannot understand Dionysius correctly 
in any other way except reading him against the Neoplatonic Parmenidian 
commentaries. This, in actual fact, means that, in Gersh's view, one cannot understand 
Dionysius correctly without knowing Corsini's argument, because Corsini is the first 
person ever to suggest this reading. Consequently, in this light nobody before the 
twentieth century has understood Dionysius. Corsini's study is, of course, most 
valuable, and if one sees Dionysius on a trajectory orientated with the Neoplatonic 
thinking Corsim is entirely right. But that can hardly be the whole story. 
There is no trace of Dionysius in the Neoplatonic circles, as far as we know, 
whereas his influence on Christian authors from Maximus and Enugena onwards is 
immense. Surely, this cannot be just a crude mistake and surely we cannot simply 
ignore the way in which Dionysius was read throughout the centuries, albeit in a variety 
of interpretations. 
Corsini's point becomes, in fact, much more acute when Dionysius is read as a 
Christian apologist. One way of viewing him could be the following. " Dionysius was a 
Christian '40 a monk or (even) a bishop, who became familiar with the fifth-century 
Athenian Neoplatortism of Proclus and maybe of Damasclus (early 6th c. ), probably 
through reading their works rather than through personal contact. He was fascinated by 
these texts but at the same time he was very conscious of the supremacy of the Christian 
truth. He attempted, successfully, to assume the figure of an educated Athenian convert 
of the first century (Dionysius the Areopagite), to write in the way such a man would 
' Of course, this interpretation is only one way of seeing the Dionysian corpus which still remains 
coveredin a veil of mystery. For a summary of theories in relation to the identity of Dionysius see 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 2: 'Studies in 
Theological Style: Clerical Style' (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd, 1984, original German ed. 1962, 
19692), pp. 145-147. See also Paul Rorern and J. C. Lamoreaux, 'John of Scythopolis on Apollinarian 
Christology and the Pseudo-Areopagite's True Identity', in Church History, 62/4 (1993) pp. 469-482 
and Polycarp Sherwood, 'Sergius of Reshaina and the Syriac Versions of the Pseudo-Denis', in SE, 4 
(1952), pp. 174-184. 
40 For this see, for example, Dionysius' account of the burial service in the E. h. 7.3 -9, PTS 36,122- 
130. No Platonist would regarda deadcorpse as something sacredand place it inside the temple for the 
time of the burial rite. 
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have written, that is in 'Platonic' Greek-for leaming in Athens was much associated 
with the fame of Plato4' and the Academy- and to give a picture of the truth which was 
fundamentally Christian (based on the Scriptures and the liturgy). " Within this truth he 
also claimed the riches of the Greek wisdom. This kind of thinking was not unknown 
among Christian apologists. For example, Justin Martyr maintained that the Greek 
philosophers were disciples of Moses and that in Christ, who was the Logos himself, 
the Christians possessed the fullness of the logos of which the wise of the olden days 
only had had a share. " The sixth century commentator of the Corpus Dionysiacum, 
John of Scythopolis, gives us a piece of evidence of such a reading when he says that 
many pagan philosophers and in particular Proclus, made use of Dionysius' texts and 
even quoted them word for word, rather than vice versa. 44 If one wants to estimate the 
success of Dionysius' 'linguistic strategy' in the East, all one needs to do is to consider 
Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene and Gregory Palamas. And if we consider 
Corsim's point in this light, it actually becomes very strong indeed: the apologist 
Dionysius shows to the Platonists in their language why they are wrong and why the 
Christians are right. 
Now, let me go back to Palamas' reading of Dionysius. If we consider Dionysius 
as a Christian writer who drew on earlier Christian writers and who was read by later 
Christian authors in this light, we can place him on a trajectory extending from Gregory 
of Nyssa to Gregory Palamas. (The latter would of course have seen Dionysius at the 
far end of the trajectory, rather than in the centre as we do. ) Gregory of Nyssa, in his 
Trinitarian theology, identifies the common with the substance or the nature (11 (poLS) 
but in addition to this he also identifies it with the activities to which he connects all the 
names and attributes common to the three hypostases. The attributes are seen in all the 
hypostases, 'in so much as the Son abides wholly in the Father, and in turn has the 
See Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989), pp. 10- 11. 
See Paul Rorem, Biblical andLiturgical Symbols within the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis (Toronto: 
PIMS, 1984). 
43 See John Behr, The Way to Nicaea . The Formation of Christian Theology, vol. 1 (Crestwood, New 
York: SVSP, 2001), pp. 109-109. 
44Schol., PG 4,21D. 
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Father wholly in Himself'. " In a treatise on the Holy Trinity Ad Eustathium, he clearly 
states that from the community of names, such as 'godhead', follows the identity of 
activities which in turn indicates the oneness of nature. 46 And in another treatise, he 
maintains that, because the divine nature is infinite, indeterminate and 
incomprehensible, it cannot be defined by any name, but is above them. Therefore, 
since 'godhead' is a name, it obviously does not indicate that which is beyond all name, 
that is, the nature, but something which can be named, that is, the acti Vlty. 47 
From this it is not very far to arrive at Dionysius' 'unions of distinctions' which 
are the manifestations through which the God unknowable in his beyond beingness is 
made known, and on account of which he is named. And from. there it is not a long way 
to Palamas. If, then, Palamas read Dionysius, and a number of other authorities, on a 
theological trajectory of this kind and in a way which does justice to Dionysius' 
intentions-a reading which Lossky recognized-I find it difficult to see what makes 
Palamas' theology so very innovative and problematic, and what makes its 
interpretation by Lossky, as drawing on Dionysius and highlighting the theological 
trajectory, fundamentally wrong. 
But let us return to our question as to whether the activity of God is essential or 
personal. The modem problematic puts the question as follows. If the activities are 
48 
essential, are they then not impersonal, and does that not mean that the Trinitarian 
persons are totally dismissed? Are we not saved and sanctified by the Holy Spint49 
rather than by some kind of impersonal uncreated 'radiation'? 
Hopefully I have managed by now to make it clear that 'personal' in the patristic 
sense is not to be contrasted with impersonal but with universal. And 'universal' is 
something which is shared by the sum of the particulars, being in no way opposed to 
the particulars. In God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each and all, are endowed with 
Ps-Basil, Ep. 38, Deferraii 1,227. 
Cf. Trin., GNO 3, part 1,14. 
Cf. Tres &i, GNO 3, part 1,52-53. 
See Stamoules, TTEpi (PWT6S*, p. 29. 
See Wendebourg, 'From the Cappadociaia,, p. 196. 
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the natural capacity to act, and to act in a way which has a certain effect whether a 
creative, providential or deifying effect. It is a commonplace in both the Greek and the 
Latin Fathers, in Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria and Ambrose for example, " to 
argue for the consubstantial ity of the hypostases from the unity and singleness of their 
activity. The activity is, as we have already said, essential. 
Does this then mean that God's activity has nothing to do with the persons? Far 
from it, since the persons are instances of an active essence. The point is that activity is 
constitutivc of essence and not of person. That is to say that activity is not a 
characteristic which individuates a particular from another particular, but a characteristic 
N,,,, hich differentiates one nature or essence from another. One example of this is the 
creative activity of God. The Father creates, not because he is Father, but because he is 
God, and the same is true of the Son and the Holy Spirit, too. 
Is there, in that case, no differentiation between the persons in this respect? To 
elucidate that question Maximus has an interesting comment to make in Opusculum 10. 
He accuses Theodore of Pharan, the father of monenergism, of breaking the rules 
concerning person and essence 'in calling the activity hypostatic' . 
51 
1 read the book of Theodore of Pharan on essence and nature, hypostasis and 
person, and the rest of the chapters; and as an introduction it is perhaps not 
altogether useless. But in the chapter on person and hypostasis, rather than following the rules concerning them, he seems to be following himself, as he calls 
the activity hypostatic. 
And it is in this that he has darkened the reason, namely, in giving to the person 
qua person the activity which characterizes nature, and not the mode 
(Tp6Trog) of 
'how' and the 'what kind of mode' of its fulfilment, according to which is made 
known the difference as to whether those who act and their actions are according 
to nature or contrary to nature. For each one of us acts firstly as being 
something-that is, as a human being-, not as being someone. As someone, as 
Peter or Paul for instance, one forms the mode of activity(Tp6lTOS Tý3 6VEP'YE(CL3) ... 
Consequently, the difference in person is made known through the manner 
(Tp6lTOý) in the action, whereas the unchangeability of the natural activity is made 
known through the logos. For any one person is not more active or rational than 
another but we all possess the same logos and its respective natural activity. " 
Consequently, it is the mode, the tropos, which indicates the individual differences 
in the actions of different persons, whereas the logos always remains undifferentiated 
as an ingredient of nature. The distinction between the universal logos and the particular 
See Studer, Trinity andIncamation, P. 147; and Doctrinapatrum 12.1-18, Diekamp, pp. 73-76. 
Opusc. 10, PG 91,136D. See also Disp. Biz., CCSG 39,123-125. 
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tropos as expressing unity and difference respectively is evident. The Cappadocian 
formulation finds here a new level in Maximus' theology of the activity. 
If we now, in conclusion, applied Theodore's terin 'hypostatic activity' to the 
Trinity, what we would have is a God with three activities and, thereby, three essences; 
that is, we would have struightforward Tritheism. But as Maximus, Interpreting the 
phrase My Father works still, and I work 53 as God's deifying activity through 
providence, says: 
This he does until such time as he unites the self-willed urge of the particular parts 
to the more generic natural logos of rational substance through their movement 
towards well-being,. ... In this way he demonstrates as effective the grace that deifies all. And it is on account of this grace that God the Word become man says My Father works still, and I work: the Father approving, the Son effecting and the 
Holy Spirit completing substantially the approval of the Father and the effecting 
of the Son, so that the God-in-Trinity may be one through all and in all-God 
entire being observed proportionally in each and in all of those made worthy by 
grace. 
Energeia: Activity or Actuality? 
Above we referred to some links between Dionysius and Gregory Palamas. Here I 
would like to address an opinion of Endre von Ivdnka concerning St Maximus and 
Palamas. In an article entitled 'Le fondement patristique de la doctrine palamite"5 as 
well as in his book Plato Christianus, " von lvdnka argues that St Maximus not only 
does not support Palamas' doctrine of distinction between essence and activity (or 
energy) but that he explicitly denies it. More precisely, in Plato Christianus, after 
discussing the question in the Cappadocian Fathers and Dionysius, von lvdnka writes: 
'It is Maximus the Confessor above all who rejects with all ngour and without any 
ambiguity the application of the concepts of dynamis and energeia in a proper and 
objective sense-albeit that he makes use of it in several places in a metaphorical 
Opusc. 10, PG 91,136C-137A. 
Jn. 5: 17. 
Qu. Thal. 2: 14-16,21-29, CCSG 7,51. 
55 In IXe congrýs des itudes Byzantines 1953, part 2, (1956), pp. 127-132. 
16PIato Christianus. La riception critique du platonisme chez les Nres de 1'1ýglise (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1990; original German edition 1964). 
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sense. 57 He then refers to St Maximus' Centuries on Theology and the Incarnate 
Dispensation 1.3 and 4 to draw the conclusion that'the legitimacy of the doctrine of the 
divine uncreated activities, taken in the sense of a metaphysical proposition, is therefore 
by no means admitted but, on the contrary, strongly contested by the Fathers. "' 
Let us first of all see what the two chapters referred to by von I vanka say. 
Cap. theol. 1.3 
Every being, as including in itself its own definition, is by nature the beginning of 
the movement by potentiality considered in it. Every natural movement towards 
actuality, understood as posterior to being and anterior to actuality, is the middle, 
since it is naturally embraced in the middle by them both; and every actuality, 
naturally limited by its logos, is the end of the essential movement anterior to it 
perceived by the mind. '9 
Cap. theol. 1.4 
God is not a being either in the general or in any particular sense of the word, 
hence he is not a beginning. Nor is he potentiality either in the general or in any 
specific sense, hence he is not a middle. Nor is he actuality either in the general or 
any particular sense, hence he is not an end of the essential movement by 
potentiality understood as being anterior to it. But he is the author of being and 
an entity beyond being; he is the author of potentiality and the establishment 
beyond potentiality; and he is the unending habit efficacious of actuality. In brief, 
he is the author of all being, potentiality and actuality; he is the author of every 
beginning, middle and end. " 
Here Maximus is arguing that the two triads, being -potentiality -actuality (oýcr[a- 
6ýVCL[LL3 - ýV6P-YELG), 
` and beginning - middle- end (dpXý-ýLEciftfl3-T6Xo3) are 
categories which apply to created beings only and in no way to God. They present a 
certain pattern of ontological change in view of fulfilment. Movement and change 
characterize the creation alone. Furthermore, 'being' in this context has the Dionysian 
sense of that which is not 'beyond being', that is to say, 'being' is 'created being', 
something which God as uncreated transcends. In Centuries on Theology and the 
Incarnate Dispensation 1.2, Maximus says that'as far as we can know, God in himself 
is neither a beginning, nor a middle, nor an end, nor anything whatsoever which is 
5'7PIato Christianus, p. 143: 'Mais c'est surtout Maxime le Confesseur qui refuse en toute rigueur et 
sans aucme ambigtfftd I'application A Dieu des concepts de dynamis et denergeia en un sens propre et 
objectif -m6me s'il s'en sert en de nombreux endroits de faqon metaphorique. ' Italics his. 
'18 Te fondement', p. 129: Ta 16gitimit6 de la doctrine des dnergies divines incr6ds, prise dans le sens 
d'un Jnonc-ý nidtaphysique, n'est donc, nullement admise, mai s au contraire fortement conteste6 par les 
P&es. ' Italics his. 
59 Cap. theol. 1.3, PG 90,1084AB. 
60 Cap. theol. 1.4, PG 90,108413C. 
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considered naturally in those that come after him; for he is invisible, unmoving and 
infinite, since he is infinitely beyond every being, potentiality and actuality. ' 
Now the Greek for the triad 'being- potentiali ty- actuality' is 01)Cr[C(-6ýVCtkL3- 
)1 62 EVEP'YELCL. is von Ivdnka has taken, In it seems, the sense of the t 'ad essence- 
power-activity, and has then drawn the conclusion that Maximus denies the 
application of the essence -activity distinction to God. 63 He emphasizes that this is so 
in the metaphysical sense of the word. What von Ivanka means by the 'metaphysical 
sense' is not clear, but it is obvious that what Maximus denies here is any process of 
actualization ývith respect to God. God is, as Maximus says, 'infinitely beyond' all such 
categories. He is, in terms of Thomas Aquinas, actus purus . 
64 There is no distance 
between his 'being' and the 'actualization' of his being; he is pure actuality in his very 
being. Now this is all very well. But the problem is that the essence-activity distinction 
that Palamas promotes has nothing to do with the process of actualization, apart from 
the homonymous Greek words. One is bound to say once more that 'the moral of that is 
"take care of the sense, and the sounds will look after themselves. "' The 'being- 
potentiality- actuality' distinction and the 'essence- activity' distinction are two quite 
different things. And in Late Antiquity, this was not an idea preserved for theologians 
only, it was in the air in the philosophical discussions more widely. Samuel Sambursky 
has pointed out that during this period '[i]n this more technical meaning of activity, 
function, force or power, energeia and dynamis are often almost interchangeable, 
whereas they remain opposite concepts as the philosophical terms of actuality and 
potentiality. 96 -' Admittedly, the difference between the two types of distinction is not 
For a discussion on this triad see Sherwood, The EarlierAmbig ua, pp. 10 1- 123. 
Combefis' Latin version in PG 90,1083A-C translates the triad as substantia-potentia-operatio. 
63 In Ambig. 23, Maximus clearly applies the triad oýcr[a -HVaýag -ýv6p-yEW to God: 'the perfect Triad 
in perfect Monad, that is, one essence and divinity and power and energy in three hypostases' (PG 9 1, 
1261A). 
64 In Summa contragentiles 1,28.264, Aquinas says: 'Anything is perfect in so far as it is actualized 
[and] imperfect in so far as it is in a state of potentiality, lacking actuality. Therefore, that which is in 
no way in a state of potentiality but is pure actuality must be most perfect. But that is what God is. 
Therefore, he is most perfect. ' Quoted in Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism. Aquinas's 
Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 132. 
65 The Physical World of Late Antiquity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), ch. IV. 3 
'Actuality and action', pp. 110-117. 
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always that conspicuous owing to the fact that they are expressed in homonymous 
Greek words, and even some overlap may be observed. " 
To clarify this issue it will prove helpful to consider Mystagogia 5, where 
Maximus makes use of both distinctions in one and the same argument. Here he speaks 
of the human soul as possessing two aspects: the mind (vob3), which is contemplative 
and static, and the reason (X6-yo3), which is practical and active. The soul, in both of its 
aspects, progressively develops and through various stages reaches its fulfilment in 
God. To describe this 'process of becoming', as one might call it, Maximus makes use 
of the first triad. Or to be more precise, he adds 'habit 167 to it so that the triad becomes a 
tetrad: being- potentiality -habit- actuality. On top of this there is still one more step 
which represents the soul's 'leap' to God as the Truth and the Good. Here is what 
Maximus says: 
The contemplative aspect the Old Man called 'mind' and the active he called 
reason, ... He used to say that to the soul belong, through its intelligent mind, 
wisdom, contemplation, knowledge, and enduring knowledge, all leading to the 
truth. Through its rational reason belong reasoning, prudence, action, virtue, and 
faith, all leading to the good. " 
How these different stages are related to the tetrad is explained in the following. Here 
with regard to the mind. 
The mind, he used to say, arrives at contemplation when it moves through wisdom, 
through contemplation it arrives at knowledge, and through knowledge at 
enduring knowledge, and through enduring knowledge at the truth. It is here that 
the mind finds the limit of its movement, for in it are circumscribed being, 69 
potentiality, habit and actuality 
(OýULCL- UVUVLý; 
- E'tL3- 
6)ýPýYELCt) 
. 
Now he used to say that wisdom is the potentiality (UVa[LL3) of the mind ... and 
contemplation is its habit (ýýL3), knowledge its actuality 
(ýV6P-YELa) 
and enduring 
knowledge is its perpetual and unceasing movement towards the knowable beyond 
knowledge, the end of which is the unerring knowable, the Truth. 70 
What we have here is a fine piece of Maximian teleology: there is movement from being 
through potentiality, habit and actuality to deification. This falls in with the same 
category as the Centuries on Theology and the Incarnate Dispensation quoted above. " 
See Sherwood, The EarlierAmbigua, pp. 122-123. 
Sherwood argues that this addition goes back to John of Scythopolis (The EarlierAmbigua, p. 105). 
68Myst. 5, Soteropoulos, 166: 10-11,14-18 [= PG 91,673C]. 
69MYst. 5, Soteropoulos, 170: 5-10 [= PG 91,676CD]. 
'70 Myst. 5, Soteropoulos, 170: 10-15 [= PG 91,676D-677A]. 
71 See also Ambig. 15,1217D- 1220A where Maximus identifies6Vep-YELct andUTCECTL3. 
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Then there is the second distinction. This applies to the two aspects of soul, the 
static and the active. 
The Truth and the Good, he used to say, signify God. When he is to be intimated from his essence it is done by the Truth-for truth is something simple, unique, 
one, identical, invisible ... -, when 
he is to be intimated from his activity (6vepyaa) it is done by the Good; for the Good is beneficent, provident and protective of 
everything that comes from It. 72 
The Truth and the Good sigrufy God as he is according to his essence and activity 
respectively, that is, as he is according to his static and his active aspects. The soul that 
desires to become like God, to be deified, is therefore to imitate him in both of these 
aspects. 
The pair which signifies God is Truth and Goodness. When the soul is moved by 
them to make progress it becomes united to the God of all in imitating what is 
immutable and beneficent in his essence (oýaia) and activity (bepaa) by means of 
its steadfastness in the good and its unalterable habit of choice. ' 
For reason is the activity and manifestation of the mind, related as effect to cause, 
and prudence is the activity and manifestation of wisdom, and action of 
contemplation, virtue of knowledge and faith of enduring knowledge ... 
' 
The conclusion we can draw from this is that Maximus clearly makes use of two 
different distinctions, both of which include the terms ovaLa andEV6PYELCt. In the first 
one, O'b9f Ct - 6ýV%LL3 - (RL3) - &6P'YELCL, applicable to created beings only, the terms 
are to be taken in the more Aristotelian sense of being, potentiality, (habit) and actuality. 
In the second distinction, which is also the one elaborated by St Gregory Palamas, 
oýafa and ýV6P-YELa should be taken as essence and activity (operation, energy). 
Consequently, von lvdnka's argument, that there can be found no support in the 
Fathers for this distinction and that it is Maximus who explicitly denies it, is not only 
entirely without foundation, but proves also a test case of a serious misinterpretation 
turning against itself. 
72 Myst. 5, Soteropoulos, 166: 13-23 [= PG 91,673CD]. 
73 Allyst. 5, Soteropoulos, 168: 3-7 [= PG 91,676A]. 
74 Myst. 5, Soteropoulos, 174: 12-15 [= PG 91,677BC]. 
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Knowing the Trinity 
SO FAR we have been discussing issues which are related to theological formulations 
and ideas. The bulk of Maximus' work, however, is concerned with spiritual life and 
the knowledge of God, and no attempt to describe his Trinitarian theology without 
some reference at least to this side of the matter would be complete. In this chapter, we 
shall, therefore, develop themes with spiritual interest emerging from Trinitarian texts. 
Moving from Monad to Triad 
Our first theme has to do with important epistemological insights that Maximus de- 
velops in his exegesis of two difficult passages of St Gregory Nazianzen. ' In these pas- 
sages Gregory appears to be saying that there is movement involved in the eternal mode 
of existence of the Trinity, something which would be entirely incongruous with a the- 
ology which regards movement as a central feature of what it is to be created. We shall 
begin with Gregory's texts. 
Oration 29.2 
For this reason the Monad having from the beginning moved into the dyad 
stopped in the Triad. 2 
Oration 23.8 
[I honour] a perfect Thad out of three perfect [bypostases]; the Monad has 
moved on account of richness, dyad has been transcended on account of matter 
and form (out of which also bodies are made), and the Thad has been defined on 
account of its perfection; for the first transcends the composition of dyad, ... 
' 
Clearly, the texts refer to the Trinity in itself, and clearly 'movement' has a part to play 
here. But the question is: what is that part? We have already seen that 'movement' in 
I Maximus discusses these passages in four texts: Ambig. I (CCSG 48,6-7), Ambig. 23 (PG 91, 
1257C-1261A), Qu. dub. 105 (CCSG 10,79-80) andEp. sec. Th. (CCSG 48,40-41). 1 mainly follow 
the sequence of Ambig. 23. For a discussion see Andrew Louth, 'St Gregory the Theologian and St 
Maximus the Confessor: The Shaping of Tradition', in The Making and Remaking of Christian Doc- 
trine. EssaYs in Honour of Maurice Wiles, edited by S. Coakley and D. A. Pailin (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), PI). 117-130. 
2 Or. 29.2: 13-14, SC 250,180ý 
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Maximus' understanding belongs exclusively to the realm of the created. 'Everything 
that by nature is moving, ' he says, 'necessarily moves for the reason of a cause; and 
everything that moves for the reason of a cause, necessarily also exists because of a 
cause.... " It is, therefore, puzzling to notice that Gregory, who is the 'mouthpiece of 
Christ', should attribute movement to the godhead. Maximus takes great care to inter- 
pret Gregory with due attention. 
It is worth remarking at this point that Maximus, although sometimes seemingly 
drifting away from Gregory's original ideas, reads Gregory in a wider context, a con- 
text which is Gregory's work as a whole. In Ambiguum 40, after quoting several pas- 
sages from different orations of the Nazianzen, he concludes: 'Thus the teacher 
[Gregor-v] himself has become an interpreter of himself to those who do not read his 
divinely inspired words in an improper way. " This by no means implies that one can- 
not place Gregory in another wider context. In that context, Maximus would have in- 
cluded Dionysius whose work forms a part in his own interpretation process. This is 
particularly interesting when we bear in mind that, for Maximus, Dionysius was a first- 
century writer, whereas in actual fact being a much later figure Dionysius himself was 
influenced by Gregory, as we know today. Why Gregory requires interpretation is be- 
cause his flowery rhetoric is, as it were, full of tempting, yet thorny, roses which, if 
taken individually, may cause real trouble- Ongenism being a classic example (cf. 
6 Ambig. 7). Maximus, who possesses a thorough knowledge of Gregory's work, can 
see the whole of the rose garden and is not shaken by his apparent discrepancies or 
rhetorical ploys. In this way he is in the position to interpret Gregory as a whole, faith- 
fully yet dynamically. 
But, let us now turn to the question itself. Maximus first of all makes it clear that 
movement has no place in the godhead as such: 'If what is without cause is certainly 
without movement, then the divine is without movement, as having no cause of being at 
3 Or. 23.8: 8-13, SC 270,298. 
4 Ambig. 23, PG 91,1257C. 
I Ambig. 40, PG 91,1304C. 
6 Ambig. 7, PG 91,1068Dff. 
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all, but being rather the cause of all beings. 97 He then suggests three different ways in 
which movement can be taken in relation to God. The godhead is said to move, he 
says, either: 
1. 'as the cause of our movement towards knowing it; ' or 
'on our account who move towards it'; 8 or 
3. on account of his gradual revelation as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
Speaking of God as the cause of movement Maximus first elaborates Dionysius' 
ide-a of God as Desire and Love. In Ambiguum 23, he says: 'As Desire and Love the 
Divine moves (KLVCLTCtL); as Desired and Loved he moves (KLVCL )9 towards himself all 
those who are capable of desire and love. "' How God does this is that 'he moves 
(KLVE-LTCIL)as installing an inward relation of desire and love in those who are receptive 
of them; and he moves (KLVE-L) as attracting by nature the desire of those who move to- 
wards him. ' In short: 'He moves and is moved as thirsting to be thirsted, and as desir- 
ing to be desired, and as loving to be loved. "' 
What is significant here is that it is God himself who first installs an inward dispo- 
sition in us. He, as it were, creeps into our being to make us move towards knowing 
him. Yet, it is we who have to make the move. We move in relation to God rather than 
God in relation to us. We move as we deepen our knowledge in God; and yet God 
makes this movement possible. He first illumines us of the fact that he exists. 
(Maximus maintains that 'to think of God without illumination is an impossibility. ')" 
'The godhead moved itself in us, ' Maximus says, 'so that we might know that there is a 
certain cause of all. "' Once we have become aware of the fact that God is, he then 
helps us to move on to find out how he subsists. The 'epistemological motion' is from 
that to how, from logos to tropos. For this move God gives us 'devout starting- 
7 Ambig. 23, PG 91,1260A. 
Qu. dub. 105: 15-17, CCSG 10,79. 
Note that the first form of the verb 'moves' (KLvcL-raL) is intransitive and middle, and the second 
(KwýL) is transitive and active. 
" Ambig. 23, PG 91,1260C. 
" Ambig. 23, PG 91,1260C. 
12 Ambig. 23, PG 91,126OD-t261A. 
11 Qu. dub. 105: 18-19, CCSG 10,79. 
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points' 14 which we may discover through natural contemplation and which in turn will 
make it possible for us to reflect on God as Trinity. 
'The Monad having from the beginning moved into the dyad stopped in the Triad': it has moved in the mind that is receptive of this, whether it be angelic or human, and through it and in it makes enquiries about it, and to speak more 
plainly, it teaches the mind, to begin with, the thought about the Monad, lest 
separation be introduced into the first cause, and immediately leads it on to 
receive its divine and ineffable fecundity, saying secretly and hiddenly to it that it 
must not think that this good is in any way barren of reason and wisdom or of 
sanctifying power, which are both consubstantial and truly subsistent (ývvrr6gTaTa), 
lest the Divine be taken to be composite of these, as of things accidental, and not believed to be these eternally. The godhead is therefore said to move as the source 
of the enquiry as to the mode of its existence. 15 
We are now moving from the knowledge of the Monad to the knowledge of the 
Triad. The knowledge of the tri-hypostatic mode of existence of the Monad does not 
annul the first knowledge of the Monad as such, 'for the Triad is truly Monad for so it 
is, and the Monad is truly Triad, for thus it subsists; since there is one godhead being 
monadically and subsisting triadically. "' 'Therefore, ' Maximus concludes, 'the 
"movement" of the godhead amounts to the knowledge regarding the fact that it is and 
how it subsists that comes about through revelation to those receptive of it. "' 
The third kind of movement in relation to God is his gradual revelation as Trinity in 
history. Gregory himself advances this idea in the fifth Theological Oration where he 
says: 'The Old Testament proclaimed the Father openly, and the Son more obscurely. 
The New Testament manifested the Son, and suggested the divinity of the Spirit. Now 
the Spirit himself dwells among us, and supplies us with a clearer demonstration of 
himself. "" For Maximus this offers yet another opportunity to interpret Gregory 
through Gregory himself. The end of this gradual revelation according to Maximus is 
'to lead those who are being taught to worship the perfect Triad in perfect Monad, that 
is, to worship one essence and divinity and power and energy in three hypostases. 119 
Natural Contemplation of the Trinity 
Qu. dub. 105: 14, CCSG 10,79. 
Ambig. 23, PG 91,1260D; quoted in Andrew Louth, 'St Gregory the Theologian', p. 127. 
16 Ambig. 1: 29-3 1, CCS G 48,7. 
Ambig. 1: 36-39, CCSG 48,7. 
Or. 31.26: 4-7, SC 250,326. 
'9 Ambig. 23, PG 91,1261A. 
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Let me now take us in a different direction. I shall take a few examples of 
Maximus' scriptural interpretation, all of which present an aspect of the spiritual life. 
We shall begin with an aspect of natural contemplation. 
The creation and the universe are, as it were, a book in which the spiritually sensi- 
tive person can read God's own handwriting; and natural contemplation is precisely 
looking at nature in this kind of way: reading the creation as God's masterpiece. It in- 
volves observing principles and patterns, beauty and harmony in the fabric of the cre- 
ated order; 20 the purpose of such observation being to lead one's mind to the Origin of 
the creation and ultimately to his praise. 
It is all very well to see the Creator behind the creation but. 'can there be found, ' as 
one of Maximus' questioners asks, 'a demonstration of the Holy Trinity in nature? "' In 
other words, by looking at creation and reading the 'book' of the universe can one be 
led to thinking of one God in three persons? 
Maximus grapples with this question by referring to three different aspects in crea- 
tion: being, difference and life. " The fact that things exist, that they possess being, 
suggests that there is a certain universal owia, Maximus argues. Here of)akt should be 
considered within the context of the Porphyrian Tree where it functions as the all- 
embracing most generic genus of created beings . 
23 It IS 'being' as the undifferentiated 
common factor shared by all within the universe. Created beings have their 'being' 
from the Creator who is Being par excellence. 'Being', then, in this context signifies 
the Father. 
If we come down the Porphyrian tree and move from the most generic genus of 
ousia to the more specific categories of being, we find that the ramifications depend on 
differences. " Created beings are distinguished by means of differences, both in species 
and in number, and this, Maximus says, is something accomplished by Wisdom. 'For 
it belongs to Wisdom to distribute to each nature properties appropriate to It, and to pre- 
2' Cf. Ambig. 10.35, PG 91,1176BC. 
21 Qu. dub. 136, CCSG 10,97. 
22 Cf. Qu. dub. 136, CCSG 10,97. 
23 See a discussion on this, ch. 9: 'The Universe and the Tree of Porphyry'. 
24 Cf. ch. 1: 'Genus and Species'. 
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serve each of the created beings well-distinct and unmingled both with itself and with 
the rest of the creatures. 725 Wisdom, then, signifies the Logos, the Son. Life or 
4 essential motion' of beings is clearly that which leads us to the 'Breath of God', the 
Holy Spirit, which is the truly subsistent (EVI)Tr6GTCtTov) eternal life principle, the source 
of life for every living being. 
Maximus draws together all this in his answer to Thalassius as to the meaning of 
Romans 1: 20, For the invisible things of him are clearly seen by intellectionftom the 
creation of the world in the things that are made, eve n his eternalpower and divine maj- 
esty. 
Or, perhaps, the invisible things of God are none other than his eternal power and his divi 
i 
ne majesty, which have as their manifest heralds the supernatural majestic 
properties of creatures. For just as we believe from beings that God is-God who 
is the Being par excellence-in the same way, too, we are taught from the differences in essence and species among creatures, of his essentially Innate and 
subsistent Wisdom which sustains the beings. And again, from the essential and 
specific motion of beings we learn of his essentially innate and subsistent Life 
which perfects beings. In this way, through wise contemplation of the creation we 
receive a word (X6-yo3) concerning the Holy Trinity, that is to say, concerning the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. For God's eternal power, as being consubstantial, is 
the Logos, and his eternal and divine majesty is the consubstantial Holy Spint-26 
The Way to the Vision: 'Why did Abraham see three angels but Lot only 
two? ' 
Naturally, Scripture alongside creation provides material for contemplation. The 
most obvious places to go for Trinitarian reflection are those passages where God 
speaks in the first person plural (the creation of Adam, the condemnation of Adam, the 
tower of Babel) 27 or where he appears in a threefold form (hospitality of Abraham) . 
21 
Maximus discusses all these cases in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium 28. His main her- 
meneutical principle here is that 'the holy Scripture moulds God in accordance with the 
underlying condition of those for whom he cares in his providence, ' and that 
'accordingly, God is multiplied or unified in scriptural formulations in accordance with 
the underlying cause. 129 
Qu. dub. 136: 7-10, CCSG 10,97. 
Qu. Thal. 13: 18-3 1, CCSG 7,95. 
'7Gen. 1: 26, Gen. 3: 22 andGen. 11: 7 respecfively. 
' Gen. 18: 2. 
29Qu. Thal. 28: 4-6 and39-41, CCSG 7,203-205. 
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In the same way in each place where Scripture moulds God in divers manners, if 
you carefully and with understanding examine the words, you will discover that 
the reason for the considerable variation of the divine images lies within the state 
of those who are the object of providence. " 
This means that in the case of, for instance, the tower of Babel when God says 
Come, let us go down, and confuse their tongues, he, through the scriptural formula- 
tion, wants to show that the builders of the tower had fallen into polytheism. Maximus 
continues: 
And since they placed together the logoi of each belief, like some bricks, and built, as it were a tower, their polytheist godlessness; reasonably then God, who disbanding the agreement of the evil concordance of the people who had been led tn ZD 
astray, calls himself in the plural on account of the condition of those who were 
the object of providence; a condition fragmented and split into innumerable beliefs. 13ý- so doing God showed that while he was one, he had been divided into 
many parts in them. 31 
When, on the other hand, the underlying condition of those in question (Abraham, for 
instance) is good and holy, then Scripture refers 'to the most holy three hypostases 
mystically indicating the mode of existence of the most holy and beginningless Monad, 
since according to its essence the most sacred and worshipful Triad of hypostases is 
Monad. ý32 
This is clearly the case with Abraham receiving the visitation of three angels. " 
34 Later in the same narrative the angels appear to Lot. Lot, however, saw only two an 
gels, and this raises the question: 'Why was it that Abraham once saw three angels but 
Lot only tWo? 135 as the questioner in Quaestiones et dubia 39 asks. 
This question bnngs us back to the movement from Monad to Tnad. In fact, it 
brings us to the middle term 'dyad' and the two angels seen by Lot. In his oration For 
PeaGe, St Gregory had said that 'dyad has been transcended on account of matter and 
form -out of which also bodies are made. "' 'Dyad, ' therefore, in the first place has to 
do with composition, material things and, in general, things perceived through the 
' Qu. Thal. 28: 22-25, CCSG 7,203. 
31 QU. Thal. 28: 30-37, CCSG 7,203-205. 
32 Qu. Thal. 28: 59-62, CCSG 7,205. 
33Gen. 18: 2-33. See also the article of Lars Thunberg, 'Early Christian Interpretations of the Three 
Angels in Gen. 18', in SP 7 (TU 92,1966), pp. 560-570. 
' Gen. 19: 1-26. 
35 QU. dub. 39: 1-2, CCSG 10,32. 
' Or. 23.8, SC 270,298; and Maximus, Qu. dub. 105, CCSG 10,79. 
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senses. It represents the phenomenal world and needs to be transcended if the nournenal 
or the divine realms are to be reached. 
Now Lot with his vision of two angels represents the person who has not tran- 
scended the dyad; hence the two angels. He is someone who is still immature spiritually 
and who has no capacity to pass beyond the phenomenal. 
In the case of Lot, who had not yet rendered his mind pure of the composition of bodies but was still attached to their generation from matter and form believing 
that God was the fashioner of the visible creation only, there God appeared as two (dually), not as three (tnadically). He, thus, showed in the things through which 
He shaped Himself, that Lot had not yet detached his ascending mind from matter 
and form. " 
Maximus does not see Lot negatively: Lot's mind is ascending. And even though 
his mind was still attached to matter and form (the dyad) and although he had in his 
mind at the level of contemplating the created order without reaching beyond this 
'dyad', he nevertheless 'venerated the divine from visible things. 38 Moreover, it was 
God who appeared to Lot, signified by two angels. Their duality was the symbol of his 
venerating God as the creator of the visible creation only. To come to the level of the- 
ologia, to reach the knowledge of Monad in Triad, one has to leave all that behind, not 
because it is bad in itself but because it is something 'after God' rather than God Him- 
self. For that, one has to endeavour to become 'another Abraham'. 39 
But before we reach that point, let us consider one more text which has to do with 
the dyad and the Triad. In Ambiguum 10, Maximus interprets a passage from Gregory 
in which he speaks of the Saints passing through matter and the fleshly, becoming 
united to the divine light and being deified. This, Gregory says, 'is granted to those 
who genuinely live the philosophical life and transcend the material dyad for the sake of 
the unity the mind perceives in the Trinity. "' Here 'dyad', as Maximus interprets it 
throughout this long Ambiguum, stands not simply for what is perceived through the 
senses, but it also stands for the two passionate parts of the soul, that is the desiring 
37Qu. Thal. 28: 15-2 1, CCSG 7,203. 
38 Qu. dub. 39: 9-10, CCSG 10,32. 
39Ambig. 10.21, PG 91,1148A. 
40 Or. 21.2, PG 35,1084C. 
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and the incensive parts, as well as for their negative and distorted aspects: attachment to 
the senses, passions and actual sin. 
What the Saints, including Abraham, have done, is that 
they have set aside the relationship of the soul to the flesh, and through the flesh 
to matter, or-to put it more generally-they have put off the natural conformity 
of sensible being with what can be perceived through the senses and genuinely 
acquired a desire for God alone, on account, as I said, of the unity the mind 41 
perceives in the Trinity. 
Similarly, then, he who emulates Abraham in this respect, 'he who through ascetic 
struggle overthrows the flesh, sense and the world, through which the relationship of 
the mind to the intelligible is dissolved, and by his mind alone through love comes to 
know God: such a one is another Abraham. 142 Thus breaking away from the flesh, the 
passions and the senses themselves will emancipate the intellect from being fragmented 
by the multiplicity of the sensible reality. It becomes in this way unified and able to re- I 
flect the unity perceived in the Trinity. Abraham's vision of God in the form of three 
men conversing with him as one shows Abraham's spiritual perfection and that he who 
reaches such detachment and purity will know God as Monad and Triad. 
Thus, when he appeared to Abraham, who was perfect in knowledge and had 
completely detached his mind from matter and its impressions, God taught him 
that the immaterial word (logos) concerning the Triad is in the word (logos) 
concerning the Monad. And it was for this reason that God then appeared as three 
and conversed as one. 43 
The Image of the Archetype 
With Abraham we have arrived at the final stage of knowing the Trinity: theologia. 
Maximus, drawing on Evagnus, calls this state the state of 'pure prayer' or 
'undistracted prayer'. 441t is a state in which the mind, completely detached from 'matter 
and its impressions', desires God alone and is wholly united to him alone . 
45 It is a state 
in which 'the mind is rapt by the divine and infinite light and is conscious neither of it- 
Ambig. 10.43, PG 91,11931); translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 147. 
Ambig. 10.21, PG 91,1145D- I 148A; translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 120. 
43Qu. Thal. 28: 10-15, CCSG 7,203. 
' Carit. 11.4 (PG 90,985A): 'undistracted prayer', 11.6 (PG 90,985AB): 'pure prayer'. See also M. 
Viller, 'Aux sources de la spiritualit6 de S, Maxime. Les Oeuvres d'Evagre le Pontique', in RAM 11 
(1930), pp. 250-251,253. 
45C 
ch 12 below. f. 
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self nor of any other creature at all, save only of him who through charity effects such 
bn ghtness in it. "' 
The mind, when it knows things, somehow reflects them in its being; it is con- 
formed to them. Knowledge of the Trinity has a similar effect. 'In contemplating him 
Nvho is simple, it becomes simple.... 147 God's unity becomes manifest in the soul, but 
also its triadic structure as mind, reason and spirit becomes a vehicle of understanding 
the Trinity. 
The unification of the soul, its union with God, its knowledge of God as Unity and 
its conformity to this unity, are all reciprocally bound together. The more one detaches 
one's mind from the multiplicity of the material world, the more the soul becomes uni- 
fied; and becoming more unified it is drawn closer to God. In this way the mind's 
knowledge increases and it is conformed to the object of its knowledge. Presenting 
Abraham as the example, Maximus takes the addition of the letter alpha to his name 
(from "App%L to 'Appad ýL) as a symbol of such state. " 
By faith he was mystically assimilated to the logos concerning the Monad, 
according to which he became unified, ..., magnificently and wholly drawn up alone to God alone, bearing on him no imprint of knowledge of any scattered 
things, which shows the power of the letter alpha given as an addition to his 49 
name. 
The same idea is behind the Centuries on Theology and the Incarnate Dispensation 
11.8 and 11.16 in which Maximus speaks of the knowledge of the divine Monad. In 11.8 
Maximus develops a succession of detachments which enables the person to overcome 
his inner division and in this way gain wholeness, reaching in the end the knowledge of 
the divine Unity itself. 
If you are healed of the breach caused by the transgression, you are severed first 
from the passions and then from impassioned thoughts. Next you are severed 
from nature and the inner principles of nature, then conceptual images and the 
knowledge relating to them. Lastly, when you have passed through the manifold 
logoi relating to divine providence, you attain through unknowing the very logos 
of the divine Monad. By this logos the intellect, noticing its own immutability, 
' Carit. 11.6, PG 90,985B. It must be noted that Maximus speaks of two states of pure prayer in this 
chapter: the one concerns those of the active life, the other those of the contemplative. Our quotation 
refers to the latter. 
4'7Carit. 111.97, PG 90,1045D. 
' Cf. Gen. 17: 5. The letter alpha is number one (1) in Greek arithmetic. Hence the allusion to the One, 
the Only One etc. reminiscent of Plotinus' Enn. VI. 9. Note also that the word ýtovdg (= monad) derives 
from the word ýL6vc, 3 (= the only one). 
49Ambig. 10.45, PC-r 91,1200B. 
-. W 
90 
re. joices with an unspeakable Joy because it has received the peace of God which transcends all intellect and which ceaselessly keeps him who has been granted it from falling. ' 
In 11.16 Maximus places the knowledge of the Monad in the context of the transfigura- 
tion of Christ. There Elijah, Moses and Christ are, on the one hand, the symbols of 
virtue, natural contemplation and theology, and, on the other hand, they are the sym- 
bols of providence, judgement and the Monad. 
He who to some degree has been initiated into the logos of the Monad, i 'ably invari discovers the logo' of divine providence and Judgement con 
. 
Joined with It. That Is 
why, like St Peter, he thinks it good that three tabernacles should be made within himself for those who have appeared to him. These tabernacles represent three 
stages of salvation, namely that of virtue, that of spiritual knowledge and that of theolo,,, y. 51 
The person v, 'ho has attained the knowledge of the Monad, also reflects and con- 
templates the Triad in his own soul. He, in fact, becomes able to see the mystery of the 
three-in-one, of Triad in Monad, in his own being. The trinitarian image in man 
Maximus sees in the soul's being a unity of mind, reason and spirit (voD3, wyo3, 
TFVEDýLa), ` a triad which can be found also in Gregory Nazianzen, Symeon the New 
Theologian and Gregory Palamas, for example. " Of course, mind, reason and spirit are 
always there by nature, and there is therefore a natural analogy between the Trinity and 
the human soul: '[W]e determined the Son and Logos of God as wisdom [and] the 
Holy Spirit as life, since also our soul, which was created after the image of God, is 
beheld in those three, that is, in mind, in reason and in spirit. 754 But seeing oneself in 
the likeness of God requires the unification of the soul and its union with God. The 
soul has a capacity by nature to be united to God through the mind- which is the fun- 
damental meaning of the 'Image'. This is a given. But being actually united to God, re- 
quires a free response aimed at fulfilling that which according to God's precepts is to be 
50 Cap. theol. H. 8, PG 90,1128CD. 
Cap. theol. 11.16, PG 90,113213C. In his commentary on this chapter, Hans Urs von Balthasar 
points out that the origin of the triad Monad -providence -judgement was developed by Evagrius and 
that in his understanding the term monas meant 'the primordial unity of all creatures in God' 
(Kosmische Liturgie, p. 52 1). Gabriel Bunge has discussed this notion in Evagrius. See his '116nade ou 
monade? Au sujet de deux notions centrales de la terminologie 6vagrienne' in Le Musgon 102 (1999), 
pp. 69-91. 
52 See Qu. Thal. 32, CCSG 7,225; Ambig. 7, PG 91,1088A; Ambig. 10.43, PG 91,1196A; Qu. 
dub. 105, CCSG 10,79-80. See also Qu. Thal. 25, CCSG 7,161-163. 
1 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 23.11, SC 270,320; Symeon the New Theologian, Hymns 44, SC 196, 
70ff.; Gregory Palamas, Capita CL 40, Sinkewicz, 126-128. 
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in his likeness-and being in his likeness ultimately means being transfused by his 
light, making God visible through one's transfigured being and actions. This precisely 
was the state of the Saints, of whom Maximus spoke in Ambiguum 10. Being united to 
God, they reflected the archetype and came to be in the likeness of the Monad in Triad. 
For since they knew that the soul is a middle being between God and matter, and has powers that can unite it with both-that is, it has a mind that links it with God 
and senses that link it with matter-they for that reason have completely shaken 
off the senses and everything perceived through them by means of the activity 
that relates and inclines it to them, and by the mind they have ineffably 
assimilated their soul to God and in it, being wholly united to the whole God in a 
marvellous manner possessing the image of the archetype according to the 
likeness in mind and reason and spirit, they beheld the resemblance so far as 
possible, and were mystically taught the unity understood in the Trinity. 55 
54Qu. dub. 105: 22-26, CCSG 10,79-80. 
" Ambig. 10.43, PG 91,1193D- I 196A; translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 147. 
Part III 
CHRIST 
6 
Nature, Difference and Number 
Introduction: Developing thought reflects the changing world of sev- 
enth-century Byzantium 
THE COUNCIL OF Chalcedon 451 and its aftermath had left the Byzantine Empire 
fragmented. This fragmentation continued to harass its political and religious life into 
the seventh century and beyond. Unity was desperately needed because of the pressure 
that Nvas coming from the Persians, the Avars and the Slavs, and from the 630's on- 
wards also from the Arabs. Egypt, for example, was the main source of grain for the 
Byzantines and losing it would have had fatal consequences. But on both sides of Chal- 
cedon people were convinced of their own orthodoxy and of the heresy of their oppo- 
nents. The Chalcedonians knew that the Acephaloi, or the Severans, confused the two 
natures of Christ, and the Severans had no doubt of their opponents' separating the na- 
tures and therefore being Nestonans. Both claimed the authority of the Fathers, espe- 
cially that of St Cyril of Alexandria, and both were certain of the correctness of their 
own interpretation. 
How, then, could unity in Christ be understood correctly? And correctly in such a 
way as could be accepted by both sides? This was the question which awaited an an- 
swer. Such an answer, if successful, would unite the divided Christians and, by the 
same token, the empire. 
For the Chalcedonian party Christ was two according to nature and one according 
to hypostasis. He was the Son and Logos of God, one of the Trinity, consubstantial 
with the Father according to his divinity and consubstantial with us according to his 
humanity. The Severans, for their part, could also see Christ's double consubstantiality 
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but they could not admit two natures in him. St Cyril had said that there was one nature: 
'the one incarnate nature of God the Word'. This one nature was for Severus a 
composite nature', an expression which could accommodate natural diversity in Christ 
-so at least the Severans believed. For them there was no distinction between hyposta- 
sis and nature in the oikonomia. Thus accepting two natures meant automatically ac- 
cepting two hypostases, which was the heresy of Nestorius. 
There was no way out. In the sixth century, Justinian had tried to persuade the 
Severans to believe that the Chalcedonians were not Nestorian by condemning not only 
Nestorius himself, but also the so-called Three Chapters: Theodore of Mopsuestia, 
some works of Theodoret of Cyrus and a Letter of lbas the Persian. ' He also made it 
explicit that Christ was 'one of the Trinity', that he was one hypostasis, the Son and 
Logos of God made flesh. 2 The Severans were not persuaded, and the situation re- 
mained pending. 
In the seventh century, as Heraclius came to restore the empire after the rather un- 
successful rule of Phocas, he, too, attempted to unite the divided Christians. ' He did so 
by inaugurating new ways of looking at the problem. His first attempt was based on the 
idea that Christ had only one activity, 4a 'theandric' activity. This idea had already been 
expressed a century earlier by Severus himself, ' drawing on-or rather misinterprer 
ing- the fourth Letter of Dionysius the Areopagite, and later by the less-known Theo- 
dore of Pharan. When in 633 in Egypt Herachus with Cyrus of Phasis and Sergius of 
Constantinople drew up the Pact of Union (the document known as Cyrus' Nine 
Chapters) based on the doctrine of Christ's one activity, it was embraced by both sides. 
The long desired union was, quite suddenly, obtained. Even the Pope of Rome 
Hononus blessed the union-and was condemned for this reason as a heretic in the 
Council of Constantinople in 681. Unfortunately for the emperor, the monk 
'See John Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions. The Church 450-680 A. D. (Crestwood, 
New York: SVSP, 1989), pp. 235-245. 
2 See Grillmeier, Christ, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 338-343. 
3 For a more detailedaccount see Meyendorff, Imperial Unity, pp. 333-373. 
4 ýV6P*YELCL, also operation or energy. 
5 See his Ep. 3 ad Johannem ducem, in Doctrina Patrum 24, Diekamp, 309; and Grillmeier, Christ, 
vol. 2, part 2, p. 1770- 
94 
Sophronius, the future Patriarch of Jerusalem, happened to be in Alexandria when 
Cyrus released the Nine Chapters. Sophronius noticed the phrase 'one activity' in 
chapter seven of the document and by so doing started a struggle against Monenergism. 
Here is Sergius' account of what happened. 
With Cyrus Sophronius examined the issues of these chapters, opposed and 
contradicted the chapter on the one activity, demanding that in every case one 
must teach the doctrine of two activities in Christ our God. ... Cyr-us asserted that since at the present time too the salvation of so many thousands of people was at 
stake, it was imperative not to contend argumentatively at all on the subject of that 
chapter because, as was already said, an expression of this kind was also uttered by 
certain inspired Fathers, and the rationale of orthodoxy had not suffered from it at 
all. The aforementioned Sophronius, dear to God, in no way accepted this 
arranaement. 6 M 
In the sequel, Sophromus went to Constantinople to see Sergius and demanded the no- 
torious phrase to be removed from the document. Sergius was not happy about this. 
We [Serojus] thought that this was harsh. How was it not harsh and exceedingly 
onerous when It was going to dissolve and destroy that whole excellent concord 
and unity which had come about in Alexandria, and in all her provinces, which at 
no stage up to the present had accepted even the name of our blessed and 
renowned father Leo or had made mention of the holy, great, ecumenical council 
of Chalcedon, while now with clear, loud voice they were proclaiming it in the 
holy mysteries? 7 
Soon the issue developed into a controversy, Unity in the empire began to splinter. 
To stop the development, first, Patriarch Sergius published already the same year (633) 
the so-called Psephos' and half a decade later Herachus released his famous Ecthesis, 9 
both of which forbade any discussion either of one or two activities. " 
The expression 'one activity', even if uttered by certain Fathers, nevertheless 
alienated and confused some who heard it, who supposed that it would lead to the 
destruction of the two natures which were hypostatically united in Christ our God. 
I dalized many, on the grounds In a similar way the expression 'two activities' scan I 
that it had been uttered by none of the holy and approved spiritual leaders of the 
Church, but to follow it was to profess two wills at variance with one another, such 
that God the Word wished to fulfil the salutary suffering but his humanity resisted 
his will and was opposed to it, and as a result two persons with conflicting wills 
were introduced, which is impious and foreign to Christian teaching. 
" 
I Copy of the Letter of Sergius of Constantinople to Honorius, Pope of Rome, ACO ser. 2, vol. 
2, 
part 2,538: 8-14; 538: 18 -540: 3. 
7 Copy of the Letter of Sergius of Constantinople to Honorius, Pope of Rome, ACO ser. 2, vol. 
2, 
pait 2,540: 7-13. 
See MeyendorfUmPerial UnitY, pp. 348-356. 
For the text of Ecthesis see ACO ser. 2, vol. 1,156: 20 -162: 13. 
10 A similar imperial compromise policy was executed twenty years after 
Chalcedon with the publica- 
tion of the Henoticon. See Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 
2, part 1, translation by J. 
Cawte and P. Allen (London and Oxford: Mowbray, 1987; original German edition 1985), pp. 
247-288. 
11 Ecthesis, ACO ser. 2, vol. 1, p. 160: 10-19. 
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With this the Ecthesis introduced the idea of one will in Christ. Also new people 
became involved in the controversy, such as Pyrrhus (later the Patriarch of Constanti- 
nople) on the emperor's side, and Maximus the Confessor and Pope Martin of Rome in 
the opposition. At one stage Maximus managed to convince Pyrrhus of the errors of the 
Ecthesis in a public debate in Carthage in 645, but only for a time. When things had 
developed dangerously far and Monothelitism had already become the content of the 
imperial policy in the form of the so called Typos (648), Martin convoked a council in 
Rome, at the Lateran, in 649. The council condemned Monenergism and Monothelitism 
along with their ecclesiastical promoters: Theodore of Pharan, Cyrus of Alexandria, and 
the Patriarchs of Constantinople Sergius, Pyrrhus and Paul. The end result was that 
Martin and Maximus (along with his disciples) were brought to trial in Constantinople 
and Nvere sent into exile as heretics and traitors to the empire. (In MaxiMus' eyes the 
Monothelites were traitors to God. )'2Both died in exile, Martin in 655 1 Cherson in n 
the Crimea and Maximus in 662 in Lazica, in present day Georgia. 
The unity, which the emperors (first Herachus, then Constans 11) hoped to 
achieve, did not eventuate and is still waiting to be achieved to this day. Heraclius, in 
fact, a few months before his death admitted that the Ecthesis had been a failure and 
washed his hands of it by attributing its authors1iip to Patriarch Sergius. " The Chalce- 
donian side cleared the muddle the controversy had created only two decades later in the 
Sixth Ecumenical Council in 681. The heretics were condemned, the doctrine of the two 
natural activities and wills in the one Christ was established and holy orthodoxy was 
glorified. But the men who gave their lives for it, Maximus and Martin, were hardly 
mentioned in the proceedings of the council. There is only one reference to Martin as 
the pope who convoked the Lateran council 649, none to Maximus. 14 They, indeed, 
preferred treason to the emperor rather than to God and to receive glory from God 
rather than from men. '5 
12 OpUSC, 7, PG 91,72C-73B. 
13 see John Haldon, Byzantium in the Seventh Century. The Transformation of a Culture (Cambridge: 
CUP, revizededition 1997; first published in 1990), p. 302. 
14 ACO ser. 2, vol. 2, part 1, p. 130. 
11 Cf. Opusc. 7, PG 91,72C-7313- 
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Natural Difference and Number 
Such then in broad lines is the historical setting within which Maximus expounds 
his Christology. As for the theological setting, for Maximus, what is logically and con- 
ceptually true of the Trinity, must be also true of Christ, since he is one of the Trinity. 
In other words, J ust as with the Trinity, so also with Christ, the distinction between the 
universal and the particular is fundamental. In the oikonomia this is mainly expressed 
by the terms nature ((ýikaýý) and hypostasis respectively. The Monophysites rejected this 
distinction in the oikonomia on account that Christ had 'renewed the natures', and 
Leontius of Byzantium had argued against this already one century before Maximus, 
insisting on its necessity. 16 By making the distinction the Fathers were able to confess 
both unity and difference in the Trinity and in Christ. This is how Maximus sees it: 
Just as with respect to the Holy Trinity difference and union are not expressed by 
the same words, but difference is confessed by declaring three hypostases and 
union by confessing one essence, so also with respect to the One of the Trinity; 
difference is confessed through acknowledging the two natures and union is 
confessed through proclaiming one composite hypostasis. 17 
In Chalcedonian theology it is very common to consider the universal and the par- 
ticular in Christ in the reverse order with respect to how they are in the Trinity. In 
Christ there is difference at the level of the universal and unity at the level of the par- 
ticular, whereas in the Trinity unity is at the level of the universal and difference at the 
level of the particular. Already Gregory Nazianzen in the fourth century spoke of aflo 
and allo when referring to the diversity in Chn St. 18 In Chalcedonian Christology, this is 
expressed by attributing hypostasis or person to the particular and nature to the univer- 
sal. Thus one (composite) hypostasis is considered in two natures. 
" Brian Daley has made the following observations with regard to this issue: 'He [Leontius] insists, 
throughout his works ... on clear definition and the consistent use of terms, tracing the origin of the 
major Trinitarian and Christological heresies to confusion about the difference between ýTr6a-racTL3 and 
oýa(a, 'person' (rrp6amTov) andnature (ýýCTL5), andrefusing to accept the argument of the Severan party 
that the very "newness" of the Incarnation justifies a new and singular use of terminology. All language 
about God, he admits, is equally inadequate; yet if the terms we use in speaking about the Trinity = 
not consistent in their meaning with those we use for the Incarnate Word and even for the subjects of 
our everyday discourse, all our argument about either is "a reduction to absurdity rather than a demon- 
stration .... ... A Richer Union": Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of Human and Divine in 
Christ', in SP 24 (1993), pp. 245-246. 
17St Maximus, Opusc. 13, PG 91,148B. 
"' See Ep. 10 1.2 1, SC 208,44-46. Gregory also speaks Of (ýýaEL3 in this sense in Ep. 10 1.19, SC 208, 
44. 
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In Severan Chnstology, which makes no distinction between the universal and the 
particular in the oikonomia, it is not possible to speak of two natures as this would nec- 
essarily involve two hypostases. '9 Instead, Severus speaks of one composite nature and 
one composite hypostasis. Severus accepts, as genuinely Cyrillian, Christ's double 
consubstantial ity, as well as natural difference in Christ, and much of post- 
Chalcedonian two-nature Chnstology challenges Severus at this particular point seeing 
him as inconsistent. " Often, as also the present day dialogue has shown, Chalcedonian 
and Severan Chnstologies seem to be saying virtually the same thing, 2' and yet, they 
could never be reconciled. 
Here, I would like to look into this question through Maximus' understanding of 
it, and to elucidate the way in which Maximus viewed Severus' theology. It is some- 
times thought that Maximus, and other Chalcedonian theologians like Leontius or Jus- 
timan, were not aware of Severus' actual teaching- i. e. that he spoke of double con- 
substantiality and natural difference, and made no distinction between hypostasis and 
nature- but this is certainly not the case, as we shall see. " In addition, I shall present 
an instance of Christological controversy which took place at the end of the sixth cen- 
tury within the Monophysite community. This, I believe, will shed some light on the 
Christology of the period. 
Maximus discusses the Severan cause in a series of Christological Letters (12-19). 
I shall take as an example Letter 13 filling in some gaps from other texts. In this Letter 
addressed 'to Peter the Illustrious', a governor in North Africa, Maximus spills much 
ink on explaining why the refusal to confess two natures in Christ is wrong, and why it 
is necessary to say 'two natures'. According to Maximus, the Severans, while ac- 
knowledging the natural difference in Christ after the union, refuse to admit two natures 
in him in order not to split him into two Christs. They do this, Maximus says, 
" Whether they could do so by using the term oýcr[a also in the oikonomia, is a question which re- 
mains open. I ' See the article of Jean-Claude Larchet, Ta question Christologique. A propos de projet d'union 
I'Eghse Orthodoxe et des tglises non Chalc6doniennes: probl6mes th6ologiques et eccl6siologiques en 
suspens', in MO 134 (2000/2), pp. 56-76. 
21 See Larchet, Ta question Christologique', pp. 56-76. 
22See Ep. 12, PG 91,492BC, Ep. 13, PG 91,513C andEp. 15, PG 91,565D-572B. 
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'because, it seems, they do not know that every number according to Its logos neither 
divides nor is divided, nor produces division or, indeed, union. 523 Consequently, num- 
ber as such seems to suggest division to the Monophysite mind. For Maximus, in con- 
24 trast, number is simply 'indicative of quantity' or 'the label of quantity'. In itself 
number says nothing about the relafion the things that are numbered have among them- 
selves. Number, as it were, has nothing to do with their affairs. They can be united as 
well as separated, and in both cases their number remains, provided that their relation 
does not obliterate them as natures. 25 
The logic Maximus follows here is that where there is difference, there there is also 
quantity-and quantity can be expressed or acknowledged only through number. That 
is to say that if there is one 'something' with no differentiation at all, it is one in every 
respect and involves no quantity. If however there is difference of some kind, it follows 
that something is different from another, which in turn involves quantity. This quantity 
can be expressed only by counting the differentiated elements. They may be natures in 
the one Christ or colours in a single stone (or flower or an animal), an example we saw 
in chapter two. " If, then, one wishes to express the existence of diversity, one has to 
admit number. If one refuses the number, one then refuses quantity and with it the dif- 
ference and the things of which the difference is predicated. 
Maximus is careful to distinguish between difference and division. The former 
does not involve the latter but they both are independent concepts. 
Difference, on the one hand, is a logos according to which the substrata differ one 
from another, and is indicative of 1T(z6 ELVCLL, that is, it is indicative of the flesh being 
by nature and essence what it is, it is indicative of God the Word being by nature 
and essence what it is. Division, on the other hand, is a cut right through which 
entirely severs the substrata and renders them to be ... separate 
from one 
another. 27 
In the case of Christ, if one admits difference of some kind in him, it follows that 
'he cannot be one in every respect (lit. according to every logos and tropos). "' There- 
Ep. 13, PG 91,513A. 
Ep. 13, PG 91,513A. 
25 Cf Leontius Cap. Sev. 8 and 10, PG 86,1904BC. 
' Ep. 12, PG 91,476A-D. 
' Ep. 12, PG 91,469AB. 
28Ep. 13, PG 91,513D. 
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fore, he must be 'in some respect at least two, or more'. " This again does not mean 
that he must be two or more in every respect-as he is one in hypostasis. He is two or 
more in the respect in which there is difference in him. And if Christ is two in some re- 
spect, we must confess this. Otherwise we ultimately deprive him of what he is arid 
render him non-existent by our thinking. 'Therefore, because they say that there is dif- 
ference in Christ after the union, they cannot say that Christ is in every respect one after 
the union. ' Maximus gives the SeVCFans two options. 
For either, according to them, the natures are not destroyed after the union, and 
they exist and are preserved, and it is [therefore] fitting to confess them as 
preserved after the union, or since it is not fitting to confess them preserved after 
the union, it is not fitting, according to them, either to say that they exist or that 
they are preserved, and [therefore] the natures are destroyed. 
So, either let them stop speaking of the mere difference, learning that difference is 
indicative of the quantity of certain differentiated things, or let them accept the 
confession of truth with us who in accord with the Fathers devoutly take the 
number by the logos of difference and only in order to make known that the 
things united have remained without confusion. " 
Leontius is not less perceptive in Capita triginta contra Severum 5. 
If they acknowledge that the things which have come together [remain] 
unconfused - and the things come together are two also according to them - how 
is it that they do not recognize the things, which in union are not confounded, [to 
be] two after the union? And if they do recognize two natures, why do they not 
confess [this]? And if they do confess, how do they refuse to count them, things 
of which they recognize the natural properties unconfounded after the union? 
For, as Saint Basil says, 'what they confess let them also count. "' 
What is implied here is that the Severans do admit natural difference, and consequently 
they should also admit number, but since they refuse the latter it logically follows that 
they also reject the natures and, by the same token, the whole mystery of Christ to- 
gether with our salvation. 
To the modern reader this kind of argumentation may, perhaps, sound somewhat 
off-putting: there seems to be no middle ground, no space for mutual understanding or 
dialogue. But in Late Antiquity doctrinal confession was something in which ultimate 
accuracy was required and the formulae used had to be able to endure every scrutiny. It 
was all or nothing. And in the latter case a reductio ad absurdum would follow the ar- 
gument. This does not mean that the opponent was necessarily unaware of the positive 
' Ep. 13, PG 91,513D. 
30 Ep. 12, PG 91,492B. 
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aspects of the theology in question- Maximus regards such aspects in Severus' theol- 
ogy as 'mock piety' aimed at 'deceiving his audience'. " In this spirit, Severus' theol- 
ogy, despite its relative ingenuity, is according to Maximus 'hideous, full of stench and 
totally deprived of grace' and in the final analysis it 'completely denies the incama- 
1 33 tion . Similar language one may find on the opposite side, too. Whether what 
Maximus says in general does justice to Severus' actual thought is difficult to say and 
goes beyond the scope of this study. 
A Sixth-century Controversy over Natural Difference 
Natural difference and number had been the bone of contention also in the Chris- 
tological controversy which took place within the Monophysite community in the 
580's. The sources for the controversy are scanty and mainly in Syriac. Much remains 
unpublished. However, some description of the Syriac sources has been provided by 
Albert van RoeY34 and the Greek that survives has been published in article form by 
Karl-Heinz Uthemann 35 and Jos6 Declerck. 36 
The originator of the controversy was none other than Stephen the Sophist whom 
we have already met in part one. His basic thesis was that 'it is impossible to speak of 
difference in natural quality (&aýopd k ýV TrOL6TqTL ri in Ch st without ad- 
mitting by the same token a duality of natures in him. 137 This was regarded as seriously 
heretical within the Monophysite community. Stephen was first challenged by someone 
named Probus in a treatise Against the impious doctrine of those who say that one must 
31 Cap. Sev. 5, PG 86,1901D-1904A andSt Basil, Ep. 214, PG 32,789B. 
32 E p 13, PG 91,512D. 
33 Ep. 13, PG 91,512CD. 
3' Albert van Roey, 'Une controverse christologique sous le patriarcat de Pierre de Callinique', in Sym- 
posium Syriacum 1976 (OCA 205, Roma: PIOS, 1978), pp. 349-357. Van Roey examines the Syriac 
manuscript tradition and the historical evidence from the histories of Denys by Tell-Mahre and Nfichael 
the Syrian. See also the brief account of the controversy given in R. Y. Ebied, A. van Roey and L. R. 
Wickham, Peter of Callinicum. Anti- Tritheist Dossier (Leuven: Departement Oridntalistick, 198 1), pp. 
6-8. 
" Karl-Heinz Uthemann 'Syllogistik im Dienst der Orthodoxie. Zwei unedierte Texte Byzandnischer 
Kontroverstheologie des 6. Jahrhunderts', in J6B 30 (198 1), pp. 103 -112. 36 jo'S613eclerck, 'Probus, 1'ex-jacobite et ses 'E7muop4tLa Ta Trpbs- 7aKWO(Tas-', in Byzantion 53/1 
(1993), pp. 213-232. Declerck adds the testimony of Timothy of Constantinople concerning the doc- 
trine of the Niobites (from Stephen the Sophist, surnamed Niobos, PG 86,65A), pp. 219-220. 
37 Roey, 'Une controverse christologique', p. 350. 
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not confess that the difference in natural quality is preserved after the (thought of) un- 
ion. 39 Probus also wrote a treatise On Difference in which he maintains that difference 
does not imply number"- something which Maximus would have completely disa- 
greed with, as we have seen. 
Probus was joined by an archimandrite called John Barbour, and together, so it 
seems from the course of the events, they went and met Stephen at Alexandria and in- 
stead of convincing Stephen they were convinced by him and eventually became his 
followers. In the sequel, Probus was excommunicated and exiled by the Monophysite 
Patriarch Damian of Alexandria, while John tried to settle the issue. In the end they both 
were condemned in the synod held sometime between 584 and 586 at the monastery of 
Gubba Baraya and presided over by the Patriarch Peter of 
CalliniCUS. 40 In the account 
of Denys of Tell-Mahre the outcome of the synod was this: 
The Patriarch Mar Peter immediately composed in the name of the whole synod a 
letter or treatise in which he annulled and destroyed the opinion of the sophist and 
of Probus and established and proved, by means of testimonies from the doctors 
of the church that there really and actually is a difference between the natures 
which make up the Christ, and that this is still preserved after the thought of the 
union without there being any numbering or separation of the natures 
themselves. 41 
A few years later Probus and John joined Constantinople and the former was ap- 
pointed metropolitan of Chalcedon. (Stephen was not mentioned in connection with the 
synod, and it may be that he had already taken the same step at an earlier date. Whatever 
the case may be, it is implied that he was a Chalcedonian Orthodox when he in the 
610's was invited by Heraclius to teach philosophy in Constantinople. ) In 595-596 by 
the order of the Emperor Maurice discussions were held between Probus and a group of 
Monophysite monks. Both parties produced eight tomoi in which they presented their 
views. An interesting paragraph from the seventh tomos of the Monophysites is given 
by van Roey. (In footnote 13, van Roey remarks that 'the synonymy of "nature" and 
"hypostasis" stated here reflects the terminology not of Probus but of the monks. ') 
38 Roey, 'Une controverse christologique', p. 35 1. 
39 Roey, 'Une controverse christologique', p. 352. 
40 A tritheist controversy between Damian of Alexandria and Peter of Callinicus took place two year 
after these events. See the account in Ebied, Roey, Wickham, Peter of Callinicum, pp. 20-43. 
41History; quoted in Ebied, Roey, Wickham, Peter of Callinicum, pp. II- 12. 
102 
We say that one must confess that the difference in natural quality remains after 
the (thought of) union without there being at the same time a duality of natures or Zý- IIIII hypostases. You, on the contrary, say that he who confesses the preservation of the 
difference in natural quality, adding 'after the union', is constrained to affirm the 
natures or hypostases after the union. 4' 
Why was it that the school of Stephen maintained that natural difference necessar- 
ily implied plurality of natures? Stephen, as we have seen earlier, was a philosopher in 
the lineage of such people as Ammonius, Olymplodorus, Elias and David. His school 
was a version of Neoplatonism in which Aristotle's logical works played a significant 
role in terms of fundamental philosophical categories. Porphyry's Isagoge, by the time 
of Stephen, formed a part of the body of texts which were not only studied but also 
commented on. Porphyrian logic, then, was the tool which helped not only philoso- 
phers to understand Aristotle but it also helped Christians to explicate their own doc- 
thrie. 
We have seen in chapter one that the kind of 'difference' in Porphyrian logic which 
makes a difference in species is called the i"wa-difference or the most specific differ- 
ence. This is regarded as a constitutive difference of a species and as distinctive from 
the more generic. It is called 'most specific' because it produces the lowest species in 
the Porphyrian Tree, a species which is thus called the most specific. This species has 
no more subdivisions but only 'subsists in the individuals under it'. As we saw earlier 
on, it is this kind of difference that makes something aXXO 43 in the sense which agrees 
with the Cappadocian usage of the word. And this also is the 'difference in natural 
quality'Stephen and his adherents were dealing with. Consequently, when they main- 
tain that if 'the difference in natural quality' of both the divinity and humanity are pre- 
served intact and unconfounded in Christ, there are then two a'XXo in him. Probus, after 
his conversion, puts it in the following way in his Syllogistic Chapters 10. 
But there are two [kinds] of differences, 'accidental differences' and 'idiaitata 
essential differences' which are constitutive of the essences and are themselves 
essences. If according to these differences Christ is two 'somethings' after the 
union, and if after the union Christ is two natures by a certain logos, how is it that 
he will not be also in two natures by a certain logos also after the union? " 
' Roey, 'Une controverse chfistologique', p. 355. 
'3 See Porphyry, Isag., CAG 4,3a: 25. 
'" Uthemann, 'Syllogistik', p. 112. 
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Probus' and John's move proved convincing enough to the Monophysites in the 
environment of Antioch, so much so that, according to Declerck, 'many people fol- 
lowed their example and whole villages passed from one camp to the other. 145 Of 
course, not all of the Monophysites were convinced. And if one were to conjecture 
what the theological reasons for the Monophysite resistance to Chalcedon at this stage 
were, it would seem to me that there were two reasons which prevailed. First the fact 
that they make no distinction between the universal and the particular in the oikonomia, 
which makes it impossible for them to admit duality of any kind in Christ; and sec- 
ondly, they ývere happy with their understanding of 'composite nature' which in their 
conceptual framework allowed them to speak of natural difference, and indeed double 
consubstantial i ty, in the one nature and hypostasis of Christ. 
Composite Nature or Composite Hypostasis? 
The idea that Christ could be called a composite nature is based on the analogy of 
the human nature as composite of body and soul. St Cyril made a considerable use of 
the comparison and it seems to have been the touch-stone of Severan Christology. In a 
flonlegium, Severus quotes Cyril: 
We are composed of body and soul, and we see two natures, the one that of the 
body, the other that of the soul; but the human being is one from the two owing to 
the union. And the fact that he is composed out of two natures does not permit us 
to conclude that he who is one is two men, but rather one single man, as I have 
said, on account of the composition from body and soul. 
And the man that we are may serve us as an example. For with regard to him we 
comprehend two natures, one that of the soul and the other that of the body. 
However, although in subtle reflection we distinguish or in the imagination of the 
mind perceive a distinction, we still do not juxtapose the natures and do not allow 
in them the power of the separation to exhaust itself entirely, but we understand 
that they belong to a single unique being in such a way that from then on the two 
are no longer two, but through the two a single living being has been formed. 
46 
Maximus acknowledges that the human being is one composite nature, and that every 
instance of the human species is a 'composite hypostasis' on account of the underlying 
45 probus', p. 222. 
46Severus, Philalethes 42, CSCO 134 (French translation), 214 (= Cyril, Ep. adSuccensum 1 (45), PG 
77,233A and Ep. ad Succensum 11 (46), PG 77,245A); quoted in Grillmeier, Christ, vol. 2, part 2, p. 
34. The syriac can be found in CSCO 133,260-26 1. 
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eidos. 47 He, however, does not think that it is correct to speak of Christ as a composite 
nature. For Maximus, Chnst is composite at the level of hypostasis alone, that is, at the 
level of particular being, but not at the level of the universal. 
41 The reasons why Maximus thinks like this can be summarized in the following. 
Firstly, the union of divinity and humanity did not result in the generation of a single 
nature (universal) but in the generation of a hypostas's (particular) which participates in 
both divine being and human being. 'Christ' is not a name of a species or of a nature 
but of a hypostasiS. 49Human being, in contrast, is a species or a nature subsisting in a 
multiplicity of individuals. And why is it, then, that Christ as a divino-human being 
cannot be regarded as a species? The reason for this is very simple if we bear in mind 
the principles of the Porphyrian Tree. Porphyry himself points out that what is common 
about all the five terms in the Isagoge is that they are necessarily predicated of many 
individuals . 
50 In the same sense the Cappadocians spoke of what is common to indi- 
viduals or hypostases, in contrast to what is particular to each. One individual cannot 
make a species, that is, a nature. Christ is unique and single, and cannot fall into this 
categorization. He cannot be a generic nature since he is only one, nor can he be con- 
sidered as a 'monadic nature' for then he would be like some mythological creature and 
would no longer be consubstantial either with God the Father or with US. 51 Maximus 
writes: 
For this great and venerated mystery of Christ neither possesses as an individual 
the nature as a species predicated of it as of something generic and universal, nor 
however, is it a genus or a species predicated of the individuals which by nature 
are subordinate to it, so as to be able to fit into the above mentioned rules, 
because, indeed, [this mystery of Christ] does not possess, in the coming together 
by composition of God the Logos with the flesh, composition equal and of similar 
kind to the conjunction [the parts of] composite [natures] have with each other. " 
Secondly, with composite natures the coming-into-being of their parts is necessar- 
ily contemporaneous. The moment of the union of body and soul is the moment they 
4' See also ch. 1: 'Whole and Parts'. 
' See also the argumentation in Doctrinapatrum where the notion of 'composite nature' is seen as 
clearly Apollinarian, Doctrinapatrum 9, Diekamp, 58-65. 
See, for example, Opusc. 16, PG 91,20 1C -202D. 
CAG 4, part 1,4a: 37. 
51 Cf p. .E 13, 
PG 91,517D-520C. 
Ep. 13, PG 91,528D-529A. 
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both come into being. With Christ this clearly is not the case since the Logos existed 
from before the ages and his humanity came into being only at the moment of concep- 
tion. Also with Christ the union happens by assumption: the Logos assumes human 
nature. Instead, the union of body and soul 'is the simultaneous generation of the parts 
from non-being into being at the moment of their union with each other as they come 
into being. "' 
And thirdly, with composite natures the union of the parts is involuntary. With 
Christ this would be blasphemous, Maximus maintains, since God willingly assumed 
the form of human being. Moreover, God became man not to complement a being- 
like soul complementing body to form the composite human nature-but he became 
man in order to restore and renew us. 'For in an unspeakable manner the Logos visited 
men through flesh by virtue of tropos of dispensation rather than by virtue of law of 
nature. 154 
55 
Let us, then, consider Maximus' understanding of 'composite hypostasis'. First 
of all we must remind ourselves of what was said about hypostasis in part two, that a 
hypostasis is a particular and concrete instance of a nature. Reading a psychological no- 
tion of the person into Christology inevitably leads to some form of Apollinarianism in 
which Christ's human soul or intellect (as being the 'person') is annihilated and re- 
placed by the Logos. In brief, modem personalism, it seems to me, could hardly ac- 
commodate the concept of 'composite hypostasis'- except, perhaps, to describe some 
schizophrenic form of being. 
For Maximus it is self-evident that before the Incarnation the Logos was a complete 
hypostasis and that this complete hypostasis was simple. With the incarnation the Lo- 
gos assumes to his own concrete and particular being another form of being; that of 
humanity. The concrete reality that results from this union by voluntary assumption is 
clearly composite in some respect. We have seen how Maximus rejects (as did Justin- 
Ep. 13, PG 91,532A. 
Ep. 12, PG 91,492A. 
55See the article of Nicholas Madden, 'Composite Hypostasis in Maximus the Confessor', in SP 27 
(1993), pp. 175-197. 
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ian 56 and Leontius" before him) the notion of 'composite nature' to describe this end 
result. Christ, therefore, is composite according to hypostasis, not according to nature. 
[Christ is], according to the Fathers, one composite hypostasis, according to which he, the same, with his humanity and owing to his divinity, is wholly God and one 
of the holy and all-praised Trinity, and he, the same, with his divinity and owing to his humanity, is wholly man and one of men. ' 
Here Maximus complements Justinian's favourite phrase 'one of the Trinity' by the 
very striking expression 'one of men'. If Christ is one of the Trinity and one of men, as 
Maximus says, then, one may wish to ask whether Chnst is then not two hypostases. 
Is this not straightforward Nestonanism? To this Maximus' answer is clearly in the 
negative. And why? 
Because, the Word himself was instead of the seed, 'Or rather he was found 
willingly to be the seed of his own incarnation, and he, who is by nature simple 
and not composite, became composite according to hypostasis. He, one and the 
same, remained unchanged, undivided and unconfused in the permanence of the :D 59 
parts of which he was constituted ... 
With the Incarnation there does not emerge a new separate hypostasis, but the sin- 
gle and simple hypostasis of the Logos obtains a second level of being. And he is par- 
ticular also at this new level. Therefore he, the same one, is also one of us. The Logos 
does not assume a human person but he does become a human person. The subtle point 
is that he, one and the same, is at once divine and human person or a divino-human 
person, a 'composite hypostasis'. He is a composite of parts, that is, of the two natures 
that are individuated in a single particular. 
For we say that the one hypostasis of Christ- constituted of flesh and godhead 
through natural union, that is true and real union-has become the common 
hypostasis of flesh and godhead by the unspeakable union. I say 'common', 
because one and the same most particular hypostasis of the parts appeared from 
the union; or rather it was one and the same hypostasis of the Word, now as 
before. But earlier it existed without a cause (dvaLT[(js) [and was] simple and 
uncomposite, later for a cause it became truly composite without change through 
assuming a flesh animated by an intelligent soul. " 
For Maximus what marks off one person from another are the hypostatic differ- 
ences. This applies to Christ, too. 
[Bly virtue of the hypostatic particularity of his own parts, he was distinguished 
from his extremities, I mean from his Father and mother, and he proved to have 
Monoph. 57, Schwartz, 16. 
Cap. Sev. 14 and 15, PG 86,1904D-1905B. 
Ep. 13, PG 91,525C. 
i9 Ep. 15, PG 91,553D-556A. 
61 Ep. 15, PG 91,556CD. 
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kept the oneness of his own hypostasis totally undifferentiated and always unified 
in the utter personal identity of his own parts one with another. " 
These are not simply logical niceties. Admittedly Maximus makes use of rather stiff 
logical jargon, but he does this in order to argue for deep soteriological. concerns. The 
incarnate Logos, Christ, is a composite hypostasis 'so that he may mediate according to 
hypostasis between the parts of which he was composed, closing in himself the dis- 
tance between the extremities, making peace and reconciling, through the Spirit, the 
human nature with God and Father ....... 
'Ev-uTroUTCtTOV 
Another concept closely related to composite hypostasis is that of ývim6cr-ra-rov -a 
concept which during the last one and the half centuries has been almost exclusively 
misunderstood. As a result of this there emerged the doctrine of 'enhypostasia', as the 
essence 'subsisting-in-the-hypostasis' of another, attributed to Leontius of Byzantium 
as the cornerstone of sixth-century Christology. Thanks mainly to the careful work of 
Brian Daley on Leontius we are now becoming aware of the fact 'that the theory that 
Christ's personal unity was achieved through the "enhypostatization" of a full, but im- 
personal human nature into the person of the divine Logos ... has nothing to do with 
Leontius of Byzantium. 963 Daley has conclusively argued (albeit reluctantly accepted by 
modem theologians)61 that the prefix ýv- in the word ývvTr&TTaTOV is the opposite of the 
dv- privative, and has no locative sense of 'in' whatsoever. Daley has also demon- 
strated how the nineteenth-century German Patristics scholar Friedrich Loofs conceived 
the idea of enhypostasia through an erroneous etymology and a misreading of Leontius' 
Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos I (where EVI)IT69TCtTOV is contrasted with 
61E 
. 15, pG 91,556B. P 62Ep. 15, PG 91,556A. 
' Brian Daley, 'The Christology of Leontius of Byzantium: Personalism or Dialectics? ', (unpublished 
paper read at the Oxford Patristic Conference in 1983), p. I- See also his ' "A Richer Union" ', pp. 
239-65; and Matthias Gockel, 'A Dubious Chiristological Formula? Leontius of Byzantium and the 
Anhypostavis-Enhypostasis Theory', In JAS SI (2000), pp. 515-532. 
' See, for example, U. M. Lang, 'Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy 
and Karl Barth', in JThS 49 (1998), pp. 630-657. 
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4 65 accident'), and how Loofs' reading was elaborated first by Herbert Relton and ulti 
mately by Stefan Otto in the direction of existential phenomenology 'to be not merely a 
Christological theory but a term which describes the way any "concrete individual na- 
ture" is taken up into the "ijbergeordneter Selbstand" of "absolutes Ffirsichsein", the 
state which comprises the formal determination of the human individual as a person. "' 
This trend has inspired many Maximian scholars, too. 67 The summit has, perhaps, been 
reached by Eric Perl in his thesis Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint 
Maximus Confessor where he states: 'That he [Maximus] accepts the principle that the 
hypostasis of union which is Christ is the Logos and the idea of enhypostasization, and 
makes these central to his Christology, is so well known that we need not demonstrate 
it again here. '"And he maintains that 'this is the Christology which Maximus adopts 
and develops into a universal ontology. "' 
Let us now consider what Leontius and Maximus themselves have to say about this 
issue. Leontius, first of all, rather than creating a new ontological category is quite sim- 
ply defending Chalcedon against Severan Monophysitism. The Severans argued that 
since, according to the commonly accepted dictum, 'there is no anhypostatos nature', it 
follows that those who admit two natures must also admit two hypostases. 'For they 
say: "If you say two natures in relation to Christ, and as there is no anhypostatos na- 
ture, there will thereby be two hypostases. "' As a response to this, Leontius makes a 
distinction between hypostasis and 6vvTr6crTaTov, as well as between ousia and 
enousion. 
'-ftr6(yTao-L3 signifies the particular being (T6v Týva), whereas the ývvTrooTaTOV 
signifies the essence. '-fTr6aTagL3 defines a person by means of characteristic 
properties, whereas ýVI)Tr6(TTC(TOV signifies that it is not an accident which has its 
being in another and is not considered in itself. ... Therefore, he who says that 
' Nest. et Eut., PG 86,1277CD, 
66Daley, 'The Christology', p- 13. 
' See, for example, Eric Perl, Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus Confes- 
sor (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1991) pp. 18-220; Larchet, La divinisation, pp. 331-332; and Alain 
Riou, Le monde et Vgglise selon Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Beauchesne, 1973), pp. 103-104 ft. 
30! ). See also Andrew Louth's criticism in 'Recent Research on St Maximus the Confessor: A Survey' 
(review article), in SVThQ 42/1 (1998), pp, 73 and 81-82. 
68perl, Methexis, p. 188. 
69Perl, Methexis, P. 188. Italics are mine. 
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there is no dVUTTO9TaTO3 nature speaks the truth, but he does not draw the right 
conclusion if he deduces that that which is not dvvTr6gTaTOý; is a inT6crTctmý; . 
70 
What Leontius is saying here is that to say there is no nature which is not individuated 
does not mean that one cannot make a distinction between nature and hypostasis. It is 
true that nature exists only instanced. as individuals, that is to say as hypostases, but 
this does not mean that nature is hypostasis. Therefore, one can say that Christ is one 
hypostasis in two natures individuated in one composite particular, which is Christ. 
Maximus in his turn gives two definitions of the term ýVVIT6(JTCMV. Something is 
ýVU76GTCMV, he says, 
1. 'which by no means subsists by itself, but is considered in others, as a spe- 
cies in the individuals subordinate to it, ' or 
2. 'which is put together with another, different by essence, to bring about a 
whole i. 71 
In the first definition we have many elements which could almost support the enhy- 
postasia theory, but not quite. What we have here is the Porphyrian Tree again-into 
which Christ does not fit because he is not an individual of a species. What Maximus is 
saying, is that evijTT6aTaTov is the species (E'L8O3)which exists only in the form of indi- 
viduate, d cases of it, that is to say 'in individuals', or perhaps as individuals would be a 
better way of putting it so as to resist the temptation of translating ývu-F&YTaTov as in- 
subsistent, rather than simply as subsistent or real and concrete. Ironically, this is not 
the definition which can be applied to Christology. Instead, it is the second one which 
has no trace of the idea of in-subsistence. The second definition brings us back to 
Maximus' understanding of composite hypostasis, as a particular made up of two es- 
sentially different realities, 'that which is put together with another, different by es- 
sence, to bring about a whole. ' And if, in conclusion, one wanted to make a connection 
with Leontius, one could repeat a line here concerning hypostasis from Contra Nestori- 
anos et Eutychianos: '[W]e can define as "hypostasis" either things which share a na- 
' Nest. et Eut., PG 86,1277CD. 
71EP. 15, PG 91,557D-560A. 
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ture but differ in number, or things which are put together from different natures, but 
which share reciproaly in a common being. 72 
72 Nest. et Eut., PG 86,1280A. 
7 
Activities and Wills 
Activities 
NATURAL INTEGRITY and salvation in Christ were at stake in the rather 
sophisticated controversy over Christ's activity and will. At the cost of being mutilated 
and exiled Maximus defended the doctrine that activity and will are constituents of the 
tv., o natures of Christ and must therefore be confessed as two. Any compromise would 
lead to annulling our salvation according to St Gregory's principle: 'That which has not 
been assumed is not healed'. 
Let us first consider the beginnings of Monenergism. In the Disputatio cum 
Pyrrho, an account of the public debate which took place in 643 in Carthage between 
Maximus and the (then deposed) Patriarch of Constantinople Pyrrhus, Maximus refers 
to the correspondence between Theodore of Pharan and Sergius of Constantinople 
(638-641) as being the origin of this new doctrine. ' Later, Theodore of Pharan was 
regarded as the father of the heresy. At the Lateran council of 649 eleven fragments 
from Theodore's texts were read out demonstrating his understanding of Christ's 
activity and will, that it is one and comes forth from the divinity of the Logos. It does 
not become altogether clear from the fragments what Theodore wants to say exactly, but 
he quite clearly is trying to establish the idea that because Christ is one, therefore also 
his activity is one. This could, then, serve as a bridge between the Chalcedonians and 
the Monophysites. 
Fragment 10 
For our soul is not of such a power by nature so as to be able to repel the 
properties of the body either out of the body or out of itself, but nor has the 
rational soul proved to possess such a dominion over its own body, so as to have 
both mastery over the body's mass, fluids or colour (which are natural to the 
body) and to render the body outside these things at certain times; things which 
are both recorded in the Dispensation of our Saviour Jesus Christ and which have 
happened in his divine and life-giving body. For he came forth without mass and, 
so to speak, incorporeally without expansion from the womb and tomb and 
through the doors, and he walked on sea as on the floor. ' 
' There was also a nuddleman involved calledSergius Macaronas, bishop of Arsenod. See Pyrr., PG 91, 
332B-333B. 
2 Sermo adSergium, ACO ser. 2, vol. 1,122: 32-39. 
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Fragment II 
Therefore we must think and speak in this wise. All those things that are recorded 
of the Saviour Christ in his incarnation are to be understood as one activity of 
which the fashioner and creator is God the Word and the instrument is his 
humanity. Thus, the things that are said of him as God and the things which are 
said of him as referring to a man (dvOpw-aoiTpETrCo3), are all an activity of the 3 divinity of the Word . 
It is suggestive that Theodore, who was a Chalcedonian, drew on the themes 
which were very dear to the Monophysite heart, namely the virgin birth and walking on 
water. In the eyes of the Fathers of the council his treatment of these themes appeared 
alarming and was repudiated by quoting several patristic texts. Walking on water 
'without mass and incorporeally' was refuted by two passages from Dionysius the 
Areopagite, one from On the Divine Names and the following one from Letter 4: 'A 
sign of this that a virgin supernaturally give birth [to a child], and that unsteady water 
carried the weight of his corporeal, earthly feet, and did not yield but by virtue of 
supernatural power was fi rm. 14 
Another source for the doctrine was this self-same Letter of Dionysius, or rather its 
interpretation. It included the well known phrase 'a certain new theandric activity'. This 
too was discussed at the council. Its interpretation in the ninth chapter of Cyrus of 
Alexandria together with the commentary of Sergius of Constantinople were 
scrutinized. Cyrus had used the formula 'one theandric activity': '[O]ne and the same 
Christ and Son performed activities fitting for God and for a human being by one 
theandric activity, according to holy Dionysius. ' This falsified, as Pope Martin pointed 
out, Dionysius' expression 'a certain new theandric activity'. Sergius went even further 
and spoke simply of 'one activity'. 'We know several of the approved Fathers, and in 
particular the most holy Cyril, archbishop of Alexandria, who said in some of his 
wntings that there was one life-giving activity of Christ our true God. ' Thus from 'a 
certain theandric activity' through 'one theandric activity' Sergius ended up saying 'one 
activity'. 
3 Sermo adSergium, ACO ser. 2, vol. 1,124: 2-7. 
4 Ep. 4, PTS 36,160: 12-161: 2. 
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In the sequel, some texts of the Severan Themistius and of Severus himself were 
read out, and the conclusion was drawn that Cyrus and Sergius were in agreement with 
these heretics. Severus, though, had made it explicit that this one activity of the one 
Christ was theandric and not divine (koiTpErýý; ) only. Maximus gives an interesting 
account of what his contemporary Severans thought of the question. 
I remember, when I was staying on the island of Crete, that I heard from certain false bishops of the Severan party who disputed with me, that 'we do not say, in 
accordance with the Tome of Leo, that there are two activities in Christ, because it 
would follow that there were two wills, and that would necessarily introduce a duality of persons, nor again do we say one activity, which might be regarded as 
simple, but we say, in accordance with Severus, that one will, and every divine and 
human activity proceeds from one and the same God the Word Incarnate. " 
This, perhaps, gives us an idea as to how the doctrine actually emerged, and why, 
when the'one activity' formula failed, the discussion moved on to'one will'. 
How, then, does Maximus argue against the idea of one activity? In the Ison of his 
letter to Bishop NikandroS6 and in the Disputatio cum Pyrrho, ' for example, Maximus 
defends the doctrine of two natural activities and wills. He argues following the same 
principles we have already seen several times that things are either natural 
(universal/common) or hypostatic (particular). (Here we should bear in mind that 
Maximus' opponents are followers of the Chalcedonian tradition and therefore the 
distinction between theologia and oikonomia is taken for granted. ) Maximus lays out 
the options. If, he says, Chnst's activity -and the same applies to his will -is one, it 
must be either natural or hypostatic. If it is natural, there are three options. It must be 
either divine only or human only, or neither divine nor human. It follows that Christ is, 
in such a case, either divine nature only, or human nature only, or neither of them. 
If, on the other hand, the activity is hypostatic, then Christ is found to be different 
from his Father and mother according to his activity. This, however, introduces 
division in the divine essence since it is a commonplace that singleness of activity 
implies singleness of essence or nature also. In Opusculum 7, Maximus says: 
If it [the activity] is said to be hypostatic, then this is a new idea: for who has ever 
spoken of possessing an hypostatic activity? Thus such an idea makes him foreign 
5 Opusc. 3, PG 91,49C-52A; translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 195. Still Maximus is quite unhappy 
about this. See the sequel of the Opusculum. 
6 Opusc. 8, PG 91,89C- I 12B. 
7 Pyrr., PG 91,288A-353B. 
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to the Father in his activity, if he has an hypostatic activity, and not a natural 
activity, other than that of the Father. For in his hypostatic characteristics, the 
Word is clearly different from him. ' 
Chnst, according to Maximus, acts because he is by nature capable of acting; and 
he is capable of acting both according to his divine nature (as creator, for example) and 
according to his human nature (when he eats, for example). Had he no such capacity, 
he would be a lifeless nature, such as a stone, for instance. Activity, Maximus 
maintains, is a capacity which a nature possesses; it is a natural property. And since we 
confess two natures in Christ, we must also confess the properties of those two 
natures. Otherwise they will be elliptic, and an incomplete nature is, in the final 
analysis, not a real nature at all. 
Christ's activity is, then, twofold. Maximus' opponents were not too happy with 
this. Pyrrhus argued that what if one regarded as activity the effect of Christ's activity? 
Was that not one and single? Maximus' answer is intriguingly clear. 
For although the activities of both fire and sword are united with each other, we 
nevertheless see the end result of fire to be burning and that of sword cutting, even 
when they are not divided from each other in the burning cutting or the cutting 
burning. 
One more challenge Maximus had to respond to were the expressions in Dionysius 
and Cyril where they speak of Christ's activity in 'monadic' terms. These Maximus 
regards as periphrastic expressions which imply a duality of natures and activities but 
which lay emphasis on their inseparable, yet unconfused, union. The hypostatic union 
of the divine and human natures in Christ without confusion or separation is as true of 
the natural activities, as it is of the natures themselves. The appellation 'theandric' is 
clearly double and is indicative of the duality of natures. The fact that it is expressed 
'monadically' does not denote the disappearance of the natural differences or the 
existence of single natural activity, but emphasizes the inseparable union according to 
the one hypostasis constituted of the two natures. In Ambiguum 5, comparing the 
incarnation to the simile of sword plunged in fire, he says that 
in the same way in the mystery of the divine Incarnation, too, the godhead and the 
humanity were hypostatically united, but neither of them departed from its natural 
its activi activity on account of the union, nor possessed after the union 1 ity 
Opusc. 7, PG 91,85B; translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 189. 
Pyrr., PG 91,341 B. See also Ambig. 5: 272-277, CCSG 48,33. 
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unrelated to or separated from its co-subsisting partner. For the Word made flesh, 
in virtue of an unbreakable union, possessed the capacity of his own humanity to 
undergo suffering. This he possessed attached as a whole to the entire active 
power of his own godhead; and thus, being God, he humanly performed wonders, 
accomplished through the flesh that is passible by nature, and being man, he 
divinely underwent the sufferings of nature, executed by divine authority. Or 
rather, in both he acted theandrically, being at the same time both God and man. " 
Cyril's phrase 'the activity shown to have kinship with both' Maximus regards as 
an 'Imitation of Denys' in different words. Again emphasis is on unity but without 
'destroYing the essential difference of the natural activities. "' 
As he [Cynl] showed that the natural activities of Christ God, who is composed of 
both are perfectly preserved, that of his godhead through the almighty command, 
and that of his humanity through the touch, he proves them to be thoroughly 
united by their mutual coming together and interpenetration, showing that the 
activity of the Logos himself and his all-holy flesh is one on account of the union, 
not natural or hypostatic-for the teacher did not say any such thing-but akin 
by the parts (U_UY'YEVý TCýLS; [L6PC9L), through which, as was said, in accordance with 
his almighty command and the touch of his hand this kinship was manifested. " 
Wills 
Let us then turn to the question of 'will'. In his Ecthesis of 638, Heraclius imposed 
on his people the doctrine of Monotheletism, or the doctrine of one will in Christ, on 
the grounds that Christ could not have two wills opposing one another. He argued that 
since even Nestorius, who divided the one Christ into two sons, professed tautoboulia, 
it was impossible for the orthodox to confess two contradicting wills in Christ. Here is 
Heraclius' own statement: 
Therefore following the holy Fathers, in this case as in all, we confess one will of 
our Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, since flesh animated by an intelligent soul, at 
no one time [acted] its natural movement separately and of its own impulse, 
contrary to the indication (v6ýLa) of God the Word, who was united to it, but [it 
acted its natural movement] as God the Word wanted, defining its time, kind and 
quantity. 13 
Maximus was well aware of the fact that the Ecthesis was designed to make 
imperial 'orthodoxy' acceptable to the Monophysites. Therefore any notion which could 
betray the doctrine of the two natures was to be uprooted. Since 'will' could be-and 
had to be- understood as the natural faculty of willing in the human nature, rather than 
" Ambig. 5: 280-291, CCSG 48,33-34. 
11 Opusc. 7, PG 91,85C. 
12 Opusc. 7, PG 91,85D-88A; translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 189, 
13 ACO, ser. 2, vol. 1, p. 160. 
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simply as the object or the goal of willing, it was necessary to maintain than Christ had 
two wills. 
Will, then, according to Maximus, is a natural property of the human (and also of 
the divine) nature. " it is a distinctive and constitutive feature of any rational or 
intelligent nature. Intelligent natures possess a certain 'self-governed movement' 
(CLVTEýOýCTLO3 KIVT]CrL3) or self-determi nation which Maximus calls 'will'. Such beings 
are not governed in their actions by senses or natural urges, but by a rational self- 
detennination through which they express their freedom. They do certain things 
because they want to do them, in contrast to animals and plants which do not have this 
capacity. Maximus argues his point on the basis that will is not something that is taught, 
and that for this reason it must be natural. 
[T]he usage of the uneducated has also affirmed that what is natural is not taught. 
So, if natural things are not acquired through teaching, then we have will without 
having acquired it or being taught it, for no one has ever had a will which was 
acquired by teaching. Consequently, man has the faculty of will by nature. 
And again, if man by nature possesses the faculty of reason, and if rational nature 
is also self-determining, and if self-determination is, according to the Fathers, the 
will, then man possesses will by nature. ... 
And again, if man was made after the image of the blessed godhead which is 
beyond being, and since the divine nature is self-determined, then he is by nature 
endowed with free-will. For it has been stated already that the Fathers defined 
4will' as self-determination (IaýTEýOýGLOV). 
15 
An existentialist type of understanding of personhood sees freedom as a property 
of the person as opposed to nature. Nature or essence is bound to necessity and must be 
transcended in the ecstasy of the person out of the impersonality of essence. In 
Byzantine theology, in contrast, freedom is an intrinsic element of certain natures or 
essences, of intelligent or rational natures, not to mention the divine nature itself. 'The 
natural things of intelligent beings are not under necessity, "' argues Maximus against 
Pyrrhus. God, angels and men are free by nature and by essence, and not because they 
are 'persons', that is, particular instances of their species. For St Maximus even a 
14 For an account of the process of willing in Maximus see R. -A. Gauthier, 'Saint Maxime le 
Confesseur et la psychologie de Facte humain', in R ThAM 21 (1954), pp. 51- 100. 
15 Pyrr., PG 91,304CD, translation in Joseph P. Farrell, The Disputation with Pyrrhus of our Fadjer 
among the Saints Maximus the Confessor (South Canaan: St. Tikhon's Seminary Press, 1990), pp. 
24-25. 
'6pyrr., PG 91,293C. 
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particular mouse, as we have seen, is a person or hypostasis. But a mouse is not free, 
because its nature possesses no freedom; it has no 'self-governed movement' or self- 
determination (ctýTEýoýmov). Yet, we must not forget that human beings are amphibians 
that have a twofold nature constituted of a rational and free part, and an irrational animal 
part. The latter is to be governed by the former but in the fallen man these two parts are 
somewhat confused. In this context Maximus does sometimes speak of the 'law of 
nature' (v6ýLog T-q3 qýý)(YCW3)17 and the need of being liberated from it. By this Maximus 
means detachment of the intellect-the seat of rationality- from the senses which are 
holding it captive. No sense of the 'person' emerging from the prison of the objective 
impersonality of nature can be determined here. 
Having established that will is a natural property both of divine and of human 
natures, Maximus argues that although Christ has two wills, it does not follow that 
Christ has two contradicting wills. He makes a distinction between the natural and the 
gnomic will; the former is characteristic of nature, the latter of person. In Opusculum 3, 
Maximus demonstrates the consequences of confessing one will. 
If this [one] will is gnomic, then it will be characteristic of his single hypostasis ... and it will be shown to be different in will from the Father and the Spirit, and to 
fight against them. If, furthermore, this will [is natural and] belongs to his sole 
godhead, then the godhead will be subject to passions and, contrary to nature, 
long for food and drink. If, finally, this will belongs to his sole human nature, 
then it will not be efficacious by nature. " 
Gnomic will is, it seems, a characteristic of the fallen world. '9 It is the inclination 
away from the purpose of God for his creation, which is why it is so radically separated 
from the natural will. Natural will, in turn, is 'the power that longs for what is 
natural', 'O and 'that nothing natural is opposed to God is clear from the fact that these 
things were originally fashioned by him. "' Christ has two natural wills, but not two 
gnomic wills, for his willing is not dominated by the blameable passions, as usually 
happens with us. 'The willing of that one [i. e. Christ] is not opposed to God, but is 
" See, for example, Qu. Thal. 54, CCSG 7,443-455. The wordTrp6cw-ffov in the text clearly has the 
meaning of face only - 
" Opusc. 3, PG 91,53CD; translation in Louth, Maximus, pp. 196-197. 
19 See Opusc. 16,193B-196A. See also below, Ch. 13: 'Gnome. 
20 Opusc. 3, PG 91,48A. 
21 Opusc. 7, PG 91,80A. 
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wholly deified, ' Maximus maintains quoting St Gregory Nazianzen. 2' There is, 
therefore, no contradiction between the two wills of the two natures of Christ. 
Moreover, Christ's agony in the garden of Gethsemane is indicative of his human 
will. As a man he begged the Father to let the cup passftom him" to show that he was 
truly human-and that he truly bore the consequences of the unblameable passions, 
voluntarily and without sin. Also, that Christ's human will was wholly deified is 
shown 
in its agreement with the divine will itself, since it is eternally moved and shaped 
by it and in accordance with it. ... All that matters is a perfect verification of the will of the Father, in his saying as a human being, Not mine, but your will be 
done, " by this giving himself as a type and example of setting aside our own will 
by the perfect fulfilment of the divine, even if because of this we find ourselves 
face to face with death. ' 
Our ascetic struggle aims at this same end: to will and act naturally according to the 
divine order. Freedom of will, rather than being simply freedom to choose between 
things, becomes in Maximus' theology freedom to exercise that which is natural in 
God's unfallen reality. It is freedom from the blameable passions and freedom to act 
according to God's will-even when this may be utterly painful and difficult-with a 
clear vision and a certainty of the correctness of one's actions. If, then, freedom in this 
sense, is constitutive of what it is to be truly human, then liberation through ascetic 
struggle of the soul's rational powers and its self-determination(CtýTEýOýaLOV) from its 
irrational animal side becomes vital for men and women to be truly human. 
' Opusc. 3, PG 91,48AB; Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 30.12, SC 250,248. 
23 Matt. 26: 39. 
24 Cf. Lk. 22: 24. 
' Opusc. 7, PG 91,801); translation in Louth, Maximus, p. 186. 
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Union 
SO FAR we have seen how unity and differentiation can be considered in Christ simul- 
taneously at the level of the particular and of the universal, that is, at the level of hy- 
postasis and nature. What has not been discussed yet is the role union and distinction 
have in the relation between the two natures in Christ. Here two notions of particular 
interest for Maximus' theology will be addressed: 'union without confusion' 
(dgý-YXVT013 EVWOIý; ) and 'interpenetration' (-7EPLXC6PTjCTL, 3). The discussion begins with 
Porphyry's views on the union of body and soul and then moves on to consider how 
this features in the Christologies of Cyril of Alexandria and Maximus. 
Union Without Confusion 
Porphyry. The Neoplatonist Porphyry found particularly important and chal- 
lenging the question of the manner of union of body and soul. His conclusion, that this 
was a 'union without confusion' (ct"yXvToýý CVWULýý), was an innovation in Greek 
philosophy and was later taken up by the Christians to describe the union of the divine 
and human natures in Christ. 
Porphyry's argumentation on the union of body and soul can be found in his Mis- 
cellaneous InquiriesV The discussion is primarily addressed to the Stoics. Starting 
from their language of mixture Porphyry argues against the Stoic concept of the corpo- 
reity of soul and shows that there must be 'another manner of union' 
(E'TEP03 Tp6TrO3 
'Porphyry, Fragnzenta, Smith, 278-290; and Nemesius of Einesa, Nat. hom., Morani, 38-42. An Eng- 
lish translation is provided in Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa, The Catechetical Lecturesl 
On the Nature of Man, editedby W. Tefler (The Library of Christian Classics 4, London: SCM Press 
Ltd, 1955), pp. 293-298. The argument is attributed to Ammonjus Sakkas by Nemesius of Emesa in 
the De naturahominis chapter three, but modem scholarship, especially H. D6rrie, has argued-albeit 
not conclusively- that the actual source was Porphyry. See Grillmeier, Christ, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 34- 
35 and 200-20 1; Pierre. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris: 
ttudes Augustiniennes, 1968), pp. 109- 
110; and Brian E. Daley, "'A Richer Union": Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of Human 
and Divine in Christ', in SP 24 (1993), pp - 254-256. (1 have not been able to consult D6rrie's study 
first hand. ) A similar discussion can be found in Porphyry's Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes 33, 
Lamberz, 35-38. 
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... JýOL VW1, 
ý CL, 3)2 apart from those which the Stoics applied to material things. These 
were 'blending' (KPdGP3), 'combination' ([dýLg), 'joining' (aývo6og), 'juxtaposition' 
(TTCLPdOEaL3) and'confusion' (aý, yXvuL3). For example, 'blending' (or 'mingling') hap- 
pens when water and wine are mixed, and 'juxtaposition' is the way in which grains in 
a heap relate to one another. The strongest of the five terms is 'confusion'. It involves 
an erasure of the united elements as such (a-qLýOctpývcu) and results in a third element 
with new qualities. ' The union that Porphyry is after should somehow combine the 
density of confusion and the imperishability and the clear distinction of the elements in 
juxtaposition. 
According to Porphyry, soul is an immaterial and intelligible being, and intelligible 
beings are by nature such that cannot suffer any alteration (dXXO[WGL3). Hence their im- 
mortalivy. The soul, as the life-principle, is there to animate the body, to give life to it, 
and if the soul changed and thus ceased to be life, there could be no living human na- 
ture. Consequently, since any mixing of material things involves alteration, the Stoic 
materialistic terminology proves inadequate to express this 'divine and wondrous 
blending" of body and soul. Porphyry, therefore, suggests that there is a special man- 
ner of union between an intelligible and a sensible thing. 
It is in the nature of intelligible beings both to be capable of union with things 
adapted to receive them,. Just as much as if they were things that perish when they 
are united (T6 (TuvE"(xpiVL6va), and to remain, nevertheless, unconfused (da&YX_UTa) 
with them while in union, and imperishable WLOýpa), just as though they were 
merely juxtaposed 
(T61 iTaPGWEI 11CVCt). 
5 
There is union but no change or annihilation. It is worth noting here that sympathy be- 
tween body and soul is essential for Porphyry's argument: it proves that there is a un- 
ion. On the other hand, soul's individual operation during sleep shows its distinctive- 
2Sent. 33, Lamberz, 38: 2-4. 
For these terms see Grillmeier, Christ, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 39-40 and 205; and Harry Austryn Wolfson, 
The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
HarvardUniversity Press, 1956), pp. 372ff. 
4 Porphyry, Ad Gaurum 10.5, quoted in Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, p. 89, 
5 Nemesius, Nat. hom. 3 (= Porphyry, Miscellaneous Inquiries 7), Morani, 39: 17-20. 
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ness from the body. Porphyry's corollary is this famous 'union without confusion' 
which he illustrates by the metaphor of light blending with air. 
It follows of necessity that when intelligible beings are in union with bodies, they 
do not perish in company with those bodies. So the soul is united to the body, 
and, further, united without confusion. ... The soul is incorporeal, and yet it has established its presence in every part of the body, just as much as if it were a part- 
ner to union involving the sacrifice of its proper nature. Nevertheless, it remains z: 1 
uncorrupted by body, just as if it were something quite distinct from it. Thus, on 
the one hand, the soul preserves its own independent unity of being, and on the 
other, it modifies whatever it indwells, in accordance with its own life, while itself 
suffering no reciprocal change. For, as the presence of the sun transforms the air 
into light, making the air luminous by uniting light with air, at once maintaining 
them distinct and yet melting them together, so likewise the soul is united to the 
body and yet remains distinct from iC 
It is not at all surprising that the Fathers-St Cyril of Alexandria in the first place- 
were ready to make use of this idea in their Christology, especially if we bear in mind 
that soul for Porphyry was not just a created life-principle, but aVOTIT6v, an intelligible, ýI 
eternal being, which originated from the divine world of Forms. The union of body and 
soul was one in which the sensible and the intelligible realities came together. It was not 
a union between two material objects but a union between incorporeal and corporeal 
natures. As the Neoplatonists, drew the fundamental ontological divide between these 
two realities (the intelligible and the sensible) -something which the Christians drew 
between the created and the uncreated-a union of body and soul corresponded to no 
less than a union of God and man in Christian terms. A terminology which could bridge 
the ontological gulf and unite the realms on either side of the divide was very welcome 
to Christian theology, and, as is well known, the phrase 'uruon without confusion' be- 
came one of the key concepts of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. 
The body-soul imagery, however, could serve only as an analogy for the Christian 
Fathers, because, on the one hand, in the person of Christ, God assumed both a human 
body and soul, and, on the other hand, the union of the two natures in Christ was to be 
sought at the level of person, rather than at the level of nature. 
Cyril of Alexandria. The way in which CynI discusses the question of the 
manner of union of the two natures is strongly reminiscent of Porphyry's analysis of 
6 See E. L. Fortin, Christianisme et Culture Philosophique au CinqWme Sikle. La Querelle de I'Ame 
Humaine en Occident (Paris: ttudes Augustiniennes, 1959), pp. 111- 128; Hadot, Porphyre et Victor- 
inus, pp. 109-110. 
7 Nat. ho m. 3, Morani, 40: 9-11,40: 19-41: 2. 
122 
the union of body and soul. Cyril definitely knew Porphyry's works. He quotes several 
of them in Contra Julianum' and his terminology of the manner of union draws on Por- 
phyry's Miscellaneous Inquiries and Sententiae-even the structure of his argumenta- 
tion betrays a certain familiarity with these texts. Also the body-soul analogy, of wl-ýich 
Cyril makes considerable use in his Christology, creates a strong link between the two 
men. In the Scholia de Incarnatione Unigeniti, 9 he enumerates the terms- more or less 
the same as in Porphyry-which should not be used in relation to Christ, concluding 
that the only proper word to be used is 'union' (ýVWGL3). 
Cyril compares this union to the human being which is one although made of body 
and soul. He admits the obvious defects of such an analogy and states that 'Emmanuel' 
is above every analogy. For example, compassion between body and soul, which in 
Porphyry's argument was the sine qua non, in the Christological context would lead to 
heresy. In this analogy soul represents the divine nature of Christ and body represents 
his human nature. If the soul suffers with the body at the human level, in Christ this 
would mean that his divine nature suffered with his human nature, which simply was 
incompatible with orthodoxy. Interestingly, Nemesius, in whose treatise On the Nature 
of Man the aforementioned discussion of Porphyry is preserved, in the same chapter 
comments on this particular weakness of the analogy. 
The above arguments [concerning unconfused union] would apply even more 
exactly to the union of the divine Word with his humanity. For he continued thus 
in union, without confusion, and without being circumscribed, in a different 
manner from the soul. For the soul, being one of the things in process of 
completion, and because of its propriety to body, seems even in some way to 
suffer with it, sometimes mastering it, and sometimes being mastered by it. But the 
divine Word suffers no alteration from the fellowship which he has with the body 
and the soul. In sharing with them his own godhead, he does not partake of their 
infirmity. He is one with them, and yet he continues in that state in which he was, 
before his entry into that union. This manner of mingling or union is something 
quite new. The Word mingles with body and soul, and yet remains throughout 
unmixed, unconfused, uncorrupted, untransforined, not co-suffering but only co- 
acting with them, not perishing with them, nor changing as they change. " 
Cyril rejects the use of the term 'blending' (KpdgLg) in Christology on the grounds 
that it introduces 'confusion' (CFý-YXVUL3). 'Confusion' would mean the destruction of 
the divine and the human in Christ and the coming-into-being of a tertium quid. Also 
See Juln., PG 76,645B, 781B, 817BC and977B. 
Schol. inc., PG 75,1369A-1407B. 
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other terms such as 'combination' ([L! ýLýý) and 'juxtaposition' (TrapdOE013) Cyril regards 
as inadequate. In his view, the only really acceptable term is 'union' (EVWcFL3). Cyril 
clearly has in mind the kind of union of which Porphyry spoke, a union without confu- 
sion: 'But we say that Jesus Christ is one and the same knowing the difference of na- 
tures (&CtýOpd (ýýaEcov) and guarding them without confusion in relation to each other 
(dCF&YXVTOL dXXýXCU3). "' And in another place he says: '[A]Iso after the Word was 
brought into a real union with the human nature, the things united have remained with- 
out confusion (duiryXuTct [JEýLCVýIMGIP Td ý 1)(j)[LC VCt) 1.12 It seems quite clear from all 
this that Cyril is here taking the concept of 'union without confusion' from Porphyrian 
anthropology, placing it in a new environment and in so doing prepares its way to 
Chalcedonian ChnStology. 13 
If the Council of Chalcedon received from Cyril the concept of 'union without con- 
fusion', it certainly was not the only thing which was common to Cyril and the council. 
Without having to refer to the Formula o Reunion, which was adopted by Cyril and 
which lent much of its language to Chalcedon, one can notice the presence of the Cyril- 
Ilan theology in the famous section of the Chalcedonian Definition: 14 'one and the same 
Christ, Son, Lord, Only-Begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, 
without change, without division, without separation. `5 The identity and oneness of 
Christ and the Logos was the very issue for which Cyril was fighting against Nesto- 
nus. The phrase 'without confusion' in Cyril is connected with the concept of 
'blending' which also is included in the Definition. As for the 'without division' a pas- 
sage from Contra Nestorium 2 is revealing: 'As soon as we bring in the mystery of 
Christ, then the rationale of the union allows for that of difference, but discounts any 
division (&alpEgPý), not confusing or mingling the natures ..... 
16 
" Nat. hom - 3, Morani, 
42: 9-22; translation in Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Eniesa, edited by 
William Telfer (Ilie Library of Christian Classics 4, London: SCM Press Ltd, 1955), pp. 300-301. 
" Schol. inc., PG 75,1385C. 
12 Schol. inc., PG 75,1380D. 
13 See E. L. Fortin, 'The Deftnitio Fidei of Chalcedon and its Philosophical Sources', in SP 5 (1962), 
pp. 489-498. 
14 ACO, ser. 1, tome 1, vol. 2, part 1,322-326. 
15 ACO, ser. 1, tome 1, vol. 2, part 1,325: 30-3 1. 
'6ACO, ser. 1, tome 1, vol. 1, part 6,42: 34-36. See Ruth Siddals, 'Oneness and Difference in the 
Christology of Cyril of Alexandria', in SP, 18.1 (1983), p. 207. 
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Maximus. Moving on to Maximus, we have seen earlier on that for 
Maximus integrity both of nature and person is of major importance. Since confusion is 
something which involves destruction of a nature, it is thereby something to be avoided 
at all cost. On the other hand, in Chnstology, separation is the monster that destroys 
personal unity. (Heretics in Maximus' ranking were always either 'confusers' or 
'separators'. A good example of this can be found in the fifth session of the acts of the 
Lateran Council 649, a document inspired to a great extent by Maximus. )" 
[I]t is altogether devout to confess two natures, dissimilar in essence, that have 
come together in an unspeakable union, and to hold the opinion that they have 
remained unconfused also after the union. To say that they remain unconfused does not introduce any division ... but signifies that the difference has remained unchanged. For difference and division are not the same thing. 18 
The greatness of this notion lies in the fact that it can accommodate at once both unity 
and differentiation within one being. 'No' to confusion means 4yes' to difference, and 
hence to natural integrity. 'Yes' to union means 4no' to separation, and hence also 'yes' 
to personal integrity. Maximus draws together a great deal of Christological insights in 
an allegory on Zacharias' prophetic vision of the flying sickle. " The sharp edge of the 
sickle serves as an image of the utter inviolability of unity and difference in Christ. 
'Sickle' is, therefore, our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son and Logos of 
God, who in himself is and ever remains simple by nature but who for my sake 
became composite by hypostasis, as he knows how, through assuming flesh 
animated by an intelligent soul. He neither accepted a fusion (CF4YI)GLý; ) into one 
nature on account of his utter hypostatic union with the flesh, nor was he severed 
into a duality of Sons due to his utter natural difference from the flesh. (By 
tutter' [lit. 'edge' of the sickle] of the hypostatic union I mean the absolute 
undividedness, and by the 'utter' of natural difference the complete unconfusion 
and unchangeability. ) ... 
For the union was of two natures into one hypostasis, not 
into one nature, so that the hypostatic oneness is shown to result by union from 
the natures which have come together, and the difference in natural particularity 
of the natures united in an unbreakable union is believed to remain free from 
every change and confusion. " 
If there is something new in Maximus' treatment of 'union without confusion', it is 
its extension to include activity. What is true of the natures themselves is true of what 
belongs to them, activity being one essential constituent. Christ himself, Maximus con- 
cludes, is the unconfused union of the activities: 'By fitting these [divine and human] 
things one into the other he has demonstrated the natures, of which he was a hyposta- 
17 See ACO, ser. 2, vol. 1,320-332 for the 'confusers' and 332-334 for the 'separators'. 
18 Ep. 12, PG 91,469A. 
" Zach. 5: 1-4. 
20 Qu, nal. 62, CCSG 22,117: 29-39,44-50. 
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sis, and their essential activities, that is movements, of which he was a union without 
confusion. "' 
Perichoresis 
The term TTCPLX6PTICFLýý, 22 or interpenetration, was first made use of by Gregory 
Nazianzen among the Christians -though he used it only once, and the meaning even 
21 
of this instance is disputed. Maximus is the next person to have taken advantage of the 
notion, and it was he who established its place in Christology. St John of Damascus is 
the first person known to have applied it to Tnnitarian theology. Through his Expositio 
fidei it became more widespread and eventually found its way Io the fourteenth-century 
compilation De pietate of Joseph the Philosopher, more commonly known as De 
sacrosancto Trinitate of pS. _Cynl, 2' a treatise which for long was regarded as a sev- 
enth-century text and the originator of the idea of tntutanan perichoresis . 
25 
As a notion perichoresis is very similar to 'urHon without confusion'. And nor- 
mally where the term perichoresis appears in Maximus' text, there also the phrase 
'union without confusion' is present. Maximus uses perichoresis to describe the inter- 
penetration of essentially different natures. With the interpenetration, natures are utterly 
united but do not alter qua natures. Maximus is careful to point this out by -making it 
clear that there is a perichbresis but not a metachoresis, that is, a change of one nature 
into the other. 
[Ajnd this. is truly marvellous and astounding to all, the same one is wholly among 
men remaining entirely within its own nature, and the same one being wholly 
among the divine remains completely unmoving from its natural properties. For 
this was an interpenetration (TTEPLX6PTj19LS; ) of the natures, and of their natural 
properties, one into the other, according to the teaching of our Fathers inspired by 
God, but not a change or declination ([IETC1X(6PTj(TL3 fl [LETdTrT(OCFL3) on account of 
the union-which is proper to those who malevolently turn the union into 
confusion.... 26 
Ambig. 4: 74-79, CCSG 48,16. 
See Verna Harrison, 'Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers', in SVThQ 3S11 (1991), pp. 53-65; Wolf- 
son, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, pp. 418-428; and Thunberg, Microcosm, pp. 21-36. 
23See Harrison, 'Perichoresis', pp. 54-57. 
24PG 77,1120ff. Vassa Conticello has shown that this treatise forms a part (De pietate) of Joseph the 
Philosopher's (d. ca 1330) Encyclopedia and is a compilation from John's Expositio fidei and 
Nicephorus Blemmydes'(1197-1272) Sermo ad monachos suos (PG 142,583-606). See V. S. Con- 
ticello, 'Pseudo-Cyril's "De SS. Trinitate", A Compilation of Joseph the Philosopher', in OCP 61 
(1995), pp. 117-129. 
25See, for example, G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1952), pp. 280-281. 
26Disp. Biz.: 531-538, CCSG 39,121-123. 
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It has often been asked whether there is a mutual interpenetration of the natures or 
only a penetration of the human nature by the divine. 
27 It seems to me that in Maximus 
this depends on the context in any given case. The metaphor he is fond of repeating Is, 
as one might expect, that of incandescent iron, but there are also the metaphors of air 
penneated by light, of reason and conception, 
28 
and that of the union of body and 
soul., 9 
For mutual interpenetration Maximus employs the first three metaphors. The na- 
tures of fire and iron interpenetrate one into the other, and the result of this is seen in the 
double effect of cutting and burning of the red-hot sword. 
Just as the utter and complete union and mixture with fire does not alter an iron 
sword from its own essential being, but the sword undergoes what belongs to the 
fire since it becomes fire by virtue of the union. It still weighs down and cuts, for 
it has suffered no maiming of its own nature nor has it at all changed from its 
natural activity-albeit that it exists with the fire in one and the same hypostasis 
and accomplishes the things that belong to its nature, that is cutting, without 
separation [from the fire]. And again it also does the things of the union, which is 
burning. For burning now belongs to it, as does cutting to the fire, by virtue of 
their utter interpenetration into each other and their exchange. " 
Yet in another place, where he defends the doctrine of natural will and the deification of 
Christ's humanity and human will, he is perfectly happy to use the same metaphor to 
present a more one-sided penetration. 
[C]onfirming the truth of the Incarnation, he became everything for our sakes and 
acted voluntarily on our behalf, in no way deceiving in respect to our essence or 
in respect to any of its natural and blameless passions, since he both deified the 
essence with all that belongs to it, like an incandescent iron, ... ' penetrating it 
thoroughly and to the utter [degree] on account of the union, and becoming one 
with it without confusion according to one and the same hypostasis. " 
The same is true of the metaphor of body and soul, 'the soul being united to the body 
entirely penetrating it without confusion according to the union. 
-)32 
If we now look at the context, we shall discover that in the last two examples 
Maximus speaks of the deification of the humanity of Christ by the Logos. There is, 
one might say, a vertical penetration. The Logos deifies the human nature; the Logos 
penetrates and the humanity is being penetrated, as the soul penetrates the body. 
27See for example, Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus, pp. 257-259. For a discussion see Larchet, La 
divinisation, pp. 335-346, and Thimberg, Microcosm, p. 21. 
28 Pyrr., PG 91,337CD. 
Ambig. 42, PG 91,1320B. 
Opusc. 16, PG 91,189CD. 
31 Opusc. 4, PG 91,60BC. 
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In the first example, in contrast, Maximus is defending the doctrine of the two 
natural activities. It is vital for him to show that they both are there and that they both 
are active and real, yet in an unbreakable union. This could be called a horizontal and 
symmetrical interpenetration. Two natures with their natural activities penetrate each 
other in such a way that their natural characteristics are preserved unharmed but are al- 
lowed to form one whole with a double effect. This, in conclusion, could be taken as 
the culmination of the pnnciple of union and distinction in Maximus' Christology. 
It is just like the way the cutting-edge of a sword plunged in fire becomes burning 
hot and the heat acquires a cutting-edge (for just as the fire is united to the iron, 
so also is the burning heat of the fire united to the cutting-edge of the iron) and In 
the iron becomes burning hot by its union with the fire, and the fire acquires a 
cutting-edge by union with the iron. Neither suffers any change on account of the 
exchange [of properties] with the other in union, but each remains unchanged in 
its own [being] also in the identity that the one has with the other by virtue of the 
union. In the same way in the mystery of the divine Incarnation, too, the godhead 
and the humanity were hypostatically united, but neither of them departed from 
its natural activity on account of the union, nor possessed after the union its 
activity unrelated to or separated from its co-subsisting partner . 
33 
3'Ambig. 42, PG 91,1320B. 
' Ambig. 5: 272-284, CCSG 48,33. 
Part IV 
UNIVERSE, SCRIPTURE, CHURCH 
9 
The Creation Song 
The Logos and the Logoi 
THE CONNECTION between the universe and its cause, whether a Creator or a first 
principle, is an issue of primary importance for the understanding of any religious or 
philosophical system. Such a connection may be a direct continuum, or it may be one or 
another form of participation, or even just a fading link of a distant deus otiosus with 
the world he once created and then left to own its fate. In Neoplatonism, for example, 
the acute dilemma of the One and the many, central to its whole doctrine, is directly 
relevant to this question. In early Christianity in general, much of theological discussion 
revolves around the question of the relation between the uncreated and the created, and 
in Maximus' thought in particular, the connection between the uncreated and the created 
also includes a certain vision of the One God and the many beings. He expresses this 
connection between God and the creation in terms of logoi of beings, a theme very cen- 
tral to his cosmology. As a whole, his cosmology is a vast subject and has received a 
number of different interpretations, ' but here we shall limit the discussion to aspects 
relevant to our subject matter. 
Proclus. Let me first take one instance from Neoplatonic thought to illustrate the 
connection between the primary cause, the One, and the many. Proclus in his Elements 
of Theology speaks in terms of union and distinction when he expounds the idea that 
everything is produced by productive causes. All productive causes participate in the 
completeness of the Good, the supreme productive cause, and imitate the Good by be- 
ing productive causes to other beings. Each product must somehow differ from its 
' The most recent discussions can be found in ToRefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, pp. 93-173, 
and Perl, Methexis, pp. 147-179. 
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cause or else it will not be other than the cause. The product therefore proceeds from its 
cause and in this way becomes distinct from it. Nevertheless, the product cannot be al- 
together distinct from the cause because, Proclus says, 'it is necessary that the effect 
should participate in the cause, inasmuch as it derives its being from the latter. ý2 And 
also, he continues, because 'every producing cause brings into existence things like to 
itself before the unlike 1.3 Thus the product must be similar to its cause and united with 
it. The cause and the product are 'at once united and distinguished' (KaL ýVWTCLL KaL 
6L CLKý KPL TOLL). ' The product 'both remains in the cause and proceeds, and the two rela- 
tions are inseparable'. -s In sum, what Proclus expresses here in terms of union and dis- 
tinction, is the ontological identity and difference between a productive cause and a 
product. 
Whether or not one wants to call this unfolding of the One into the many an ema- 
nation, it still remains a given that there is a continuum between the cause and the effect. 
The connection here is a continuum. The Christian notion of creation cannot accommo- 
date such essential continuum. There is in Christian understanding an ontological gulf 
between the creator and the created. At the same time, however, there is a connection, 
too, a connection without which the universe would not exist. 6 In other words, in 
Christianity, too, there is union and distinction between the cause and the effect, but it 
is of a different order than that in Procl us. 
'Aslan' and Maximus. For understanding the Christian view-point of creation an 
intriguingly vivid image is provided by C. S. Lewis in The Magician's Nephew where 
God's creative activity is presented as the creation song of the Lion Aslan. This, I 
think, will help us to approach Maximus' vision. 
All this time the Lion's song, and his stately prowl, to and fro, backwards and 
forwards, was going on. ... 
Polly was finding the song more and more interesting because she thought she 
was beginning to see the connection between the music and the things that were 
2 Inst. 28, Dodds, 3 2. 
3 Inst. 28, Dodds, 32. 
4 Inst. 28, Dodds, 3 2. 
5 Inst. 30, Dodds, 34. 
The theology of Athanasius of Alexandriamoves precisely along these lines. See the recent study by 
Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius. The coherence of his thought (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). 
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happening. When a line of dark firs sprang up on a ridge about a hundred yards 
away she felt that they were connected with a series of deep, prolonged notes 
which the Lion had sung a second before. And when he burst into a rapid series 
of lighter notes she was not surprised to see primroses suddenly appearing in 
every direction. 
Thus, with an unspeakable thrill, she felt quite certain that all the things were 
coming (as she said) 'out of the Lion's head'. 
When you listened to his song you heard the things he was making up; when you 7 looked round you, you saw them . 
The connection between the creatures and the creator in this figure are the different 
musical notes. With the notes everything seems to proceed, as Polly puts it, 'out of the 
Lion's head. ' Yet, it is clear that this is not a process of emanation but an act of crea- 
tion. It is not the Lion, as it were, unfolding into the creatures. It is not his self- 
creation. Yet, it is the Lion's creation, a creation which expresses and realizes his will 
and ideas. 
Aslan creates a manifold world. The beings there are different owing to the differ- 
ence of their creative tones. Without this differentiation Narnia would have been a very 
monotonous place and the song a rather boring one, or not a real song at all. But, in 
fact, the end product of Aslan's music was a new world full of all kinds of creatures 
(often rather strange) which all had their particular gift and function there. Everything 
was very well thought through in advance. 
If one now interchanges the musical notes of the Lion's song with Maximus' vi- 
sion of the logoi of beings, the picture is strikingly similar. The logoi according to 
Maximus are God's intentions or wills. They pre-exist in the Logos of God eternally as 
his wills, and are actualized in time. That is to say that the logoi are not the beings 
themselves, but are, as it were, what God in his mind thinks he is going to create. The 
logoi are God's ideas or plans for the creatures, and when actualized they seem to be 
like things coming out of 'God's head'. In accordance with these logoi everything re- 
ceives being, and everything is different owing to the differentiation of the logoi, just as 
the firs and the primroses followed different sounds in Aslan's song. 'Ft is] by means 
of these logoi, and even more so because of them, that the different beings differ [from 
7 C. S. Lewis, The Magician's Nephew (Tales of Narnia, London: Diamond Books [HarperColliiiis Pub- 
lishers], 1998; first published in 1955 by The Bodley Head), p. 10 1. 
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one another]. For the different beings would not differ from one another, had the logoi, 
by means of which they have come-i nto-being, no difference. " 
Maximus points out that 'the logoi ... according to the holy Dionysius the Are- 
opagite are called "predesti nations" and "divine wills" in Scripture. Similarly, those 
around Pantaenus the teacher of the great Clement, the author of The Stromata, say that 
the Scripture is wont to name them "divine wills". " Elsewhere, also the term 
'paradigm' denotes the same thing. 
How then does Maximus understand the connection between God and the creation 
through the logoi? In Ambiguum 7 (in which he discusses a difficulty from Gregory 
Nazianzen, the phrase 'we are a portion of God')'O Maximus -first of all makes it clear 
that 'beings have been brought into existence by God from non-being through reason 
and wisdom'. " 
In God the logoi of all are firmly fixed. And it is said that God knows all beings 
according to these logoi before their creation, since they are in him and with him, 
in God who is the truth of all [beings]. [This is so] even though all these very 
beings, those that are and those that are to be, were not brought into being 
together with their logoi or their being known by God, but each being was created 
at the appropriate time according to its logos in harmony with the wisdom of the 
creator, receiving thus its particular concrete being in actuality-since God is 
always creator in actuality whereas these do not yet exist in actuality but only in 
potentiality. 12 
For having the logoi of created beings existent before the ages in his benevolent 
will, he from non-existence established the visible and invisible creation in 
accordance with these logoi. By reason and wisdom he has made and continues to 
make everything both things universal and things particular in due time. For we 
believe that [there is] a logos of angels precedent to their creation, a logos of 
every essence and power which makes up the upper world, a logos of men, and- 
not to mention each separately-a logos of every being receiving existence from 
God. 13 
Despite the fact that Maximus does speak in terms of participation, reading into his 
thought the kind of participation Proclus represents is misleading. To accommodate 
such reading it has been argued that the 'non-being' out of which God creates is God 
himself, since he as 'beyond-being' can be called 'non-being'. As an idea this draws on 
Dionysius the Areopagite and his interpretation of this apophatic expression-and 
8 Ambig. 22, PG 91,1256D. 
Ambig. 7, PG 91,1085A. 
Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 14.7, PG 35,865C. 
Ambig. 7, PCT91,1077C. 
12 Ambig. 7, PG 91,1081AB. 
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Dionysius' usage is perfectly legitimate. But to draw the conclusion that creation ex ni- 
hilo is, in actual fact, God's self-creation, can only be erroneous. Such a mistake was 
made already by Eriugena, and has been recently taken up by some modem thinkers. " 
Texts such as the following could easily be read in this light. 
The same in itself, by virtue of its infinite superiority, is inexpressible and 
incomprehensible, and is beyond all creation and the difference and distinction 
which is and is understood in relation to it. And the same is made known and 
multiplied proportionately in every being which is from him. The same also 
recapitulates everything, into himself. By this Logos there is being and remaining, 
and from this the creatures, in as much as they have come into being and on 
condition that they have come into being, they participate in God both remaining 
[still] and moving. For everything participates proportionately in God on account 
of coming into being from God, either according to intellect, reason, sense or vital 
motion, or according to essential and habitual fitness, as the great and God- r) 15 revealing Dionysius the Areopagite maintains. 
Beings do participate in God through their logoi, and the Neoplatolllc scala naturae 
does find its way into Maximus' cosmology, but it is language which Maximus takes 
from the Christian Dionysius the Areopagite and which he reads within the context of 
creation out of non-being. One is easily tempted to understand Maximus in a more di- 
rectly Neoplatonic way because of this language, but the fundamental distinction be- 
tween the created and the uncreated is so deeply embedded in his theology that such 
reading will inevitably lead to distortion. 
Again, creation, although deriving from non-being, exists because of God, and it 
exists as God's creation. Creation participates in God as creation rather than as the un- 
folded many emanating from the One. While there is no essential continuum, there is a 
union between God and the creation; the ontological gulf is bridged without being vio- 
lated. 
Looking from another angle we have God's immanence in beings. Athanasius 
must have been one of Maximus' sources in this area. They both speak of God's being 
present in all things together and at once in each and every one in particular. For 
Maximus unity and difference with respect to God's presence in the universe is a cause 
for wonder rather than an intellectual dilemma. 
13 Ambig. 7, PG 91,1080A. 
See Philip Sherrard, Christianity: Lineaments of a Sacred Tradition (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox 
Press, 1998), pp. 232-244, especially p. 239; and Eric Perl, Methexis, pp. 118 and 127. 
15Ambig. 7, PG 91,1080AB. 
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If, therefore, in accordance with truthful reasoning, every divine energy 
individually intimates through itself the whole God without partition in the logos by which each being exists, who, then, can understand and say, how God is both 
wholly in all beings in general and in each in particular, undividedly and without 
partition, neither being contracted according to the particular existence of one [of 
the beings] nor contracting the differences of beings according to the single 
wholeness of all, but being truly all in all and never departing from his own 
indivisible singleness? " 
Maximus goes further to explain that the Logos and the logoi are in actual fact one 
and the same thing. He distinguishes three different levels in relation to the Logos. 
These could be designated as 'the apophatic Logos', 'the Logos of the logoi' and 'the 
logoi of the Logos'. Here all the levels become apparent: 
Excepting the supreme and apophatic theology of the Logos, according to which 
he is not called or understood ... as the 
being beyond being, and according to 
which he is participated by no-one in any respect, excepting this, then, the one 
Logos is the many logoi and the many logoi are the one Logos. The one Logos is 
the many logoi according to the benevolent creative and preserving procession of 
the One towards beings. And the many logoi are the one Logos as bringing them 
all together according to the reference and providence which returns and guides 
the many into the One, like as into an all-governing principle or a centre which 
contains the beginnings of the radii that extend from It. 17 
At the level of the creation we see the differentiated logoi actualized in beings. 'The 
one Logos is the many logoi distinguished in the undivided difference of created things 
through their unconfused particularity in relation to one another and themselves. ' 
Then in the other direction: 
The many logoi [are] the one Logos by virtue of reference of all to him, the 
essentially existing and truly subsistent God the Logos of God and Father. He 
exists by himself without confusion, as the principle and cause of all, and by him 
were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and 
invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or pri . nci . palities, or powers: all 
things were created by him and through him and for him. " 
The ultimate unity of the creation can be seen in this reference of all the logoi to the 
Logos. Once again we find a unity which is without confusion. Maximus goes as far as 
to say that the Logos 'exists by himself without confusion, as the pnnciple and cause of 
all'. 
This idea that the Logos is the logoi in a way that is without confusion is strongly 
reminiscent of the doctrine of the Universal Intellect of some Neoplatonists, such as 
Plotinus and Syrianus. Without wanting to go too far in companng them with 
" Ambig. 22, PG 91,1257AB. 
17 Ambig. 7, PG 91,1081BC. For a discussion on the metaphor of centre and radii see Tollefsen, The 
Christocentric Cosmology, pp. 86-104. 
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Maximus-who most likely had never read either-it will prove useful to see what they 
have to say. I shall take Plotinus as the example. 
Plotinus. Plotinus explains how the Intellect and the Forms, which also are in- 
tellects, are one. Intellect is at the same time one and many, a unity-in-multiplicity. " It 
is one as the image of the One, it is one as the one Intellect, and it is one as the all- 
encompassing intelligible universe in which the true beings, the Forms, are in an undi- 
vided unity, yet without confusion. The Intellect preserves its unity not simply because 
it has the Forms in itself, as if they were something separate from it, but because it is 
the Forms. On the other hand, the Intellect is manifold on account of its being the 
Forms or the particular intellects, which are many. 
Moreover, the Universal Intellect is identified with Being-Being, here, meaning 
the eternal beings, the Forms, all together in unity-and as such, too, it is manifold. 
How, then, are unity and multiplicity in the Intellect to be reconciled in Plotinus' think- 
ing? The Intellect or the intelligible universe is, he says, 'a quiet and undisturbed 
movement, having all things in itself and being all things, a multiplicity which is undi- 
vided and yet again divided'. " The whole and the parts, although distinct categories, 
are united in the all-embracing Intellect. 
The great Intellect exists by itself, and so do the particular intellects which are in 
themselves, and again the partial intellects are comprehended in the whole and the 
whole in the partial; the particular ones are on their own and in another, and that 
great Intellect is on its own and in those particular [intellects]. " 
The parts in the Intellect are not closed units, constituting a whole, but they are, as 
it were, cells of a living organism" each of which has its distinct existence- Plotinus 
compares the Universal Intellect to theCOOV TrC[VTEXEgof Plato's Timaeus 31b1.23 At the 
same time they encapsulate the whole and every other part in themselves, again without 
18 Ambig. 7, PG 91,1077C-108OA; Col. 1: 16. 
'9 See R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 55-59; H. Crouzel, Origýne et 
Plotin. Comparaisons doctrinaLes (Paris: T6qui, 1991), pp. 117-178. 
' Enn. VI. 9.5: 14-16, Amstrong 7,318; 1 have adopted Armstrong's translation in the same edition 
throughout this chapter. See also Enn. 1.8.2,111.8.9, VI. 6.7 aladVI. 7.14. 
21 Enn. VI. 2.20: 14-20, Armstrong 6,166. 
2' Cf. K. Corrigan, 'Essence and Existence in the Enneads', in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 105-129. 
'3 See Enn. VI. 2.21. 
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confusion. Contemporary cosmologists, in discovering links between the nuclei of at- 
oms and the formation of galaxies, would be fascinated by Plotinus' insights: 
Each thing there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that 
all are everywhere and each and every one Is all-, ... A different kind of being stands out in each, but in each all are manifest. Here [i. e. in the world of senses] 
one part would not come from another, and each would be only a part; but there 
[i. e. in the intelligible world] each comes only from the whole and is part and 
whole at once. " 
Soul, the third primary hypostasis in Plotinus' system, reflects this unity-in- 
multiplicity at the level of the reality perceived by the senses and in turn projects it into 
the natural world by means of the forming principles, the logoi. There is a clear differ- 
ence between Intellect and Soul. In terms of contemplation, which constitutes the 
framework of Plotinian metaphysics, Soul thinks of objects in'time, separately, one by 
one, whereas Intellect 'embraces the whole Intelligible world in a single timeless vi- 
sion'. " Soul is bound to discursive thought which entails otherness and separation 
between the subject and the object while Intellect contemplates itself and thus unites the 
subject and object by being both the one and the other at once. Also in this sense the 
Intellect can be understood as one and many. 
Finally, Plotinus illustrates his understanding of the Intellect by two examples. He 
compares the Intellect to bodies of knowledge which exist without confusion in an indi- 
vidual human soul, and he also compares it to a seed. 
Even soul has many kinds of knowledge in it but does not contain any confusion, 
and each kind of knowledge does its own work when the need arises without 
dragging in the others along with it, and each individual thought is clear of the 
other thoughts which remain within the mind when it comes into activity. 26 
All the parts are undistinguished in the whole and their rational forming principles 
are as if in one central point and all the same there Ini 
another of the hand known from the sense-ob 
is one p inciple of the eye and 
distinct. ' 
ject which is produced by it to be 
Harmonious Universe 
Let me go back to the idea of creation as a song or a piece of music. This is not un- 
common in the Greek Fathers to reflect on the universe as a harmonious whole, and to 
24 Enn., V. 8.4: 7-9,11-12 and 22-24, Armstrong 5,248-250; italics mine. 
25 R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 53. 
' Enn. V. 9.6: 4-8, Armstrong 5,300. 
' Enn. VI. 9.6: 11-15, Armstrong 5,302. 
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speak of it in terms of music. It is not the language Maximus makes use of in this con- 
text 28 but it does express the kind of vision of harmony he has in mind, and this has 
been described by, for example, Athanasius and Clement of Alexandria in such lan- 
guage . 
29Athanasius compares God and the universe to a musician and his lyre. 
Just as a musician, tuning his lyre and skilfully combining the bass and the sharp 
notes, the middle and the others, produces a single musical piece, so the wisdom of 
God, holding the universe like a lyre, draws together the things in the air, and 
combines the whole with the parts, linking them by his command and will, thus 
producing in beauty and harmony a single world and a single order within it 
while he himself remains unmoved with the Father but by his intrinsic being 
moves evervthin2 as seems good to the Father. The surprising thing about his 
divinity is the fýct that by one and the same command he links and orders 
everything together according to its individual nature, not by intervals but all at 
once: the straight and the curved, the upper, middle and lower, the moist, the cold, 
the hot, the visible, and the invisible. ... 
Everything according to its own nature is 
given life and subsistence by him, and through him a wonderful and truly divine 
harmony is produced. 30 
Clement, in his turn, describes Christ as the new song and the minstrel. 
See how mighty is the new song! ... 
It is this which composed the entire creation 
into melodious order, and tuned into concert the discord of the elements, that the 
whole universe might be in harmony with it. The ocean it left flowing, yet has 
prevented it from encroaching upon the land; whereas the land, which was being 
carried away, it made firm, and fixed as a boundary to the sea. It softened the rage 
of fire by air, as one might blend the Dorian mode with the Lydian; and the biting 
coldness of air it tempered by the intermixture of fire, thus melodiously mingling 
these extreme notes of the universe. What is more, this pure song, the stay of the 
universe and the harmony of all things, stretching from the centre to the 
circumference and from the extremities to the centre, reduced this whole to 
harmony, not in accordance with Thracian music, which resembles that of Jubal, " 
but in accordance with the fatherly purpose of God, which David earnestly 
sought. 32 
In what does this harmonious universe then consists? For Maximus the harmoni- 
ous universe is seen in such things as order, proportion and pennanence, and the mu- 
tual interrelation of wholes and parts which betrays the wisdom of their Creator. 
So therefore when the Saints behold the creation, and its fine order and 
proportion and the need that each part has of the whole, and how all perfect parts 
have been fashioned wisely and with providence in accordance with reason that 
fashioned them, and how what has come to be is found to be not otherwise than 
good beside what now is, and is in need of no addition or subtraction in order to 
be otherwise good, they are taught from the things he has made that there is One 
who fashioned them. So, too, when they see the permanence, the order and 
' He does utilize it when speaking of the soul and the virtues in Myst. 5, Soteropoulos, 168-174, md 
Cap. theol. 11.100, PG 90,1172D- 1 173A. 
29See Boniface Ramsey, Beginning to Read the Fathers (London: S CM Press Ltd, 1993), pp. 47-50. 
Gent. 42: 22-34,37-39, Thomson, 116-118; translation in the same edition, pp. 117-119. 
Cf. Gen. 4: 21. 
32 Clement of Alexandria, Prot. 1, GCS/StdWin, 5: 30,5: 33-6: 10; G. W. Butterworth's translation in 
Clement of Alexandria, The Exhortation to the Greeks. The Rich Man's Salvation. To the Newly Bap- 
tized, translated by G. W. Butterworth (Loeb, London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's 
sons, 1919), pp. 11-15. 
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position of what has come to be, and its manner of being, in accordance with 
which each being, according to its proper form, is preserved unconfused and 
without any disorder... 
But the cosmic harmony consists also in natural phenomena. 
- and the course of the stars proceeding in the same way, with no alteration of 
any kind, and the circle of the year proceeding in an orderly manner according to 
the periodic return of the [heavenly bodies] from and to their own place, and the 
equal yearly proportion of the nights and days, with their mutual increase and decrease, taking place according to a measure that is neither too small nor too 
great, they understand that behind everything there is providence, and this they 
acknowledge as God the fashioner of all. " 
Another dimension to union and distinction in the universe is the relationship be- 
tween the sensible and the intelligible universe. The visible creation and the logoi ac- 
cording to which it was created constitute two worlds which coinhere in each other. 
Maximus compares this to the wheels in Hezekiel's vision: 
Since according to the vision of Hezekiel their action was like, as it were, that of a 
wheel in a wheel, IIIIIIII 34through which is signified both the sensible and the intelligible 
universe the one existing in the other-for the intelligible universe is in the 
sensible by means of figures (TCýLýý TftOLý) and the sensible world is in the 
intelligible by means of logos-thus, what the apostle was shown, was everything 
that belongs to the sensible world. The words which was lowered down knit at the 
four corners" signify the universe which is constituted of four elements, and the 
universe is clean by virtue of the logoi inherent in the elements. 36 
It is the Logos himself who is revealed through the logoi. The idea that the uni- 
verse is a book and the beings are letters that make up words is just another way of ex- 
pressing the way in which the one Logos, as it were, shines through the universe in 
diverse forms. The 'Word becomes thick' Maximus explains 
because having for our sakes hid himself unspeakably in the logoi of beings, he is 
intimated analogically through every visible being as if through some letters. He Is 
whole in the wholes at once, most complete and entire in particular[s] [? ]; whole 
and without diminution in beings that are different, he who is without difference 
and ever the same; in beings that are composite, he who is simple and non- 
composite; in beings that have a beginning, he who is without beginning; in things 
visible, he who is invisible, and in things touchable, he who is untouchable. ' 
33 Ambig. 10.35, PG 91,117613C; translation in Louth, Maximus, pp. 136-137. See also Myst. 
Soteropoulos, 150: 6-16 [=PG 90,664D-(%5A]. 
3' Ez. 1: 16. 
" Acts 10: 11. 
36 QU. dUb. 116: 1-13, CCSG 10,85. See also Qu. That. 27, CCSG 7,193-195. 
37 Ambig. 3 1, PG 91,1285D. 
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Judgement and Providence. " Oneness of God and his providence go hand in hand 
with the harmony and differentiation in the universe. A harmonious whole Is dependent 
on the differentiation of its parts and on a governing principle which organizes the dif- 
ferent parts into a harmonious entity. In Ambiguum 10.19, Maximus explains this in 
terms of providence and judgement. 
Movement is indicative of providence of beings. Through it we behold the 
unvarying essential identity of each of the created beings according to Its kind, 
and similarly its inviolable manner of existence. And through it we perceive the 
One who preserves and protects all beings in accordance with the logos of each 
well distinct from one another in an ineffable unity. '9 
Difference is indicative of judgement. Through it we are taught that God is the 
wise distributor of the logoi of each particular being. This we learn from the 
natural potency in each being; potency which is commensurate to the underlying 
essence. 40 
When I [here] speak of providence (Trp6VOM), I associate it with mind (voý3), and I 
do not mean the converting providence or the providence which, as It were, 
dispenses the return of things subject to it from what is not fitting to what is 
fitting. Instead, I mean the providence which holds together the universe and 
preserves it [unharmed] according to the logoi it was made in the first place. And 
when I speak of judgement, I mean, not the chastening or, as it were, punitive 
judgement of sinners, but the saving and defining distribution of beings, in 
accordance with which each created thing, by the logos in accordance with which 
it exists, has an inviolable and unalterable constitution in its natural identity, just as 
from the beginning the fashioner determined and established that it was to be, 
what it was to be, how and of what kind it was to be. " 
It may be that Maximus is here working through the Ongenist idea of judgement 
and providence which is an integral part of the Ongenist cosmology. According to the 
version of Ongenism which Maximus rebuts in his Ambigua 7 and 15, before the crea- 
tion of the material world there was a primordial henad, or unity, of intellects, or the 
logikoi, united with God through contemplation. These were sated with contemplation 
and became lax, as a result of which they all moved and fell. At their fall they cooled 
down (ýPX%LaL) thus becoming souls (#Xý). To stop the fall God created bodies of 
varying density, each according to the degree the logikoi had relaxed their contempla- 
tion. This was the so-called firstjudgement. The bodies functioned as a punitive means 
through pain but also as a means of return to the henad through contemplation. The fi- 
' See Blowers, Exegesis, P. 158, n. 45; Thunberg, Microcosm, pp. 69-72; Gersh, From Iambilchus, 
pp. 226-227; Sherwood, The EarlierAmbigua, pp. 36-37; von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, pp. 131 
and 53 1; and George C. Berthold, 'I-fistory and Exegesis in Evagrius and Maximus', in Origeniana 
Quarta (Innsbruck, 1987), pp. 395-398. 
3' Ambig. 10.19, PG 91,1133C. 
' Ambig. 10.19, PG 91,1133CD. 
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nal goal, the restoration and rest of all the logikoi in the primordial unity in which all 
differentiation, names and bodies are done away with, was the aim of providence. 42 
Because Maximus in the above text refutes the Origenist idea of converting provi- 
dence and of punitive judgement, it is tempting to think that he in so doing rejects any 
idea such understanding of providence andjudgcment. But this would not be an accurate 
reading of the text. By saying that providence is that 'which holds together the universe 
and preserves it [unharmed] according to the logoi it was made in the first place' and 
thatjudgement is 'the saving and defining distribution of beings, in accordance with 
which each created thing, by the logos in accordance with which it exists, has an invio- 
lable and unalterable constitution in its natural identity', Maximus certainly undercuts 
the Ongenist principle according to which the world exists as subsequent to a pre- 
eternal fall. And he defines judgement and providence in this way in order to underline 
the fact that he is addressing a cosmological issue, and not a moral one. God is a judge 
and a provider even without the fall, and he has these two sides to him as the creator of 
a manifold universe which he has created to be intrinsically differentiated and at once 
harmonious. Differentiation is the condition of multiplicity on the one hand and of har- 
mony on the other; this differentiation is created in view of constituting a harmonious 
whole and it shows God to be a wise judge who in the beginning gives to the beings 
what is proper to each. The preservation of this harmony is his task as the provider, but 
depends also on our free choice. 
Once we have understood the positive side of judgement and providence, we can 
take into consideration their negative aspect. This is a different effect of the same thing. 
'I do not for this reason think, ' Maximus says, 'that there are two different kinds of 
providence and judgement. I recognize one and the same Uudgement and providence] in 
potency, differentiated and many-formed in its effects in relation to us'. " The beings 
41 Ambig. 10.19, PG 91,1133D- I 136B. 
42 See Sherwood, The EarlierAmbigua, pp. 72-102; Antoine Guillaumont, Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' 
d'&qgrele Pontique et I'histoire de l'Origenism chez les Grecs et chez les Syriens (Paris: tdition da 
Seuil, 1962), pp. 37-43. See also Gabriel Bunge, 'Hdnade ou monade? An sujet de deux notions cen- 
trales de la terminologie 6vagrienne' in Le Musion 102 (1989), pp. 69-9 1. In opposition to Guillau- 
mont, Bunge argues against the attribution of the doctrine of henad to Evagrius. 
43Ambig. 10.19, PG 91,1136AB. 
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which are endowed with free-choice can violate this harmony by transgressing against 
their own logos. The result of such a transgression is a natural punishment which from 
another angle appears as corrective or converting. 
Since now providence and judgement, understood in the other sense, are 
connected with our chosen impulses: they avert us in many ways from what is 
wicked, and draw us wisely back to what is good, and by setting straight what is 
not in our control by opposing what is, they cut off all evil, whether present, future 
or past. 44 
Here punitive judgement and converting providence do not correspond to the Origenist 
idea of the soul (the 'cooled-down' fallen intellect) getting rid of the created world but 
rather they correspond to the idea of coming back to discover its true nature and mean- 
ing within a movement towards ever-well -being. 
Through providence he is also working the likening of 
i 
the particular 
i 
parts to the 
universal wholes. This he does until such time as he unites the self-willed urge of 
the particular parts to the more generic natural logos of rational substance 
through their movement towards well-being, and thus makes them harmonious 
and of identical movement with one another and with the whole, so that the 
particular beings have no difference of will to universal beings, but that in all one 
and the same logos becomes apparent; a logos that is not severed by the modes 
[of action] of those of whom to an equal measure it is predicated. And in this way 
he demonstrates as effective the grace that deffies all. 45 
Moreover, Maximus maintains that the Creator and the provider is one and the 
same God, and that this, too, we can learn from observing the universe, a universe 
which is a real union and distinction of all that is. He lists a whole host of things which 
prove that God's providence maintains the cosmos, and in so doing Maximus gives us 
a beautiful and intelligent picture of the harmonious universe in which the saints con- 
template God as the Creator and the provider. These things are: 
[T]he permanence of beings, as well as their order, position and movement; 
the holding together of the extremities one with another through the mediation of 
the middles, and their not being harmed on account of their contrariety; 
the agreement of the parts with the wholes, and the union throughout of the 
wholes with the parts; 
the unblurred distinction of the parts themselves one from another by virtue of the 
individuating difference of each, and their unconfused union by virtue of their 
indistinguishable identity in the wholes; 
and-not to mention each individual case separately-the combination of all 
things with all things and their distinction from all things, and the ever preserved 
succession of each and every being in accordance with the species, so that no-one 
44Ambig. 10.19, PG 91,1136A. 
' Qu. Thal. 2: 12-22, CCSG 7,5 1. 
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suffers an alteration with respect to its logos of nature, or confuses or is confused 
with another being in this respect-all these things show that everything is held 
together by the providence of the Creator God. 46 
The Universe and the Tree of Porphyry 
This last quotation with its reference to 'species' and 'difference' brings us con- 
veniently to the Porphyrian Tree. Here we shall see how Maximus handles unity and 
differentiation in the universe in relation to Porphyry's logiC. 41 Max, MUS gives US an 
account of this in the final section of Ambiguum 41a which follows a discussion on the 
18 
well-known five diý,, isions. 
Maximus draws to some extent on Gregory of Nyssa in his understanding of the 
distinctions between beings. Gregory's basic pattern is summarized by Andrew Louth 
in the following way: 
All beings can be divided into uncreated beings (consisting only of the blessed 
Trinity) and created beings. Created beings into celestial beings (= angels) and 
terrestrial beings (= human beings); and sensible beings into living beings and 
lifeless beings. Living beings can be divided into sentient and non-sentient beings; 
sentient beings into rational beings (= human beings) and irrational beings (= 
animals). And note that these successive divisions converge on the human being 
who embraces all the divisions to be found in created reallty. 49 
For Maximus the divisions are slightly different and he sees them in the context of fall 
and restoration. The divisions between God and the creation, the intelligible and the 
sensible, heaven and earth, paradise and the inhabited world, and male and female were 
to be overcome by the human being as the crown and bond of unity of all creation. 
Man, however, failed to fulfil this task and for this reason God himself became incar- 
nate in order to restore the universe. 
With us and through us he encompasses the whole creation through its 
intermediaries and the extremities through their own parts. He binds about himself 
each with the other, tightly and indissolubly, paradise and the inhabited world, 
heaven and earth, things sensible and things intelligible, since he possesses like us 
sense and soul and mind, by which, as parts, he assimilates himself by each of the 
extremities to what is universally akin to each in the previously mentioned 
manner. Thus he divinely recapitulates the universe in himself, showing that the 
whole creation exists as one, like another human being, completed by the 
gathering together of its parts one with another in itself, and inclined towards itself 
by the whole of its existence, in accordance with the one, simple, undifferentiated 
and indifferent idea of production from nothing, in accordance with which the 
Ambig. 10.42, PG 91,1188D- I 189A. 
For a discussion on the logoi in relation to the Porphyrian Tree see Tollefsen, The Christocentric 
Cosmology, pp. 104-118. 
4" For an extensive discussion on the five divisions see Thunberg, Microcosm, pp. 373-427. 
' Louth, Maximus, p. 72. See also his notes on Ambiguum 41 on pp. 72-74 and 212-213. 
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whole of creation admits of one and the same undiscriminated logos, as having 511 
non-being' before its 'being' . 
Maximus then gives a logical demonstration of how all the created things are united 
according to the natural logos of having come into being from non-being. On this basis 
he argues that all the things in the universe necessarily have something in common. 
There is differentiation, no doubt, but there is also unity: 'For all those beings, that are 
distinguished one from another by their particular differences, are united by their uni- 
versal and common identities, and pushed together towards oneness and sameness by a 
certain natural generic logos; ' everything 'admits of one and the same undiscriminated 
logos, as having "non-being" prior to its "being". "' This is to say that everything 
within the universe from angels to daffodils and from stars to stones is created, and as 
such united. 
This is where the Porphynan Tree with its genera and species come into the pie- 
in the most gen ic genus, the species in the genus, ture. The various genera are united I en II 
the individuals in the species and the accidents in the subject. Maximus here follows 
Dionysius whom he in the sequel quotes: 'There is no multiplicity which is without 
participation in the One ... that which is many in its accidents is one in the subject, and 
that which is many in number or potentialities is one in species and that which is many 
ý52 
in species is one in genus .... 
The overall unity of the universe is produced by the most generic genus. We have 
not yet seen, however, what that genus is. What Maximus says in Ambiguum 41 is that 
'the various genera are united one with another according to "being", and they are one 
and the same and undivided according to it. ' Also in Quaestiones ad nalassium 48 de- 
scribing various unions between parts and wholes, he says that there is 'the union of 
' Ambig. 41, PG 91,1312AB. 
51 Ambig. 41, PG 91,1312B. 
52 D. n. 13.2, PTS 33,227: 13-16/Ambig. 41, PG 91,1313A. Clearly Dionysius in his turn draws on 
Proclus who says that, '[e]very multiplicity in some way participates in the One' (Inst. 1, Dodds). Cf. 
Plotinus' axiomatic statement, 'It is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are pnmar- 
ily beings and those which are in any sense said to be among beings. For what could anything be if it 
was not oneT (Enn. VI-9.1). 
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the individuals with the species, that of the species with the genera and that of the gen- 
era with "being" (oVUCa). "' 
Thus, Maximus calls the most generic genus 'being' or oýcyýct. But how are we to 
understand this? Is not also God a 'being'? Does not also he have an essence or ovaýct? 
First of all we should say that Maximus is probably referring to the example Porphyry 
gives in Isagoge 8, an example in which the most generic genus is oýG[a. Porphyry, 
though, makes it quite clear that according to Aristotle there is no such all-embracing 
genus as 'the being', T6 6V. 54 'Being' (okrict in this case) is simply the highest genus 
of the particular example. For Maximus, in contrast, 'being' is an all-embracing genus. 
It is, nevertheless, qualified by one thing, and that is their being created. 
If we add to this the fact that the whole discussion in the last section of Ambigutim 
41 draws heavily on Dionysius, and the fact that for Dionysius ovalct means 'being' in 
distinction from the irrrEpoýmov, 'the God who is beyond being' (that is to say, created 
and uncreated being respectively) then we may conclude that 'being' here means the 
same as 'created being'. After all, the point in Maximus' whole argument is that all be- 
ings have one thing in common which is 'being created'. Consequently, we can con- 
clude that the all-embracing and most generic genus in Maximus' cosmology is 'created 
being 7.55 
Maximus, then, discusses the question of the way in which unity exists between 
the generic and the specific. The gencnc must first of all remain what it is. Its being ge- 
nenc and its being the principle of unity go together. 'For that which does not naturally 
unite what is separated, but is divided together with them and departs from its own sin- 
gular unity, can no longer be generic. 51 Simultaneously, however, there must be a 
mutual presence between the generic and the particular, in order that there can be unity. 
'[E]verything genenc, according to its own logos, is wholly and indivisibly present, in 
Qu. Thal. 48: 82-94, CCSG 7,34 1. 
Isag., 2b: 7-8, CAG 4/1,6. 
Stephen Gersh points out about the Neoplatonists that '[almong texts dealing with the interrelation 
between Forms, one group expounds the doctrine of genus and species more or less in the Aristotelian 
manner. Thus the genus is "predicated of' its species, genera are "divided into" the various subaltern 
genera, and the species are "embraced" within the genus. In these passages the Neoplatoni sts are confin- 
ing their attention to sensible Forms' (Gersh, From Iamblichus, p. 97). 
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the whole of the subordinate species while remaining a unity, and the whole particular 
is observed in [the] generic. "' 
One more approach to unity and differentiation in relation to genus and species is to 
see it in the context of movement; movement expressed in terms of expansion 
(&ctaToXý) and contraction (CFUUTOXTI). 58Again, one should note that Maximus is with 
this pattern proving that the universe is created and finite. Movement belongs to the cre- 
ated and finite realm, and since we can observe movement in the universe, it means that 
it is created and finite. The movement from the most generic genus towards the gen- 
era/species and the most specific species is seen as expansion, and the opposite move- 
ment as contraction. 
For it ('being') is moved from the most generic genus through the more generic 
genera to the species through which and into which everything is naturally 
divided, proceeding as far as the most specific species, where its expansion ends; 
expansion which circumscribes its being in the downward direction, 
and again, it is gathered together from the most specific species, retreating 
through the more generic up to the most generic genus, in which its contraction 
ends, limiting its being in the upward direction. -59 
' Ambig. 41, PG 91,1312C. 
57Ambig. 41, PG 91,1312CD. The text reads6VeEWPCLTCLL 'YEVLK6ýý. 
' See the articles of Paul Plass, 'Moving Rest in Maximus the Confessor', in CM 35 (1984), pp. 177- 
190, and'Transcendent Time in Maximus the Confessor', in The Thomist (1980), pp. 259-277. 
-59 Ambig. 10.37, PG 91,1177C. 
10 
Transparent Words 
The Unity ýof Scripture 
SCRIPTURE IS another 'universe' in which we are called to detect the Logos. In its 
syllables and words the Word 'becomes thick' as he does in the beings that constitute 
the universe. Both the universe and Scripture are, as it were, a bridge by means of 
which we, when properly orientated, can arrive at the Logos himself. The Word 
enables this by coming down to our level and in so doing building the bridge. 
The Word is said to 'become thick' ... 
because he for our sakes, who are coarse in 
respect to our mentality, accepted to become incarnate and to be expressed in 
letters, syllables and words, so that from all these he might draw us to him, as we 
closely follow him and are united by the Spirit. And that he might lead us up to 
the simple and incomparable thought about him[self], he has contracted us 
towards union with him for his own sake to the extent he has expanded himself 
for our sakes by virtue of coming down to our level. ' 
The Logos is the meaning of Scripture. In him everything finds unity and its true 
meaning; the old and the new; past, present and future. He is also the unity of the 
Scriptures; he himself is behind the multiplicity of the veil of the letter. Just as the soul 
penetrates every individual part of the body remaining one and single, so also the Logos 
penetrates the Scriptures without being fragmented with its words and syllables. 
Every word of God is neither diffuse nor prolix but single constituted of diverse 
aspects, each of which is a part of the word. Thus he who speaks about the truth, 
even if he deals fully with his subject, he [always] speaks one word of God. ' 
It is through variegated and many-sided things that the Logos becomes approachable to 
us. Being bound to senses we need a prism which by refracting the single ray of light 
proceeding from the Logos makes it diversified and visible. 
This dictates Maximus' approach to Scripture in general. ' He can give several 
different interpretations to one single scriptural passage, but 'these various 
1 Ambig. 31, PG 91,1285B, 1285D-1288A. 
2 Cap. theol. 11.20, PG 90,1133C. 
' On Maximus' Biblical interpretation see Paul M. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in 
Maximus the Confessor. An Investigation of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); of the same, 'The Anagogical Imagination: Maximus the 
Confessor and the LegacY of Origenian 1-jermeneutics', in Origeniana Sexta (Leuven, 1995), pp. 639- 
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interpretations are, ' as Polycarp Sherwood has said, 'but diverse representations of the 
one central mystery: the mystery of Christ and of our unity in Him. ý4 The letter of 
Scripture is then an invitation to go and find its spirit. In order to achieve this, Maximus 
makes a considerable use of the spiritual interpretation or contemplation. 
This hermeneutical tradition' was already known to the classical Greek world in the 
form of commentaries on Homeric (or other) poems. It was taken up by the Jewish 
philosopher Philo and from there it found its way to Christian writers such as Clement 
and Ongen. The earliest Christian authors, St Paul for example, made use of it. Origen 
himself bases his argumentation in the fourth book of the De principiis concerning 
scriptural interpretation largely on St Paul. Letter and spirit, symbol and logos, shadow 
and truth, all express the same idea of two levels, two realities, one natural and literal, 
one spiritual and going behind the veil of the letter. ' 
The main principles of the spiritual interpretation could be summarized in the 
following. 
1. There is nothing superfluous in the Scriptures but everything has a meaning, 
either literal or spiritual. 
2. There are passages which cannot be interpreted in a literal way. (Origen in 
De principfis 4.3.5 7 states that everything in Scripture has a spiritual 
meaning, but not necessarily a literal one. ) 
3. To remain at the level of the letter of the Old Testament shows camal 
mentality. 
654; George C. Berthold, 'History and Exegesis in Evagrius and Maximus', in Origeniana Quarta 
(Innsbruck, 1987), pp. 390-404; and Polycarp Sherwood, 'Exposition and Use of Scripture in St 
Maximus as manifest in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium', in OCP 24 (1958), pp. 202-207. 
Sherwood, 'Exposition', p. 204. 
See Manlio Simonetti, Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church. An Historical Introduction to 
Patristic Exegesis, translated by John A. Hughes (Edinburg: T&T Clark, 1994; original Italian edition 
198 1); and the monumental work by Henri de Lubac on Mediaeval interpretation of Scripture which is 
now being translated into English, Medieval Exegesis. The Four Senses of Scripture, vol. 1, translated 
by M. Sebanc, vol. 2, translated by E. M. Macierowski (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd, 1998 and 2000; 
original French edition 1959). 
6 In De principiis 4 Origen argues for three levels of meaning in the Scripture which correspond to 
body, soul and mind. In general the twofold pattern is more dominant. 
7 De princ. 4.3.5., GSC/Koetschau, 33 1. 
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4. The etymologies of Hebrew names of people and places are interpreted 
allegorically. 
5. Animals, objects and materials are interpreted allegorically. 
6. Numbers are interpreted allegorically. 
7. Feasts are interpreted allegorically. 
8. Allegories are mainly anthropological, cosmological or ecclesiological, and 
Christological among the Fathers. 
All this is there in St Maximus, ' and although the same can be said of the great 
allegonst Ongen, Maximus, who fiercely attacks the very heart of Ongenism in his 
Ambigua, sees nothing exclusively Ongenist in this approach to the Scriptures. It is the 
'what' rather than the 'how' that has gone wrong with Ongenism. The fact that Ongen 
made a lot of allegory does not mean that it was his private property, nor does it make 
allegory an "Ongenist' way of interpreting Scripture. In other words not everything 
Origen did, wrote or made use of was Origenist as such. We should not forget that he 
was also the father of the historical-critical study of Scripture. 
Maximus saw allegorical interpretation as a part of a wider Christian tradition of 
which each and everyone made use of in a particular way, Origen in an Ongemst way, 
Maximus in a Maximian way, so to speak. For example, Origen would make some 
characteristically 'Ongenist' remarks on the way thus betraying his personal 
convictions. In the fourth book of the De principiis, for instance, he says in passing: 
'[B]y man I mean at present moment souls that make use of bodies. " This is something 
Maximus would have never said. 
In the Quaestiones ad Dialassium, a work mainly concerned with the interpretation 
of Scripture, Maximus frequently refers to questions of hermeneutics, such as, who is a 
8 Examples in Maximus: (4) (proper names) Qu. Thal. 54, CCSG 7,443 -, (place names) Qu. dub. 15, 
CCSG 10,12; (5) (animals) Qu. Thal. 55, CCSG 7,501-513; (objects) Qu. Thal. 63, CCSG 22,145- 
191; (materials) Qu. Thal. 54, CCSG 7,465-467, (6) (numbers) Qu. dub. 56, CCSG 10,45., Ambig. 
67, PG 91,1396B-1404C, see the article of Peter van Deun, Ta Symbolique des nombres dans 
Foeuvre de Maxime le Confesseur (580-662), in Byzantinoslavica 53 (1992), pp. 237-242; (7) 
(feasts)Qu. dub. 10, CCSG 10,9. 
' De princ. 4.2.7., GS C- 
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true interpreter, what is a true interpretation and what these two imply. 10 For Maximus 
the author of Scripture is ultimately the Holy Spirit and its authentic interpreter can only 
be someone who has become worthy of the same Spirit, " that is, someone who has 
purified his soul and mind through ascetic struggle and practice of virtues, and who has 
in this way removed every obstacle between God and himself. Real knowledge and 
understanding, which a true interpreter needs, comes from engaging with God himself 
in a close relationship, from 'experiencing' (lTdGXELV) the divine. Such engagement 
enables the interpreter to see in Scripture its spiritual meaning hidden in the letter. 
The basic tenet of Maximus' hermeneutics is the Pauline idea 'the letter kills but the 
spirit gives life'. ", Maximus sees that in Scripture there are, -on the one hand, 
letters 
(ypd[LýLaTa), and, on the other hand, spirit (TrVEDýLC(). These have as their counterparts 
in creation the external appearance and the logoi, and in the human being the senses and 
the mind. Letter, external appearance and senses go together, and spirit, logoi and mind 
go together. " One should perhaps add the pair carnal worship and worship in spirit. " 
This gives us two different approaches not only to the Scriptures but to life in general. 
On the one hand, there is the carnal minded sensual person, who takes pleasure only in 
external things which please the senses, and who reads the Scripture at the level of letter 
only and worships God accordingly. On the other hand, there is the spiritual person 
who strives after detaching his intellect from material things and from the power of the 
senses, who endeavours through natural contemplation to see the logoi in the created 
order and to read the Scripture and worship God 'in spirit and in truth'. " These two 
approaches cannot coexist, Maximus says. 16 They are like two different roads leading 
to the opposite directions. The one leads to spiritual starvation, the other to deification. 
A true interpreter, of course, takes the latter direction. 
'o See, for example, Qu. Thal. 10, CCSG 7,87; Qu. Thal. 11,89; Qu. Thal. 17,113-115; Qu. Thal. 
55,481-483. 
See Qu. Thal. 65, CCSG 22,253. 
2 Cor 3: 6; Qu. Thal. 65, CCSG 22,277-2779. 
13 Qu. Thal. 32, CCSG 7,225. 
" See Qu. Thal. 65, CCSG 22,481ff. 
15 Jn 4: 23. 
16 Qu. Thal. 65, CCSG 22,277-279. 
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Maximus is explicit about the fact that the Holy Spirit means something very 
precise by every word, " and that there is a reason why in the Old Testament there are 
statements which are historically untrue: 'To the historical narration has been mingled 
the paradoxical element in order that we should seek after the true meaning of what is 
written. "8Histoncal discrepancies, as Carlos Laga puts it, are for Maximus starting- 
points: 'Pour lui, un passage difficile, une "aporie", est en somme un point de depart 
pour une pens6e sp6culative qui nous introduit au mystere m8me de la R6v6lation: la. 
d6ification de Fhomme dans le Christ. "9 Finally, the fact that the author of the 
Scriptures is the Holy Spirit implies that, since he is uncircurnscribable, the word that 
he speaks also is uncircumscribable, at the level of spirit.. At the level of letter, 
however, it is confined to the limits of historical contingency. 
The Word of the Age to Come 
Going beyond the historical confines is pivotal to Maximus' biblical hermeneutics. 
He is intensely eschatological. Everything within the created order could, in fact, be put 
on a trajectory extending from the times of the Old Testament, through the present time, 
to the age to come. The truth and the fulfilment lies in the future, and it is this dynamic 
towards the truth of the age to come that penetrates Maximus' thought. Passing over 
from the literal and historical to the spiritual within an eschatological dynamic, is a 
constant theme in his exegetical works. There is a tension between the past, present and 
future, a tension which could be described as the relationship of all things with their 
own truth: 'For it is by shadow and image and truth that the whole mystery of our 
salvation has wisely been arranged. "2' Everything in Maximus' understanding of the 
world and Scripture ultimately points to this one end: Christ in glory, the Logos that the 
world cannot contain. 
17 QU. Thal. 55, CCSG 7,481-483. 
'8 Qu. Thal. 65, CCSG 22,275. Origen says much the same thing in De principiis 4.2.9. -4.3.5, 
GSC/Koetshcau, 321-33 1. 
" Maximi Confessoris, Quaestiones ad Thalassium I (Quaestiones I-LV), text edited by C. Laga and C. 
Steel with a Latin translation by John Scotus Eriugena (CCSG 7, Turnhout: Brepols, 1980), p. xii. 
20 Ambig. 21, PG 91., 1253C. See also Ambig. 48, PG 91,1361A-1364A; and Qu. Thal. 36, CCSG 
7,243-245. 
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The Logos is like an infinite lighthouse towards which everything is heading, 
having the human being as its helmsman. Maximus, of course, sees the value of the 
present age but at the same time he is very much aware of its limitations. 'Every form of 
providence and mystery around man that belongs to the present age, even if it be great, 
is somehow preparing in advance and prefiguring the things to come. 921 
1 shall take an example of Maximus' eschatologically orientated exegesis from 
Ambiguum 21 in which he interprets, not a biblical text, but a patristic one. Its theme, 
however, is biblical, and by means of it Maximus unfolds his understanding of the 
relation the present age has to the age to come and in it he manages to present a 
panoramic vision of the interpretation of Scripture, cosmos and man, in a perspective of 
an eschatological fulfilment. 
The text Maximus is asked to interpret runs as follows: '... and which John, the 
forerunner of the Word and great voice of the truth, declared even this very "lower" 
world could not contain. 122 Here Maximus is faced with the apparent historical 
discrepancy that St Gregory calls John the Divine a 'forerunner' . 
2' To an English 
speaker 'forerunner' does not necessarily suggest any particular person in Sciipture and 
thus the discrepancy may not be so evident, but to a Greek speaker 'forerunner' is 
exclusively the epithet, if not a synonym, of John the Baptist and therefore Gregory's 
appellation begs for an explanation. 
Maximus begins his interpretation by stating that he will set about the problem by 
4contemplation' (OEWPCcL). This alone, he says, 'is the resolution of things which at the 
literal level seem contradictory, since it can exhibit the truth, which is incorporeal in all 
things, to be simple by nature and not becoming "thick" together with words or 
bodies. "' If the Logos 'becomes thick' in words and syllables for our sakes, as we 
saw above, he does this in order to give us a gateway to him as he is. Again, he does 
not become 'thick' by nature in the sense that he remains what he was. In other words, 
21 Ambig. 21, PG 91,1256B. 
Or. 28.20. 
Or. 28.20: 17, SC 250,142. 
2'Ambig. 21, PG 91,1244B- 
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the fact that he comes down to our level does not mean that he ceases to be God 
invisible and incomprehensible in himself. 
'Contemplation' will then be Maximus' hermeneutical method. The extraordinary 
thing one notices reading Maximus and Gregory together is that Maximus manages to 
see Gregory's actual point through these kinds of difficulties. Maximus also knows to 
choose the right way of reading him, a way which does justice to the text he interprets. 
He does not begin by wondering how Gregory could possibly have made such a 
blunder as to confuse between John the Baptist and John the Evangelist (and in tl-iis 
particular case it seems quite clear at first glance that Gregory must have simply made a 
mistake). Maximus has a different approach. His task is not that of a hasty critic, but 
rather he takes his task to be that of a very careful 'literary critic' who wants to find out 
what the truth behind Gregory's rhetorical ploys is. There is great sensitivity towards 
the whole in Maximus' approach. The same is true of his approach to the Scriptures, 
too, and in our text these two constantly blend. 
Maximus realizes that what we have here is, one might say, the kind of 'deliberate 
discrepancy' which has as its purpose to draw the reader's attention to somewhere else, 
that is, somewhere beyond historical limitations. This, then, is to be approached 
through contemplation if one wants to get it right. Let me first quote St Gregory so that 
we can see the wider context of the question. 
If it had been permitted to Paul to utter what the third heaven contained, and his 
own advance, or ascension, or assumption thither, perhaps we should know 
something more about God's nature, if this was the mystery of the rapture. But 
since it was ineffable, we too will honour it in silence. Thus much we will hear Paul 
say about it, that we know in part, and we prophesy in part. This and the like to 
this are the confessions of one who is not rude in knowledge, who threatens to 
give proof of Christ speaking in him, the great doctor and champion of truth. 
Wherefore he estimates all knowledge on earth only as through a glass darkly, as 
taking its stand upon little images of the truth. Now, unless I appear to anyone too 
careful, and overanxious about the examination of this matter, perhaps it was of 
this and nothing else that the Word himself intimated that there were things which 
could not now be borne, but which should be borne and cleared up hereafter, and 
which John, the forerunner of the Word and great voice of the truth, declared even 
the whole world could not contain. The truth then-and the whole word-is full 
of difficulties and obscurity. ' 
' Or. 28.20: 1-2 1: 1, SC 250,140-142; translation in Christology of the Later Fathers, edited by E. R. 
flardyandC. C. R. Richardson (The Library of Christian Classics 3, London: SCM Press Ltd, 1954), 
pp. 149-150. 
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The tone is strongly eschatological, and Maximus rightly contextualizes both his 
ap roach to the question and his answer to it. The unity of Scripture, which is the UP 
Logos himself, goes beyond history and is therefore above all historical inconsistency, 
and the only way to reach this realm in hermeneutical terms is by reading the Scripture 
(and in this case Gregory, too) beyond the letter, that is, by spiritual contemplation. 
And this is what Maximus does. Contemplation or allegory is not for Maximus a means 
for arbitrary speculation but the vehicle that carries one over to the actual truth and 
meaning which lies beneath the surface of the text. Here is how Maximus sees 
Gregory's point in context. 
The evangelist has said And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the 
which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itseýf 
could not contain the books that should be written. . 26 Through these words he has 
manifested to us that what he has written is a preparation of a more perfect and 
hitherto uncontainable word. Should anyone call the holy evangelist John a 
'forerunner' in this sense, by virtue of his gospel which prepares the mind for the 
reception of the more perfect word, he will not miss the mark. 27 
This is a very truthful interpretation of Gregory. Maximus, however, develops it 
further. He sees the whole created order within a certain movement or tension between 
shadow, image and truth. The different shadows and images that point to the truth are 
united in it as their archetype. Unity and difference in relation to scriptural personages, 
such as John the Baptist, Elijah and John the Divine for our example, find a stunning 
resolution in Maximus' interpretation. Interchange between the biblical saints ceases to 
be a problem or a discrepancy. 
For every saint up to this day, it would be true to say, by heralding in advance the 
archetypes of the things which he suffered, acted and spoke, was a forerunner of 
the mystery disclosed and prefigured through him. 
For this reason every saint can be taken in place of another without error, and all 
can be taken in place of all, and each in place of each, and the saints can be 
named in place of the books written by them just as the books can be named in 
place of the saints, as it is customary in Scripture. Clearly the Lord indicates this 
when he both renders and calls John the Baptist 'Elijah'... 28 
For if the one announced through them is one, then those who announce him may 
also be considered as one, and each may be taken in place of all, and all may be 
rightly taken in place of all-both those who served the mystery of the old 
covenant and those who have believed the proclamation of grace in the gospel. " 
26Jn. 21: 25. 
Ambig. 21, PG 91,1252BC. 
Ambig. 2 1, PG 91,1252D- 1253B. 
Ambig. 21, PG 91,1253B. 
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By virtue of the reference of all to the Logos everything is unified, like in the simile 
of a central point and radii. The saints are one because their archetype, that is Christ, is 
one. But there is a sequence here which we must not forget. One thing follows another, 
and one thing points to another as its truth. To be a 'forerunner' is to refer to the truth 
of one's self which lies ahead, and it is to function as an instructor to this truth. The Old 
Testament introduces one to 'Christ in flesh', Maximus explains, and the New 
Testament introduces one to 'Christ in Spirit', and Maximus adds 'that every concept 
which is capable of leaving an impression on the intellect is nothing else than an 
elementary introduction to the things beyond it to which it refers. "' 
In this sense, the four gospels are seen as 'an elementary introduction' to the 
eschatological word. Maximus makes a connection between 'elementary introduction' 
(OFTO L XE f WUL3) and 'elements' ((YTOLXEICL). He, thus, links the fourfoldness of the 
gospels with the sensible reality and its four elements (fire, air, water and earth), but 
also with the four cardinal virtues (sagacity, courage, chastity, justice) which are the 
'elements' of a certain spiritual world. All these, the gospels, the senses, the elements 
and the virtues are there to lead and prepare us for the future age, for the reception of 
the word of the age to come. 
For this reason there are four gospels, as being comprehensible to those who are 
bound to senses; even while being still under corruption. For this is also the 
number of the elements of the universe. The virtues, again, which constitute the 
spiritual world of reason, are four so that the word of truth would circumscribe the 
intelligible universe at present within us and the universe in which we are, and that 
he would unite them with each other in a union without confusion and would, 
again, distinguish them from each other without separation by the similarities of 
the elements that constitute them. 31 
The 'outer' and the 'inner' universes, the material and the spiritual one, Maximus here 
explains, are to be united without confusion and distinguished without separation. He, 
then, goes on to expound the links between the elements in both universes, and on what 
correspondences there are between the gospels, the elements and the virtues. 
The gospel according to Matthew mystically holds the logos of earth and of 
justice, as speaking in more natural terms. 
30 Ambig. 21, PG 91,1244D-1245A. 
31 Ambig. 21, PG 91,1245A. 
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The gospel according to Mark holds the logos of water and of chastity, as beginning from the baptism of John and the repentance preached by him in t> 
which chastity consists. 
The gospel according to Luke holds the logos of air and of courage, as being the 
more periodic and full of historical accounts. 
The gospel according to John holds the logos of ether and of sagacity, as being 
the highest of them all and as mystically introducing the faith in and the 
understanding of God as simple. " 
To this list Maximus adds the faith and the triad practical, natural and theology 
(philosophy). 
[T]he symbol of faith is the gospel of Matthew, as introducing the faithless magi 
worshipping [Christ] with gifts. The symbol of practical [philosophy] is the gospel 
of Mark, as beginning with repentance by which there is virtuous praxis. The 
symbol of natural [philosophy] is the gospel of Luke, as containing a more 
periodic account and making use of ways of narration. proper to teaching. The 
symbol of theology is the gospel of John from which the [New Testament] begins 
and with which it in a godly manner ends. 33 
Matthew earth justice faith 
Mark water chasti ty praktike 
Luke air courage physike 
John ether sagacity theology 
Maximus then takes a different turn. He applies the idea of elementary introduction 
or instruction also to the faculties of the soul and the bodily senses. The sensible world 
by means of the senses leads the soul to the knowledge of itself. But when the senses 
discern the logoi in sensible objects, they become, Maximus says, 'instructive for the 
faculties of the soul, calmly instructing them to activity by means of their own 
perceptions of the logoi that are in beings; logoi through which, as through some 
letters, those who are sharp-sighted to perceive the truth, read the word of God. '" 
Maximus then draws links between the bodily senses and the faculties of the soul. He 
says that the senses are called 'the exemplary images of the faculties of the soul, since 
every sense together with its means, that is the sense organ, has naturally been assigned 
Ambig. 21, PG 91,1245CD. 
Ambig. 21, PG 91,1245D-1248A. I am not entirely certain of whether this is the meaning of the 
last sentence. It should be noted that the Byzantine rite lectionary begins on Easter Sunday with the 
readingof Jn 1: 1-17. 
' Ambig. 2 1, PG 91,1248AB 
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beforehand to each faculty of the soul analogously to a certain more mystical logos. "' 
These are the correspondences: 
the image of the intellect is vision or eye; 
the image of reason is hearing or car; 
the image of anger is smell or nose (nostril); 
the image of desire is taste, and 
the image of life is touch. " 
Then the soul by means of its faculties 'reaches out through the senses to sensible 
things. ' If the soul acts wisely it 'has voluntarily created in its reason a most beautiful 
and spiritual universe. -)37 'This the soul does, Maximus continues, 'by combining the 
four virtues one with another like as elements in view of constructing from them a 
spiritual and intelligible world, and, indeed, by establishing every virwe from the 
activity of its faculties in an intertwining relation to the senses. 138 Here is, then, how 
Maximus sees the union and distinction of the material and the spiritual world, and we 
must not forget that the creation of this world of virtues, intertwined with the sensible 
universe, is creating something which makes one able to receive the word of the age to 
come. 
Thus, 
i 
sagacity is form 
i 
ed from 
i 
the interweaving 
* 
of the contemplative and 
cognitive activity belonging to the intellective and rational faculties with the senses 
of seeing and hearing, which are directed towards the sensible objects appropriate 
to them. 
Courage is formed from the interweaving of the incensive aspect with the sense of 
smell, that is, with the nostril, in which the incensive aspect is said to dwell as 
breath, this aspect being directed in a highly controlled way towards the 
appropriate sensible objects. 
Chastity is formed from the interweaving of the appetitive faculty with the sense 
of taste, directed in a moderate way towards its own sensible obýject, 
and justice is formed from the even and well-ordered and harmonious application 
of the activity of the vivifying faculty through the sense of touch to virtually all 
sensible objects. " 
In the sequel, following a kind of Torphyrian telescope logic' the soul combines 
the four virtues into two, meekness and wisdom, and eventually Joins also these two 
into one and the most generic virtue which, of course, is love. Love, then, is `the 
35 Ambig. 21, PG 91,1248B. 
' Ambig. 21, PG 91,1248C. 
'7 Ambig. 2 1, PG 91,1248C. 
38 Ambig. 21, PG 91,1248CD. 
39 Ambig. 2 1, PG 91,1248D- 1249A. 
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producer par excellence of deification, "' and that is the consummation of the movement 
from shadows and images to the truth: 'to become living images of Christ, or rather to 
become identical with him or a copy, or even, perhaps, to become the Lord himself, 
unless this seems blasphemous to some. "' Here we are coming to the end, and 
Maximus draws things together. 
In this way the soul moving wisely and acting in harmony with the divine logos 
according to which it is and has come into being, usefully through the senses 
perceives sensible things, appropriating the spiritual logoi in them. As for the 
senses, already having been infused with reason through the plenitude of reason 
(logos), the soul uses them as some rational vehicles of its faculties. And the 
faculties themselves it unites with virtues, and through the virtues the soul unites 
itself to the more divine logoi, inherent in virtues. And the divine logoi of the 
virtues conjoin the soul to a spiritual intellect hidden in them inscrutably, and this 
spiritual intellect of the divine logoi in virtues tears away from the soul every 
natural and voluntary relation which it has to things temporal, presenting it wholly 
as simple to the whole God. God in turn embraces it throughout together with its 
connatural body and proportionately likens them [both] to himself, so that it will 
be possible for God to become wholly manifest through the entire soul. ' 
In the end, it is Christ himself, the unity and the truth of Scripture and of the entire 
'lower world', who in the Scriptures is the 'forerunner' of himself instructing and 
leading us through himself to himself as he is. 
Consequently, compared to the more mystical word to be granted to the disciples 
in to coming age, the containable one which the Lord had given earlier, is a 
forerunner of itself The same is true if you compare the first and the second 
coming of the Lord. In himself he has intimated [this word] dimly in proportion 
to the capacity of those who receive it. But he has not yet revealed the mysteries 
he in silence has hidden in himself owing to the fact that for the time being they 
are entirely uncontainable to the created order. 43 
We, therefore, fall silent in expectation of his second coming and the age to come when 
he, the Word hitherto uncontainable, will be 'everything to every being on account of 
the superabundance of his goodness'. ' 
"0 Ambig. 21, PG 91,1249B. 
41 Ambig. 21, PG 91,1253D. 
42Ambig. 21, PG 91,1249BC. 
Ambig. 21, PG 91,1256BC. 
Ambig. 21, PG 91,1256B. 
II 
'Spiritual Hierarchy' 
Introduction 
TO SAY THAT the Church has a structure would hardly raise any objections, but to 
define this structure as hierarchical would in contrast stir the minds of many today. Yet, 
it is obvious on the basis of the Pauline epistles alone that from the very beginnings of 
its existence the Church has had ranks or orders which define the position and, to some 
extent, the function of each Christian: And God has appointed in the Church first 
apostles, second prophets, third teachers, then workers of miracles, then healers, 
helpers, administrators, speakers in various kinds of tongues. ' 
At the same time the Church is conceived as a unity, as a body, to use the Pauline 
term. Unity is what the Church is supposed to be. As L. Cerfaux in his classic study on 
Pauline ecclesiology has said: 'Harmony and solidarity must reign among the members 
of the Christian society as it does in the human body. ý2 
Again diversity of members is constitutive of the body and their similarity would 
make the body's eXistence impossible: If the whole body were an eye, where would be 
the hearing? If the whole body were an ear, where would be the sense of smell? But as 
it is, God arrangedthe organs in the body, each one of them, as he chose. If all were a 
3 
single organ, where would the body be? As it is, there are many parts, yet one body_ 
Unity in the Church can be viewed from different standpoints. The two elementary 
ones are unity in Christ and unity in the Holy Spint both of which are fundamental in 
the thought of St Maximus. In the first view point, the unity in Chnst, the Church is 
seen as Christ's body of which he is the head, or else Chnst as the Logos is presented 
as the point of reference to which everything leads and in which everything is united. In 
the view point, the unity in the Holy Spint, the one Spint is considered as bestowing on 
11 Cor. 12: 28. 
2 The Church in the Theology of St. Paul, translated by G. Webb and A. Walker (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1959; original French edition 1947), p. 266. See further his chapters on the unity of the 
church (11115) andon the notion of the 'Body of Christ' (H/6) in ibid., pp. 228-261; 262-286. 
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Christians diverse gifts which enable them to fulfil their particular function within the 
one body. These two view points then are closely bound together since it is Christ who 
is seen as the giver of the Spirit to his Church, and on the other hand the Spirit is 
viewed as the one who makes the faithful the body of Christ. 
As for Maximus, it would not be too far reaching to say that his understanding of 
the Church springs forth from a reading of Paul's address in Romans 12 where Paul 
expounds the unity and diversity of the members of the Church in terms of functions, 
gifts and virtues: For as in one body we have many members, and all the members do 
not have the same function, so we, though many, are one body in Christ, and 
individually members one of another. Having gifts that differ according to the grace 
given to us, let us use them. 4 
Gifts and Ranks 
5 Maximus discusses the diversity of gifts in Quaestiones ad Thalassium 29, a text 
which deals with an incident in the Acts of the Apostles. It refers to St Paul's travelling 
through Syria to Jerusalem and meeting some disciples who through the Spirit told Paul 
6 
not to go on to Jerusalem. Paul of course ignored this and went, which also was the 
reason for Thalassius to ask Maximus: 'Why did Paul disobey the Spirit and goT 
This alleged disobedience of Paul gives Maximus an occasion to expound on the 
way in which oneness of the Spirit and diversity of functions in the Church should be 
understood. He makes a distinction between the Spirit and the 'spirits', which he 
interpretes as the Holy Spirit and its activities or operations. The latter, he says, St Paul 
also calls 'gifts'. This distinction he sees in the prophecy of Isaiah where it says: the 
Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit 
of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the ftar of the Lord. 7 This text had 
1 Cor. 12: 17-20. 
Rom. 12: 4-6. 
Qu. Thal. 29, CCSG 7,209-213. See also, Ambig. 68,1404D- 1406C. 
Acts 21: 4. 
7 IS. 11: 2. 
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been interpreted earlier by Cyril of Alexandria in a way which recognizes such a 
distinction. 
To the one Spirit he has given a multiplicity of operations. For there is not one 
Spirit of wisdom and another of understanding or of counsel or of might, and so 
on. On the contrary, just as the Word of God the Father is one but is called, 
according to his various operations, life and light, and power, so it is too with 
regard to the Holy Spirit. He is one but is regarded as multiform because of the 
way in which he operates. That is why the most wise Paul lists for us the various 
kinds of gifts: All these, he says, are inspired by one and the same Spirit, who 
apportions to each individually as he wills. ' 
Ma: ximus in his interpretation quite clearly draws on Cyril. 
In his prophecy the holy prophet Isaiah says that seven spirits rested upon the 
Saviour who grew out of the root of Jesse. 9 He says this, not because he knows of 
seven spirits of God and teaches others, too, to accept such a doctrine, but because 
he calls the activities of the one and the same Holy Spirit 'spirits', owing to the 
fact that the actuating Holy Spirit exists wholly and complete in each activity 
proportionately. On the other hand the divine apostle calls the different activities 
of this same one Holy Spirit different 'gifts', which of course are actuated by this 
one and the same Spirit. 0 
The gifts which the Spirit actuates have been listed both by Isaiah and by Paul (in 
different versions). 11 These lists do not of course coincide, but that is less important. 
What is more important is that in each case one and the same Spirit is their source and 
that they are diversified in those who receive them. The underlying condition of each 
faithful defines the gift he can receive and the way in which the Spirit can operate on 
him. 
If, therefore, the manifestation of the Spirit is given according to the measure of 
each person's faith, then each of the faithful in partaking of such a gift of grace- 
in proportion, to be sure, to his faith and to the disposition of his soul-he 
receives in due measure the activity of the Spirit, which activity endows him with 
the habit that enables him to put into practice a particular commandment. " 
The gift in Paul's case is 'perfect love for God' which in accordance with I Corinthians 
13: 13 is the greatest gift in the Church and at the same time the most important 
commandment. The commandment of love is of course twofold, and there is an order 
within it. Maximus highlights this order in his answer with implications to ecclesiology. 
Consequently, as one receives wisdom, another knowledge, another faith and 
another something else from among the gifts enumerated by the great apostle, " in 
like manner one receives through the Spirit in proportion to his faith the gift of 
In Is., PG 70,316AB; translation in Russell, Cyril, p. 83. Cf. In Is., PG 70,313A; 1 Cor. 12: 11. 
Cf. Is. 11: 1-3. 
Qu. Thal. 29, CCSG 7,211; cf. I Cor. 12: 4. 
See Is. 11: 2; 1 Cor. 12: 8-10,13: 13-14: 1; Rom. 12: 6-8. 
12 Qu. Thal. 29: 15-21, CCSG 7,211. 
13 Cf 1 Cor. 12: 8ff. 
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love which is perfect and immediate in relation to God having no trace of 
anything material in it, and someone else receives through the same Spirit the gift 
of perfect love for his neighbour. 14 
Thus the truly great Paul, a minister of mysteries that pass human understanding, 
who immediately received the spirit of the perfect grace of love for God in 
proportion to his faith, disobeyed those who had the gift of perfect love for him [i. e. Paul] and who through the spirit told him not to go up to Jerusalem. The 
spirit' in this case is the gift of love for Paul actuated by the Spirit, for the 
spirit' is the same as a gift, as I said above following the prophet. Paul disobeyed 
them because he regarded the love which is divine and beyond understanding as 
incomparably superior to the spiritual love which the others had for him. " 
From this already we may at this point draw the conclusion that the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit as well as the commandments are not only diversified but also hierachically 
arranged. Maximus does not provide us with a map to this structure but the principle is 
clear. 
He then moves on to the more functional gifts. There too there is a clear order. 
Again, if the prophetic gift is far inferior to the apostolic gift, it was not fitting 
with respect to the Logos, who directs everything and ordains everyone his due 
place, that the superior should submit to the inferior, but rather that the inferior 
should come after the superior. For those who prophesied through the prophetic 
spint-and not the apostolic one-revealed the way in which Saint Paul would 
suffer for the Lord. 16 
Here Maximus speaks in far more explicit terms of ranks and their order- 
something which, he says, has a divine origin. Maximus' own conclusions are that 'the 
alleged disobedience of the great apostle is a guardian of the good order which arranges 
and directs all that is divine and which keeps everyone from falling away from his own 
position and establishment, "' and that 'the Church's ranks which the Spirit has well 
ordained must not be confused one with another. "" 
The latter confirms a whole sequence of things: Firstly, that there are ranks in the 
Church; secondly, that these ranks are defined by certain gifts which are actuated by the 
one Holy Spirit; thirdly, that these ranks and gifts form an orderly hierarchy arranged 
by the Spirit, and consequently, that this order must be respected and kept owing to its 
divine origin; and finally that the ranks must not be confused one with another. (It is 
interesting to notice that the 'bugword' once again is 'confusion'. ) 
" Qu. Thal. 29: 22-29, CCSG 7,211. 
Is Qu. Thal. 29: 35-45, CCSG 7,213. 
16 QU. Thal. 29: 54-6 1, CCS G 7,213. 
17Qu. Thal. 29: 67-70, CCSG 7,215. 
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In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 63, Maximus gives a little more detailed account of 
the gifts. There he interprets the prophet Zechariah's vision of a lampstand and its seven 
lamps. '9 The lampstand signifies the Church and the lamps 'the operations of the Holy 
Spirit, that is to say the gifts of the Spirit which the Logos grants to the Church. "' He 
then quotes the key text from Isaiah and a little later on explains what the seven spirits 
or gifts do. 
Consequently, wisdom removes foolishness and understanding does away with 
stupidity. Counsel destroys lack of discernment and strength cuts down weakness. Knowledge makes ignorance vanish, devotion chases impiety and the foulness of 
its works, and fear expels the hardheartedness of contempt. After all, not only are the statutes of the Spirit a light but also its operations. " 
He then goes on to say that the 'lamps' also signify the ranks of the Church. 
'Again, "lamps" are the ranks (paop[) which constitute the good order of the Church 
and which through it enlightens every living thing with the light of salvation. 122 In this 
case he sees the ranks as made up of the bearers of the seven gifts mentioned in Isaiah 
11: 2-3(LXX): wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety and fear of 
God. 
For example, he who is a wise teacher of divine and lofty doctrines and mysteries 
is a 'lamp' that discloses to the many what had formerly been hidden from them. 
He who with -intelligence and understanding listens to the wisdom spoken by the 
perfect ones is another 'lamp' being a sagacious listener who guards within 
himself the light of truth of what was spoken. 
He who with counsel discerns times fittingly in relation to events and who 
understands the modes that are to be added to the general principles without 
allowing them to be confused in unsuitable mixtures, he too being a 'wondrous 
counsellor' is shown to be another 'lamp'. 
And he too is a strong 'lamp' who with unshakeable mind bears the attacks of 
involuntary temptations, as did the blessed Job and the brave martyrs. He guards 
the light of salvation inextinguishable in the manner of bravely keeping to 
patience, having the Lord as his strenght and song. 23 
He who knows the devices of the evil one and who is not ignorant of the tricks of 
the invisible enemies, he too is another 'lamp' as being illumined by the light Of 
knowled e. With the great apostle he says: For we are not ignorant of his 
devices. 
Qu. Thal. 29: 71-72, CCSG 7,21S. 
Zech. 4: 2-3. 
Qu. Thal., 63: 148-151, CCSG 22,153-155. 
Qu. Thal., 63: 175-182, CCS G 22,155-157. 
Qu. Thal., 63: 183-185, CCSG 22,157. 
23 cf. Ps. 177: 14LXX. 
'2 Cor. 2: 11. 
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He who leads a devout life according to the commandment, that is a life directed 
by virtues, is yet another 'lamp', since he is devout and proven through devout 
manners. 
He who on account of the Judgement has by means of abstinence blocked the 1 1-4 
passions entrance into his soul, he is another 'lamp'. He has earnestly by means 
of the fear of God purified the destructive stains of passions and has made his life 
bright and radiant through rejecting unnatural pollutions. " 
All this reflects Maximus' ever iconic reading of Scripture: he sees in it an image of 
the Church. The life of the Church is presented as a life of virtue in its manifold 
forms. 26 He makes no direct link with the Church hierarchy as he himself would have 
known it, which may mean that this also reflects his iconic reading of the Church itself. 
In the Chapters on Love, for example, he writes: 
He who anoints his mind for the sacred contests and drives bad thoughts from it 
has the characteristics of a deacon, of a priest, however, if he illumines it with 
knowledge of beings and utterly destroys counterfeit knowledge; of a bishop, 
finally, if he ýerfects it with the sacred myrrh of knowledge of the worshipful and 
Holy Trinity. 7 
In yet another Quaestio in which he expounds on 'the seven eyes of the Lord' 
(again from Zechariah)" Maximus sees the seven gifts from the fear of God to wisdom 
as successive stages in one's spiritual ascent to God. " Here, however, he makes no 
specific reference to the Church but discusses the relationship of faith and deeds. His 
conclusion is, nevertheless, worth quoting. 
Through the eyes of faith, therefore-that is, through the illuminations of faith- 
we ascend higher and higher to the divine monad of wisdom. By ascending higher 
through the practice of particular virtues, we gather together the division of gifts 
[bringing them] to their cause ... 
" 
If I now concluded that the one thing certain of Maximus' ecclesiology is that it is a 
hierarchical one, a careful reader of Maximus might argue against this by saying that 
Maximus never uses the term 'hierarchy' when speaking about the Church. That 
certainly is true. There is, however, quite a simple answer to this question. The word 
ýEpapX[a had been coined by Dionysius the Areopagite probably in the early sixth 
" Qu. Thal., 63: 185-214, CCSG 22,157-159. 
2' See also Qu. Thal. 10, CCSG 7,83 and Qu. dub. 116, CCSG 10,95. 
'7Carit. 11.21, PG 90,989D-992A. Maximus draws here on Dionysius' On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 
5.3-7, PG 3,504-509. 
'8Zech. 3: 9. 
'9 For a discussion on this see the article of Joseph A. Spiritu Sancto, 'The Seven Gifts of the Holy 
Ghost in Early Greek Theology', in The Homiletic and Pastoral Review 26 (8/May 1926), pp. 820-827 
and (9/June 1926), pp. 930-938. 
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century, and although it had to do with the Church and its ranks, its meaning was far 
wider than what we understand by 'hierarchy' today. For Dionysius this term, when 
used in ecclesiological context, covered the whole of the Church life including the 
sacraments and the ranks. Consequently, as the term had not yet been established as a 
technical term, it was only natural that Maximus should have preferred different 
vocabulary. 
Another question we might like to ask here is if, as we have seen, the Church for 
Maximus is a'collection of gifts given by the Spirit, in whom they find their ultimate 
unity, does not his ecclesiology then run the risk of being taken, in terms of 
contemporary systematic theology, a product of an unbalanced 'pneumatomonism'. To 
address this question we must go back to the interpretation of the 'lampstand'. 
Maximus there states that jiff Christ is the head of the Church, to use the simile of 
human being, it follows that the Church has been given the one who, as God, has by 
nature the Spirit [and] the activities of the Spirit. '31 
This already creates a very strong connection between Christ and the Spirit, but 
that is not all. Maximus in the sequel brings forward a theological principle which 
forms the foundation for his understanding of the Church. 
For the Holy Spirit, just as it essentially belongs to God and Father according to 
nature, so also it essentially belongs to the Son according to nature, since it 
essentially proceeds from the Father through the begotten Son, and since it'gives 
its operations like as it were'lamps' to the 'lampstand', that is, to the Church. " 
What we have here is a 'through-the-Son 133 pneumatology leading to a 'synthetic' 
(Chnst-Spint) ecclesiology. The essential unity which exists between the Son and the 
30 Qu. Thal. 54: 347-351, CCSG 7,463. 
31 Qu. Thal. 63: 156-159, CCSG 22,155. 
32 Qu. Thal. 63: 167-172, CCSG 22,155. 
' The question of the filioque in relation to Maximus is one which requires a special study. Here we 
can say only that he was not an advocate of the filioque-clause understood as double-procession, which 
he explicitly rejects (PG 91,136AB). He only defended what he saw as the contemporary Roman 
position in accordancewith which this expression (not yet included in the creed) meant that the Spirit 
proceeded from the Father through the Son, which in turn implied the consubstantiality of the three 
divine persons. This does not mean that Maximus regarded as unorthodox those who did not speak in 
terms of filioque-this would have included himself, too-but that he saw how this expression could 
admit of an orthodox interpretation, as well as of an unorthodox one (cf. Opusc. 10, PG 91,136AB). 
This explains how the council of Hatfield 679, chaired by Theodore of Tarsus, the Greek Archbishop of 
Canterbury, could without any difficulty say in its definiton 'glorificantes Deum Patrem. ..., et Filium 
et Spiritum Sanctum procedentem. ex Patre et Filio inerrabiliter' (Bede, Hist. eccl. 4.17, PL 95, 
164 
Spirit is extended to the Church, too. Consequently, not only 'pneumatomonism' is 
avoided, but also a subordinationIst type of ecclesiology in which the 'charismatic' Is 
suffocated by the institutional. Yet, even here, one can say, there is hierarchy, not 
however subordination. 
Diversity of Members 
We have seen in several areas how for Maximus the integrity of the differences of 
the parts that form a whole is so very important. This is to safeguard the particular parts 
intact and 'Nvithout confusion' in their union. In Mystagogia 1, Maximus presents such 
an understanding of the Church, the Church being an image of God, the Creator of a 
manifold universe. 
Thus, as has been said, the holy Church of God is an image of God because it 
realizes the same union of the faithful which God realizes in the universe. As different as the faithful are by language, places, and customs, they are made one by it through faith. God realizes this same union among the natures of things 
without confusing them but in lessening and bringing together their distinction, as 
was shown, in a relationship and union with himself as cause, principle, and end. " 
The Church creates unity between people who otherwise may have nothing in 
common. Maximus enumerates a whole list of differences that distinguish people one 
from another. These differences are overcome in the Church and by the Church, yet 
without being annulled. 
[T]he holy Church of God will be shown to be working the same effects as God, 
as the image reflects its archetype. For numerous and of almost infinite number 
are the men, women, and children who are distinct from one another and vastly 
different by birth and appearance, by nationality and language, by customs and 
age, by opinions and skills, by manners and habits, by pursuits and studies, and 
still again by reputation, fortune, characteristics, and connections: All are born 
into the Church and through it are reborn and recreated in the Spirit. To all in 
equal measure it gives and bestows one divine form and designation, to be Christ's 
and to carry his name. " 
19913). See also, Maximus, QuaestionesetdubiaI. 34, CCSG 10,151; Jean-Claude Larchet, Maxime le 
Confesseur, midiateur entre I'Orient et VOccident (Paris: Les PAtions du Cerf, 1998), pp. 11-75; 
Berthold, George C., 'Maximus the Confessor and the Filioque', in SP 18/1 (198s), pp. 113-117; 
Alexander Alexakis, 'The Epistula ad Marinum Cypri Presbyterum of Maximos the Confessor (CPG 
7697.10) Revisited: A Few Remarks on Its Meaning and Its History' in BZ 94/2 (2001), pp. 545-554; 
Michael Lapidge, 'The Career of Archbishop Theodore', in Archbishop Theodore. Commemorative 
Studies on his Life and Influence, edited by M. Lapidge (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), p. 24; and in the 
same volume Henry Chadwick, 'Theodore, the English church and the monothelete controversy, pp. 
88-95. 
14Myst. 1, Soteropoulos, 154: 13-154: 20 [= PG 91,66813C]. 
35 MySt. 1, Soteropoulos, 152: 9-19 [= PG 91,665C]. 
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Christ and faith in him becomes the point of reference which unites those who are 
named after Chnst. 
In accordance with faith it gives to all a single, simple, whole, and indivisible 
condition which does not allow us to bring to mind the existence of the myriads 
of differences among them, even if they do exist, through the universal 
relationship and union of all things with it. It is through it that absolutely no one 
at all is in himself separated from the community since everyone converges with 
all the rest and joins together with them by the one, simple, and indivisible grace 
and power of faith. For all, it is said, had but one heart and one mind. " 
The Neoplatonic image of a centre and radii serves Maximus to illustrate his point 
of a harmonious unity-in-diversity which both the universe and the Church are. 
It is he who encloses in himself all beings by the unique, simple, and infinitely 
wise power of his goodness. As the centre of radii that extend from him he does 
not allow by his unique, simple, and single cause and power that the principles of beings become disjoined at the periphery but rather he circumscribes their 
extension in a circle and brings back to himself the distinctive elements of beings 
which he himself brought into existence. The purpose of this is so that the 
creatures and products of the one God be in no way strangers and enemies to one 
another by having no reason or centre for which they might show one another 
any friendly or peaceful sentiment or identity, and not run the risk of having their 
being separated from God to dissolve into non-being. " 
The Temple 
In the following chapter of the Mystagogia, Maximus describes the Church as an 
image of the universe. This time the universe is understood as being composed of 
visible and invisible realities, and the Church is seen from the viewpoint of its 
construction, that is, of its being divided into a nave and a sanctuary. The image 
relationship is based on the way in which these two realities relate to each other: they 
are at once united and distinct. 'On a second level of contemplation he [= the Old Man] 
used to speak of God's holy Church as a figure and image of the entire world 
composed of visible and invisible essences because it admits of the same both union 
and distinction as the world. "' 
For Maximus the church building is first of all a 'hypostatic union' of the nave and 
the sanctuary. 
For while it is one house in its construction it admits of a certain diversity in the 
disposition of its plan by being divided into an area exclusively assigned to priests 
and ministers (= deacons), which we call the sanctuary, and one accessible to all 
the faithful, which we call the nave. Still, it is one according to hypostasis (KaTd 
Myst. 1, Soteropoulos, 152: 19-26 [= PG 91,665D-668A]; Acts 4: 32. 
Myst. 1, Soteropoulos, 154: 2-12 PG 91,668AB]. 
Myst. 2, Soteropoulos, 156: 3-6 PG 91,668CD]. 
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1 39 TTIV UTTOUTCLCYLV) without being divided with its parts by reason of the differences between them, but rather by their relationship to the unity it frees these parts from the difference arising from their narnes. ' 
Unity becomes somehow more vivid when it is approached from the aspect of 
what happens in the church building, from the aspect of the liturgy. There is a 
movement from the nave to the sanctuary during the celebration of the Eucharist. This is 
the movement from the visible to the invisible, from the sensible to the intelligible, and 
from potentiality to actuality and fulfilment. The unity between the nave and the 
sanctuary is a relationship of what one might call 'liturgical becoming'; the sanctuary is 
the actuality of the nave and the nave is the sanctuary in potentiality. Both are the same, 
yet not the same: they are at once both united and distinct. 
It shows each one to be by reversal what the other is for itself. Thus, the nave is the 
sanctuary in potency by being consecrated by the relationship of the sacrament 
toward its end, and in turn the sanctuary is the nave in actuality by possessing the logos of its own sacrament. In this way the church remains one and the same in its 
two parts. 41 
*** 
As in the universe so also in Scripture as well as in the Church the spiritual blends 
with the material and sensible. One reflects the other in a relationship of reciprocal 
interdependence. The visible and contingent receives its meaning in the invisible, and 
the visible provides a bridge to the invisible. 
Again multiplicity and diversity characterize all the three realms. The many 
discover their unity, without losing their particularity, in the divine that lies behind them 
all. The divine Logos gives coherence and harmony to the many in their mutual 
relationships, in their union without confusion, and as the source and end of all he is 
the point of reference by virtue of which beings, people, words and syllables find their 
ultimate unity in an eschatological fulfilment. 
That is to say 'as a concrete and particular entity'. 
Myst. 2, Soteropoulos, 156: 7-14 [= PG 91,668D-669A]. 
Myst. 2, Soteropoulos, 156: 15-19 [= PG 91,669A]. 
Part V 
SPIRITUAL LIFE AND HUMAN ARCHITECTURE 
12 
The Twofold Commandment of Love 
ST AUGUSTINE in his treatise On Christian Teaching writes: 'Anyone who thinks that 
he has understood the divine Scriptures or any part of them, but cannot by his under- 
standing build up the twofold love of God and neighbour, has not yet succeeded in un- 
derstanding them. " This, in a nutshell, is all we need to know about the Scriptures and 
the Christian life in general; without love we have nothing. As Andrew Louth, com- 
menting on St Augustine, has put it: 'The message of the Scriptures is of the utmost 
simplicity: love. 
But what kind of love is it that we are talking of here? Love can be understood in 
so many different ways. ' (We have already seen an example of such a difficulty in 
chapter three. ) This is a question we might ask in the words of the great Elizabethan 
lutenist and songwriter John Dowland, who towards the end of his turbulent career 
wrote: 4 
Tell me, true Love, where shall I seek thy being, 
In thoughts or words, in vows or promise-making, 
In reasons, looks, or passions never seeing, 
In men on earth, or women's minds partaking. 
Thou canst not die, and therefore living tell me 
Where is thy seat, why doth this age expel thee? ' 
' 1.86 (xxxvi 40), Green, 48. 
2 Discerning the Mystery. An essay on the nature of theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 130. 
3 See Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled. Plato and the God of Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
4 See Diana Poulton, John Dowland (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, second 
and revized edition, 1982; first published in 1972). On the song 'Tell me true Love' see pp. 298-299. 
5 'Tell me, true Love' in A Pilgrimes Solace. Wherein is contained Musicall Harmonie of 3.4. and 5. 
parts, to be sung andplaid with the Lute and Viols (The English Lute-songs 1/ 12& 14, London: Stainer 
& Bell Ltd, 1969; first published in London: William Barley, 1612), p. 20. 
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Dowland, no doubt, had seen much in his life and had come to realize that love is 
something far higher than merely a passing human emotion. On the pages that follow 
we shall see what answer St Maximus gives to Dowland's question. As always we 
shall move within the parameters of unity and diversity, beginning with unity of virtues 
and commandments. 6 
Love: The Most Generic of the Commandments and Virtues 
There are different ways unity of virtue or unity between virtues has been viewed. 
Plato, for example, asks in the Protagoras whether individual virtues are parts of a sin- 
gle virtue or whether they are simply different names of one and the same thing, ' and in 
the Republic he expounds the idea that the three cardinal virtues (wisdom, temperance 
and courage) assigned to each one of the parts of the soul (the rational, the desiring and 
the incensive part) are drawn together into a harmonious whole by a fourth virtue, that 
is, justice. " Didymus the Blind and Evagnus have seen virtue as being essentially one 
but differentiated in the different parts of the soul of those who put it into practice. ' The 
metaphor they use is that of light which penetrating through glass takes the form of 
glass, or as Gabriel Bunge puts it, they 'compare the essence of virtue to the phenome- 
non of light, which in itself is single and colourless but, when refracted through glass, 
bursts into a multitude of colours. "0 Mark the Ascetic expresses the same principle in 
different metaphors. 'All material wealth', he says, 'is the same, but acquired in many 
different ways; similarly, virtue is one, but is many-sided in its operations. "' And in 
another treatise he makes use of the imagery of water and plants: 'When rain falls upon 
' More general surveys on Maximus' spirituality can be found in Thunberg, Microcosm; Larchet, La 
divinisation; Walther V61ker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens (Wiesbaden: 
Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1965); Louth, Maximus; and Blowers, Exegesis. 
7 prt., OCIF/Burnet 111,329c-336b. 
8 R. 4, OCr/Burnet IV, 441c-444e. 
' See Cap. prac. 89 and 98, SC 171,680-688 and706. See also Gabriel Bunge's commentary on these 
two chapters in his &qgre le Pontique. Traitipratique ou le moine. Cent chapitres sur la vie spiri- 
tuelles, translated by P. Peternell (B6grolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1996; original Ger- 
man edition 1989), pp. 253-255,275-276. 
10 Bunge, 9vagre, p. 276. 
" On the Spiritual Law 196, SC 445,126; translation in The Philokalia. The Complete Text, vol. 1, 
compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth, translated and edited by 
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the earth, it gives life to the quality inherent in each plant: sweetness in the sweet, as- 
tringency in the astringent; similarly, when grace falls upon the hearts of the faithful, it 
gives to each the energies appropriate to the different virtues without itself changing. "' 
Also Cyril of Jerusalem has made use of this metaphor: 
One and the same rain comes down on all the world, yet it becomes white in the Illy, fed in the rose, purple in the violets and hyacinths, different and many- 
coloured in manifold species; thus it is one in the palm tree and other in the vine, 
and all in all things, though it is uniform, and does not vary in itself. For the rain does not change, coming down now as one thing and now other, but it adapts itself 
to the thinors receiving it and becomes what is suitable to each. Similarly the Holy 
Spirit, being one and of one nature and indivisible, imparts to each man his grace 
as he wills. Though the Spirit is one in nature, yet bý the will of God and in the 
name of Christ, he brings about many virtuous effects. 3 
Although these ideas have influenced Maximus, in ecclesiology for example (cf. 
ch. 11), he treats the question of unity of virtue in his own peculiar way. The Por- 
phyrian Tree with its genera and species is once again lurking at the back of his mind 
when he speaks of love drawing 'the individual commandments into a universal lo- 
gos"' and being 'the most generic of virtues'. " 
In case of love, or chanty, seen as something all-embracing and fundamentally as 
the source of all virtue, Maximus only elaborates the key principle of the Scriptures. 
What he in some other texts expresses in logical terms, Maximus puts in more practical 
terms in the dialogue Liber asceticus where a young brother asks 'the old man' about 
keeping the commandments. 
The brother said: 'But the Lord's commands are many, Father, and who can keep 
them all in mind, so as to strive for all of themT ... The old man replied: 'Though they are many, brother, yet they are all summed up in one word: You 
shall love the Lord your God with your whole strength, and with your whole mind, 
and your neighbour as yourse? f And he who strives to keep this word succeeds 
with all the commandments together. 16 
G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kallistos Ware (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1979), (ch. 195) p. 
123. 
" On Those who suppose Justification is from Works 109, SC 445,160; translation in The Philoka- 
lia, vol. 1, (ch. 116) p. 134. 
Catech. 16.12, PG 33,933AB; translation in Cyril of Jerusalem, St., Works, vol. 2, translated by 
L. P. McCauley andA. A. Stephenson (The Fathers of the Church 64, Washington: The Catholic Uni- 
versity of America Press), p. 82. 
14 Ep. 2, PG 91,393C. 
15 Qu. Thal. 40: 61, CCSG 7,269. 
" Ascet.: 92-100 (6), CCSG 40,15. The critical edition does not have paragraph numbers. I have put 
inside brackets those usedin PG 90 andadoptedby Sherwoodin his translation quotedhere. 
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To say, then, that the commandment of love includes all the others is nothing else 
than saying You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with allyour mind. ... and... you shall love your neighbour as yourself. On 
these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets. " Or as the apostle Paul 
puts it: The commandments, 'You shall not commit adultery, You shall not kill, You 
shall not steal, You shall not covet, 18 and any other commandment, are summed up in 
this sentence, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself. '19 Love does no wrong to a 
neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law. " 
In Letter 2, which in itself is an entire treatise on chanty, Maximus speaks of the 
'the mystery of love'21 in which the whole of the Old Testament finds its fulfilment, 
truth and ufflty. " The law and the prophets are succeeded by this mystery of love which 
'out of human beings makes us gods, and draws the individual commandments to a 
universal logos. 
Love as something all-embracing represents, in terms of Porphynan logic, the 
most generic genus of commandments. Here the Porphyrian Tree grows, as it were, 
downwards, from the universal logos to the individual commandments. The individual 
commandments are seen simultaneously as an unfolding and differentiation of the logos 
of love in time: 'All the individual commandments come uniformly under this universal 
logos according to God's good pleasure, and from it they are dispensed in diverse ways 
in accordance with God's economy. "' 
Being the universal logos of virtue, love possesses a whole range of 'species of 
good things' which Maximus in the sequel enumerates: faith, hope, humility, meek- 
ness, mercy, self-control, patience, peace , joy, and so on. 
'5 'And simply, ' he says, 'to 
17 Mt. 22: 34-40. 
"3 Dt. 6: 5. 
19 Lv. 19: 18. 
' Rom. 13: 8-10. 
21 Ep. 2, PG 91,3 93C. 
' See also ch. 10 above. 
23 Ep. 2, PG 91,393C. 
24 Ep. 2, PG 91,393C. 
25 Ep. 2, PG 91,393C-396A. 
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put it briefly, love is the consummation of every good thing (being the highest of goods 
with respect to God) and the source of every good thing. "' 
In another text, Quaestiones ad Thalassium 40, where Maximus interprets the 
meaning of the six jars in the wedding at Cana of Galilee, Porphyrian logic becomes 
explicit. Here Maximus speaks of love as 'the most generic of virtues'. 
The six jars Maximus takes as 'the capacity of the human nature to do the divine 
commandments. ' Number six is associated with creative activity on account of the six 
days of creation, but it is also seen as the number of perfection being the only 'perfect' 
number (i. e. the sum of its factors) between one and ten. This Maximus transposes to 
his discussion on the generic virtue and its division, as well as. on the faculty in human 
nature capable of producing this virtue and its differentiation. 
He first summons Thalassius to think about the following: 
[H]ow is the generic faculty of nature, productive of good things, divided into six 
generic modes of virtue? and 
[W]hat is the faculty of nature that produces the universal virtue, a virtue which is 
universal and more generic than other virtues, and which is divided into six 
species, and these generic ones, so that after having been set in order by this 
natural faculty it may through its modes advance in a six-fold manner into 
species? "' 
What Maximus' question entails is that the generic logos of virtue is differentiated 
by means of the different ways in which the faculty operates, of its tropoi. Having first 
posed the question, Maximus then answers it himself. 'The most generic of virtues, ' he 
says, 'is love and the most generic faculty of the [human] nature capable of realiZing it, 
is reason. "' Here we have the most generic genus of the Porphynan Tree. 'Reason, ' 
Maximus continues, 'as it operates, holding fast onto its own cause, is distinguished 
into six (more) generic modes'. Now we are half way down the Tree; the most generic 
genus is divided into genera having still species subordinate to it. (The non-Porphyrian 
element is that the dividing principle, instead of being a specific differentia, is the mode 
or tropos. ) Further down the generic modes 'Include the species into which the logos of 
' Ep. 2, PG 91,396B - 
Qu. Thal. 40: 40-47, CCSG 7,269. 
Qu. Thal. 40: 61-63, CCSG 7,269. 
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love is intrinsically divided. "' These are the most specific species. The content of these 
is dictated by six biblical ideals of love for one's neighbour: 'looking after both the 
bodily and the spiritual needs of those who hunger and thirst, of those who are strang- 
ers or naked or in sickness, and of those who are in prison. 130 (Love, of course, is not 
exhausted in these particular six 'species' of virtue. ) 
'Consequently, ' Maximus concludes, 'the most genenc faculty of the [human] na- 
ture is capable of differentiating the most generic virtue into species [of virtue]. It di- 
vides virtue by means of its own six modes into six species, and through these [species 
of virtue] the human nature is united in singleness of inclination (yvc6ýuq). "' 
All this rather intellectual elaboration is nothing else than Maximus' way of an- 
swering the question of true love. It is precisely the kind of reading of Scripture St 
Augustine has in mind in the passage quoted above. And here by, as it were, drawing 
from the hidden meaning of 'the six jars' Maximus builds up a whole system of love 
for neighbour. This, then, is one aspect in finding where the being of true Love is. 
Logos and TroPos of Commandments 
Before we move on to see what implications the keeping or transgressing the 
commandment of love are, I would like to draw our attention to the distinction between 
logos and tropos in this particular context. As we have already seen, it is the tropos 
which differentiates the more generic logos of virtue into particular species. 
In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 27, Maximus presents a similar idea with respect to 
individual commandments. The question here is about the need of a particular revelation 
concerning the application of a commandment. Thalassius asks: 'Since the Lord after 
his resurrection had explicitly commanded to make disciples of all nations, " why did 
Peter need a revelation for the nations in the case of Cornelius? And why did the apos- 
tles, as they heard of this, criticize Peter? "' 
29Qu. Thal. 40: 63-66, CCSG 7,269-271. 
30 Qu. Thal. 40: 66-68, CCSG 7,271. 
31 Qu. Thal. 40: 71-74, CCSG 7,27 1. 
32 Mt. 28: 19. 
33Qu. Thal. 29, CCSG 7,191. 
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Thalassius' query gives Maximus an opportunity to expound on the logos-tropos 
distinction. He first emphasizes the fact that the apostle necessarily needed a revelation: 
He had not known that in accordance with faith circumcision made no difference, nor 
had he yet leamt that there was no distinction between Jews and Greeks, for which rea- 
son he also had a hard time with the apostles in Jerusalem. Maximus writes: 
For this grace of preaching was an introduction of a divine life and a new kind of tl 
worship, different from the forensic worship [of the Old Covenant], and it was a teaching about the soul voluntarily releasing itself from the body by gnome. For 
this reason those to whom this grace of preaching was entrusted needed to be 
taught about each word (logos) by him who had given the command. " Ln 
As a corollary, Maximus once again turns the given example into a uiuversal prin- 
iple: '[E]vcrl nI ciy, word (logos) of a divine commandment necessarily requires teaching 
and revelation as to the definite mode (tropos) of its realization. For there is no such 
person who can exactly discern the mode (tropos) of a word (logos) without a revela- 
tion from him who has spoken the word. "s Despite the difficulty in rendering the 
Greek with its multi-levelled meanings of logos into English, the idea becomes clear: a 
divine commandment is a general principle which covers a great range of situations and 
circumstances. Its application in a particular case requires further knowledge. In other 
words, it requires divine inspiration to discern what the best way of putting it into prac- 
tice is. Thus, unity and differentiation with respect to commandments is in their logos 
and tropos. 
How often we find ourselves in situations where we are unable to discern what is 
right, even if we know the principles? In such cases, we may either consult some more 
experienced person who may be more discerning than we are, or else we may follow 
the example of the apostle Peter who 'although he already had received the word 
(logos) concerning preaching to the nations, did not attempt to do so but waited until he 
was taught the mode (tropos) of this word (logos) by him who gave it. 136 
34Qu. Thal. 27: 20-26, CCSG 7,19 1. 
35 Qu. Thal. 27: 28-32, CCSG 7,191. 
36Qu. Thal. 27: 32-35, CCSG 7,191-193. 
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The Purpose of the Incarnation 
Let us now turn to consider how Maximus views the relationship between the In- 
carnation and the twofold commandment of love. In the Liber asceficus, one of the 
Greek answers to cur deus homo alongside Athanasius' De Incarnatione, Maximus re- 
lates the purpose of God's incarnation to the twofold commandment. He, at the very 
outset of the dialogue, sets the question of the motives of the incarnation into the per- 
spective of an arch extending from creation and fall to redemption and deification. Here 
is his virtually credal statement expressed by the mouth of the 'old man'. 
The old man replied: 'Listen: man, made by God in the beginning and placed in 
Paradise, transgressed the commandment and was made subject to corruption and 
death. Then, though governed from generation to generation by the various ways 
of God's providence, yet he continued to make progress in evil and was led on, by 
his various fleshly passions, to despair of life. For this reason the only-begotten 
Son of God, . -taking flesh by the Holy Spirit and the holy Virgin, he showed us a godlike way of life, he gave us holy commandments and promised the kingdom 
of heaven to those who lived according to them. Suffering his saving Passion and 
rising from the dead, he bestowed upon us the hope of resurrection and eternal 
life. From the condemnation of ancestral sin he absolved by obedience; by death 
he destroyed the power of death, so that as in Adam all die, so in him all shall be 
made alive. Then, ascended into heaven and seated on the right hand of the 
Father, he sent the Holy Spirit as a pledge of life, and as enlightenment and 
sanctification for our souls, and as help to those who struggle to keep his 
commandments for their salvation. This, in brief, is the purpose of the Lord's 
becoming man. '37 
Clearly the initial human failure, according to Maximus, was the transgression of the 
commandment, the inability to love and obey God. This then led to corruption and 
death, to the increase of evil and the rule of the devil in the world. The incarnation, the 
passion, the resurrection, the ascension and finally the sending of the Holy Spirit re- 
stored the possibility for man once again to find salvation through keeping the com- 
mandments. 
The dialogue goes on to discuss the commandments and how he who imitates the 
Lord is able to do them, and again how he who separates himself from 'every fleshly 
attachment' and 'worldly passion' will be given power, that is the grace of the Holy 
Spirit, to do this. The fact that the commandments are summed up in the twofold com- 
mandment of love, and that love for God and love for neighbour are interdependent, are 
made explicit. Maximus continues: 
37Ascet.: 7-31 (1), CCSG 40,6-7. Emphasis mine. 
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'Love for every man must be preferred above all visible things. This is the sign of our love for God, as the Lord himself shows in the Gospels: He that loves me, he says, will keep my commandments. And what this commandment is, which if we keep we love him, hear him tell: This is my commandment, that you love one another. Do you see that this love for one another makes firm the love for God, 
which is the fulfilling of every commandment of God? "' 
In reality, when there is mutual love between people, it all seems quite easy, but when it 
comes to loving one's enemies, things begin to look rather different. Love for one's 
enemies seems, in fact, to be something humanly speaking impossible. For this end one 
needs to know, Maximus explains, the 'purpose(CFKOTr63) of the Lord. And here comes 
the connection between the Incarnation and the twofold commandment. The Lord's 
purpose, he says, was the following. 
'Our Lord Jesus Christ, being God by nature and, because of his love for 
mankind, deigning also to become man, was born of a woman and made under the law, as the divine apostle says, that by observing the commandment as man he 
might overturn the ancient curse of Adam. Now the Lord knew that the whole law 
and the prophets depend on the two commandments of the law- You shall love Lord your God with your whole heart, and your neighbour as yourse4f. He, 
therefore, was eager to observe them, in human fashion, from beginning to end. 
The Lord's purpose was to observe the twofold commandment of love as a human be- 
ing-something we too need to bear in mind if we wish to imitate Chnst and love our 
enemies. 
Keeping the commandment of love is a matter of spintual warfare, and that is how 
Maximus sees it in Christ's personal life. The devil attempts to cast Christ down in this 
warfare through different kinds of temptations or trials. The devil's purpose is the op- 
posite of that of Christ's: to make him transgress the commandment of love. 
The temptations are twofold just as the commandment is twofold. Love for God is 
the devil's first target when he tempts Christ in the wilderness. He hopes to make 
Christ prefer some created thing to God which he does tempting him with pleasurable 
things. These kind of temptations are described as being 'within our power', that is to 
say that it is a matter of our own free choice as to what we make of them. 
The devil failed in this first enterprise but did not give up his mission, instead he 
tried to win Christ with respect to the other half of the commandment. Maximus, or the 
'old man', continues: 
" Ascet.: 120-128 (7), CCSG 40,17-19. 
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'So making use of the wicked Jews and his own machinations, he strove to 
persuade him, on returning to society, to transgress the commandment of love for 
neighbour. For this reason while the Lord was teaching the ways of life, and 
actually demonstrating the heavenly manner of life, ..., that vindictive wretch stirred up the wicked Pharisees and Scribes to their various plots against him in 
order to bring him to hate the schemers. He thought that Christ would not be able to bear up under their plots; and so the devil would be attaining his purpose by 
making Christ a transgressor of the commandment of love for neighbour. " 
To the devil's disappointment Christ was not persuaded. Being God he knew the 
devil's designs, and instead of turning his love for his own people (including those 
who rejected him) into hatred, he fought back against the devil who instigated the 
Scribes and the Pharisees. 'He admonished, rebuked, reproached, berated, ceaselessly 
did good to those who were egged on, who, though able to resist, yet through sloth had 
willingly borne with the instigator. ' By goodness and love Christ fought against evil 
and hatred. 'It was for this reason that he endured such evils from them; rather, to 
speak more truly, on their account he, as man, contended until death on behalf of the 
commandment of love. ' 
But Christ's example is not simply a codex of moral behaviour. It is something 
more fundamental, something more, as we would say today, existential or ontological. 
Following his example means labouring with him for the restoration of the whole of 
humanity, of each and all. Christ's victory over evil opened the way for us to learn to 
live again in accordance with true Love which we once lost. The process of integrating 
this love is one of transformation both at the level of the individual human person and at 
the level humanity as a whole. In the two final chapters, we shall examine the results of 
the initial human failure and the way back to integration. 
Ascet.: 178-186 (10), CCSG 40,23-25. 
Ascet.: 201-215 (11), CCS G 40,25-27. 
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Confusion and Fragmentation 
THE FALLEN world is characterized by conflict and fragmentation. War and isolation, 
the two poles between which the pendulum of human history oscillates, are a painfully 
enduring presence both between people and within each human person. Individuals, 
communities and whole nations are constantly being reminded of a tension which seems 
never to allow peace to exist simultaneously at all these levels. Where there is external 
peace and well-being, there one discovers inner conflict and the loneliness of the city- 
dweller. Communities, rather than possessing unity naturally, gain and preserve it only 
through serious effort, whereas war between nations is hardly an issue one needs to call 
in mind at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
John Dowland's line in the song quoted earlier on, true Love ... why doth this age 
expel thee? strikes the right note, and that a sad one. Why indeed is it that conflict is so 
inevitable, and that peace is only reached through struggle? Why is it that the love that 
'makes the world go round' seems to amount to 'everybody minding their own 
business', to refresh Alice's saying in our minds? These are questions which go night to 
the heart of human existence as such, and no simple answer, especially within the limits 
of a general survey such as this, would do justice to the seriousness of the issue. 
Nevertheless, there are answers which do not leave us empty and hopeless in this 
drama, and the answer Maximus is able to provide, is one well worth consideration. 
Human Architecture 
In order to understand Maximus' view of what the state of fallen humanity 
amounts to and what we can do about it, we need to be aware of the basics of 
his 
anthropology. Following the common practice in the Greek world of his time, 
Maximus 
speaks in terms of the platonic tripartite division of the soul. In accordance with this 
conception three parts, the rational, the incensive and the desiring part (or reason, anger 
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and desire) make up the intellective, reasonable and sentient soul which animates and 
holds together the body. In his Christological, ' as well as anti-OngernSt, 2 works 
Maximus argues that soul and body come into being simultaneously. He very carefully 
excludes any idea of pre-existence of soul, or indeed of pre-existence of bod Y: 3 body 
and soul are united in a union without confusion at the moment of their coming-into- 
being. In this union, the soul, and more precisely the mind, observes the material world 
by means of its senses through the body's sense-organs. ' 
In addition to the tripartite division, Maximus makes use of another distinction, 
perhaps more characteristic of Aristotle (found also in the De natura hominis by 
5 Nemesius of Emesa, a treatise which Maximus frequently quotes). In accordance with 
this distinction the soul is first divided into two parts, the rational and the irrational. The 
irrational part is then divided into that which obeys reason and that which cannot be 
influenced by it, the former being the desiring and the incensive parts, and the latter the 
nourishing and the living parts. There are further divisions to the irrational part, but 
these are too detailed and less important for our purposes here. ' 
What is more important, is the distinction Maximus makes in Mystagogia 5 with 
respect to the rational part. ' This he divides into intellect (voD3) and reason (X&p3). 
First, intellect is a contemplative faculty through which the soul can be united to God. It 
is a static and receptive faculty at the summit of the human construct, being a kind of 
landing area for God. Through the intellect the soul becomes luminous when in 
communion with God, and the soul in turn illumines the body. But this can happen 
only when the human architecture is restored to its right hierarchical structure. 
Reason, again, is a practical faculty which governs the activity of the soul. It is the 
charioteer which drives the two horses, that is, the desiring and the incensive parts of 
' See Ep. 15,552D. 
2See Ambig. 42, PG 91,1325D- 1336B. 
3 See Ambig. 42, PG 91,1336C- 134 1 C; and Ambig. 7, PG 9 1,11 OOCD. 
4 See Qu Thal. 58, CCSG 22,33-35. Cf. ch. 10 above: 'The Word of the Age to Come'. 
' Particularly in the long Ambiguum 10, PG 91,1105C-1205C. See the references in Louth, 
Maximus, pp. 205-212; and in the critical edition of Nat. hom. by M. Morani, Nemesii emeseni & 
naturahominis (Leipzig: B. G. TeubnerVerlagsgesellschaft, 1987), p. 141. 
'See Ambig. 10-44, PG 91,1196D-1197D. 
7 Myst. 5, Soteropoulos, 164-180. 
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the soul . 
8Reason is the faculty which seeks after goodness in practice, in the soul's, as 
it were, external relations. 
Why this distinction is of such interest, is because it provides a clear 
anthropological structure in which the twofold commandment of love finds its proper 
place. Love for God through the intellect in contemplation attracts divine grace which in 
turn enables the soul to express love for neighbour in activity governed by reason. Here 
we are, of course, speaking of spiritual love which includes the love of enemies, too. It 
is only by means of this double love that the human being is able voluntarily to move 
from the image to the likeness of God and reach deification. In the opposite case we 
have what basically is the fallen humanity, fragmented and at once confused, like a 
wine-glass smashed on a stone floor. 
Fall 
Maximus was very much aware of the global disintegration. The picture he gives 
of fallen humanity in Letter 2 is rather grim. 
The deceitful devil in the beginning contrived by guile to attack humankind with 
self-love, deceiving him through pleasure, and separated us in our gnome from 
God and from one another turning us away from rectitude. In this way he divided 
the [human] nature, fragmenting it into a multitude of opinions and ideas. With 
time he established a law for the means and discovery of every vice making use of 
our powers to this end, and he installed in all a wicked cause of discord for the 
continuance of evil, namely, irreconcilability of gnome. By this he has prevailed 
on humankind to turn it from what is permitted to what is forbidden. Thus 
humankind has brought into being from itself the three greatest, primordial evils 
and the begetters of, simply, all vice: ignorance, I mean, and self-love and tyranny, 
which are interdependent and established one through another. ' 
One could tell the story of how we have arrived at this state in many different ways 
by reading Maximus. One way of doing this is by relating the adventures of the 
intellect, in other words, by describing the 'intellectual' history of mankind, which is 
what we shall attempt to do here. 
In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 61, Maximus explains the role of the intellect and 
that of pleasure at the beginning of human history. 
When God created human nature, he did not create pleasure or pain along with it 
as regards its sensibility. Instead, he furnished it with a certain intellectual capacity 
'Cf. Ambig. 15, PG 91,1216AB. 
9 Ep. 2, PG 91,396D-397A. 
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for p, leasure, whereby humanity would be able to enjoy God ineffably. But at the 
creation the first man forfeited this intellectual capacity (I mean the natural desire 
of the mind for God) to sense. Indeed at his very first movement he unnaturally 
produced in himself, by the medium of sense a pleasure in sensible things (for 
which he had not received the capacity). " 
The beginning of the whole story, then, was that the intellect, or the mind, was 
directed, not upwards to God, as it was meant to do, but downwards to sensible things. 
In its desire to take pleasure in sensible things, the intellect, as it were, 'got stuck' with 
the senses. Evidently, true Love was not found there. This was the first step, and there 
began the downhill of the human story: Adam was deceived by the devil through 
pleasure; he fell away from the knowledge of, and essentially communion with, God, 
and seeking to satisfy his existential hunger through the pleasure given from sensible 
things he ended in self-love and tyranny of his neighbour. 
The initial wrong move of the intellect leads into a disorder in the human construct. 
The hierarchical order of the parts of the soul is shattered and thus the whole being 
becomes distorted. The human construct is not altogether destroyed with the Fall but 
somehow convoluted. Maximus characteristically calls this state 'confusion' or 'evil 
confusion of passions'. " 
The intellect, as it were, sinks in the lower parts of the soul and is thus mingled or 
confused with the irrational. In biblical language (where 'Israel' takes the place of the 
intellect) this is seen as the captivity of Israel. But there are other imageries Maximus 
makes use of. In Quaestiones ad Thalassium 16, he interprets the 'molten calf', that 
spectacular idol smelted and worshipped by the Israelites in the wilderness, as 'the 
mixing or the confusion of the natural powers one with another'. " 
It is of importance to us to note that the post-lapsarian state is one of distortion of 
elements which are and remain fundamentally good. Evil comes about from their faulty 
association which violates their true nature. In Maximian terms, the 'mess' is in the 
tropos rather than in the logos. In this Quaestio, all the various types of jewellery that 
'0 Qu. Thal. 6 1, CCS G 22: 8-16,85. Translation in Blowers, Exegesis, pp. 171-172 (n. 1S4). 
See Qu. Thal. 54, CCSG 7,443; Qu Thal. 16, CCSG 7,105-107. 
Qu. Thal. 16, CCSG 7: 38-39,107. 
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were gathered for producing the calf, Maximus interprets as good elements of the 
human nature or its activity. 
'Earrings' are the logoi concerning God which naturally exist in the mind from 
devout understanding of beings. 'Necklaces' are the right doctrines about beings 
obtained through natural contemplation. 'Bracelets' are the practice of virtues in 
action. Or again, 'earrings' are the inborn reason (for ear is the symbol of 
reason). 'Necklace' is the incensive power of the soul (for neck is the symbol of 
eruption). 'Bracelets' are the desiring power of the soul disclosed through 
pleasurable action. 13 
Or in another version: 
The mind which according to [the figure of] Israel comes out of Egypt, that is, out 
of sin, and which has as its companion the imagination, ... this mind, then, as soon as it nealects and leaves rational discernment even for a little while-as Moses left 
Israel in the olden days-it sets up, as it were a calf, an irrational habit, the mother 
of all vices. It smelts-like earrings-the logoi concerning God which it had 
naturally received from devout understanding of beings; like necklaces it smelts 
the godly beliefs concerning being which it had gained from natural 
contemplation, like bracelets it smelts the natural activity of the practice of virtues. 
This the mind does in, as it were a furnace, in the burning heat of the impassioned 
attitude of anger and desire, and in accordance with the imagination and form of 
evil stored up in advance in reason it accomplishes sin in action. " 
The fact that the intellect is displaced from its seat, introduces, not only a disorder 
in the human hierarchy as a whole, but also a distortion of the parts or faculties of the 
soul themselves. As the intellect is subdued to the irrational parts of the soul, it becomes 
a slave to irrational habits, and as a result, the soul's faculties, instead of producing 
virtues (which is their natural task) become begetters and servants of passions and vice. 
Maximus regards passions as an end result of confusion: 'Every passion always 
comes about by mixing some perceived object, a sense faculty and a natural power, 
diverted from the natural-the incensive power, desire or the intelligence, as the case 
may be. "5 Thus, the intellect's wrong move causes a disorder In the human 
architecture, this leads into the distortion of the natural state of the individual parts of 
the soul, which in turn is expressed in unhealthy and sinful activity. 
Confusion, come about through turning away from God and through attachment to 
temporal things, has its turning side, too. St Athanasius in his Contra gentes says: 'As 
soon as they stopped attending to what is one and true (that is, to 
God) and stopped 
longing for him, all that was left to them was to launch themselves upon variety and 
13 Qu. Thal. 16: 53-62, CCSG 7,107. 
14 Qu. Thal. 16: 1-2 1, CCSG 7,109. 
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upon necessarily fragmentary desires of the body. 716 Attachment necessarily leads to 
fragmentation. The mind which is entangled in the senses is bound to the multiplicity of 
sensible things. This is not to say that the variety and multiplicity in the created order Is 
bad and fragmenting in itself. It becomes such to the unhealthy soul that relates to the 
world in an unhealthy manner. In other words, the mind which has become captive of 
the senses, and the IFT-ational parts of the soul, rather than curbing the latter, enables 
them to satisfy their insatiable irrational hunger. True Love was, therefore, not found 
residing in passions never seeing, as Dowland sings. 
The mind which has abandoned its correct way of relating to the world and which 
4gets stuck' with the multiplicity of things cannot retain its wholeness and unity. It 
becomes like someone who is constantly dragged to different directions at one and the 
same time. 'Sin is ever scattered, ' Maximus says, 'and with itself it ever scatters the 
mind which has committed it. It cuts the mind off the singular identity of truth and sets 
up the irrational habit that disperses the mind about many and unsteady imaginations 
and opinions concerning beings. 
Gnome 
Fragmentation does not remain at the level of the individual only. It has also a 
universal dimension. The biblical grounding for this could be found in, for example, St 
James' sharp statement: 
What causes wars, and what causes fightings among you? Is it not your passions 
that are at war in your members? You desire and do not have; so you kill. And 
you covet and cannot obtain, so you fight and wage war. You do not have, 
because you do not ask. You ask and do not receive, because you ask wrongly, to 
spend it on your passions. Unfaithful creatures! Do you not know that friendship 
with the world is enmity with God? Therefore whoever wishes to be a friend of the 
world makes himself an enemy of God. " 
For Maximus it is primarily 'self-love' that engenders conflict. 'Self-love, ' he says 
in Letter 2, 'is, and is known to be, the first sin, the first progeny of the devil and the 
mother of the passions that come after it. ' Self-love is, it could be argued, the generic 
Qu. Thal. 16: 72-75, CCSG 7,109. 
Gent. 3: 22-25, Thompson, 8. 
17 Qu. Thal. 16: 21-25, CCSG 7,105. 
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vice in a similar way as love is the most generic of virtues. " Maximus enumerates some 
of its ingredients: 'pride, the monstrous, composite evil, and the mark of vain opinion 
that opposes God'; 'the falling glory which casts down with itself those who are puffed 
up by it'; 'envy'; 'anger, bloodthirstiness, wrath, guile, hypocrisy, dissembling, 
resentment and greed'; in brief -and most importantly -'everything by which the one 
humanity is divided up'. " And in Letter3, he says: 'Human self-love and craftiness 
severed the one nature into many pieces. "' 
Maximus names the actual 'weapon' which realizes this cutting into pieces of the 
one humanity, gnome. 22 Gnome is one of those terms in Maximus' vocabulary which is 
extremely difficult to render into, any other language. Maximus himself is not always 
very consistent in its usage, and I shall not venture to map all his variations. 23 Instead, I 
want to focus simply on its negative aspect in accordance with which gnome is the 
principle which divides the one humanity. In general, gnome is associated with 
freewill, opinion, deliberation, inclination, individual attitude, and so on. In its negative 
role, we could name it 'the individualistic will'. 
When the soul's powers have become unbalanced and wrongly orientated, they 
begin to require things in an unhealthy way. This leads to an egocentric existence in 
which the soul makes use of its national capacities to satisfy its irrational desires. The 
necessary consequence is what Maximus calls 'tyranny' of one's neighbour. The 
common good of the one humanity is no longer important, but only the apparent 
individual good. That it is only apparent, Maximus points out in a practical example: 
Should anyone, who is wealthy enough to do so, ignore those in need, he clearly 
proves to have cast them away from himself and cast himself from God, since he 
has ignored the nature on account of his gnome, or rather, since he has ruined the 
good things which belong to his nature. This applies to those who deliberately 
('/VWJILK(TS) have preferred cruelty to charity and who have judged their kin and 
compatriot to be of less value than money and who yearning after gold 
have 
blocked the way from God to enter themselves. A 
18 James 4: 1-4. 
See Thunberg, Microcosm, pp. 232-233. 
All quotations are from Ep. 2, PG 91,397CD. 
21 Ep. 3, PG 91,408D. 
22Ep. 3, PG 91,409A. 
' Sherwood has a brief but comprehensive survey on the subject in St. Maximus, pp. 58-63. 
24Ep. 3, PG 91,409B. 
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Acting according to one's (fallen or distorted) gnome is acting unnaturally. It is 
activity which reveals the distortion of one's nature, and it is deviation from what is 
natural and as such already it severs the one humanity. But also its end results have a 
separating effect, as Maximus speaking about evil in general says: 'The plural form 
these are your gods, o Jsrae125 is said because evil by nature is scattering, unsteady, 
multiform and dividing. For since good unifies and holds together what has been 
divided, clearly then evil divides and corrupts what is united. 726 True Love does not 
apparently feel very comfortable in thought or words either, it seems, or in men on 
earth, or womens minds partaking. 
Consequently, gnome, to conclude, in the context of the fall, represents the sharp 
knife which cuts whatever it touches and whenever it acts '27 and fallen humanity ever 
suffers from the irreconcilability of this cutting edge. Only if we rise above our 
'individualistic wills', can we hope to achieve restoration and unification of humanity 
both at the personal and the universal level. 
But there is another aspect to gnome. Much of Maximus' understanding of the 
Christian life, as an ascetic endeavour, consists in reforming the gnome. "' The purpose 
is to bring it back home, to unite it with nature. Uniting the gnome with nature brings 
about also the unification of humanity as a whole: it means giving up one's individual 
desires for the benefit of one' neighbour, in other words, loving them as oneself. 'God 
in his love for mankind prescribed the saving commandments to us wishing thus to 
unite us one with another not only by nature but also by gnome, ' Maximus reminds us. 
In fact, when this unification takes place, gnome becomes the vehicle of voluntary 
action. It becomes the characteristic constituent of the rational human being who of his 
free choice expresses love for his neighbour and moves towards God in love. Uniting 
the gnome with nature, reaching the likeness of God and ultimately deification, one 
could argue, are but different aspects of one and the same reality. 
' Ex. 32: 4. 
Qu. Thal. 16: 47-52, CCSG 7,107. 
' See also Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, p. 267. 
' See Sherwood, St. Maximus, pp. 81-83. 
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For this reason anyone who by chaste thinking and noble sagacity has been able 
to put an end to this deviation from nature has shown mercy above all to himself, 
because he has rendered his gnome to be in one accord with nature and because 
he by gnome has advanced to God for the sake of nature. In this way he has 
shown in himself what is the tropos and the logos of the image and how God in a 
manner proper to him created our nature in the beginning similar to his own 
nature and a manifest likeness of his goodness, and how God made it the same 
throughout in every respect, namely, non-combative, peaceable, non-factious, and 
tightly bound both with God and with itself through love, by which love we cleave 
to God in desire and to one another in sympathy. Such a person has shown mercy 
to those to whom mercy was to be shown, not only by supplying them, but also by 
teaching them how the hidden God makes himself manifest through those who are 
worthy. " 
29 Ep. 3, PG 91,409AB. 
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Distinction and Unification 
Distinction 
IF THE FALL is associated with attachment to the sensible, then also the opposite is 
true: upward movement and integration requires detachment from the sensible. Once 
again, this is a matter of love, or more precisely, it is a matter of true Love. As 
Maximus puts it in one of his centuries: 
The blameworthy passion of love engrosses the mind in material things; the 
laudable passion of love binds it even to divine things. For usually where the mind 
has leisure there it expands; where it expands there it directs its desire and love, 
whether this be in divine and intelligible things (which are properly its own), or in 
the things of the flesh and the passions. ' 
What we need here, is to continue the 'intellectual journey' and to begin an ascent in 
search of true Love. Let me quote the third stanza of John Dowland's song: 
Mount then my thoughts, here isfor thee no dwelling, 
Since Truth and Falsehood live like twins together: 
Believe not sense, eyes, ears, touch, taste, or smelling, 
Both Art and Nature'sfOrc'd: put trust in neither. 
One only she doth true Love captive bind 
In fairest breast, but in afairer mind. ' 
Mount then my thoughts; the mind's joumey from the 'confusion of passions' to 
union with God is one of veritable 'intellectual asceticism'. It requires the liberation of 
the intellect from the realm of the irrational, and a diabasis, a passing through the 
sensible to the intelligible and ultimately to God. Much of Maximus' writing is 
concerned with this journey (as Paul Blowers, among others, has demonstrated). 
' Also 
true philosophy for Maximus consists in such 'Intellectual asceticiSM1.4 
True 
Carit. 111.7 1, PG 90,1037CD. 
Dowland, 'Tell me', p. 20. 
See his Exegesis, pp. 95-183. 
4 Cf - 1205C; introduced and translated 
in Louth, Maximus, pp. 94- 
. his Ambiguum 
10, PG 91,1105C 
154. 
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philosophy for him is, as it was for the philosophers of antiquity, a way of life. ' It is 
literally 'love of Wisdom', and for Maximus this involves striving after the mind's 
union with God (who is Wisdom itself and the only true source of wisdom) but it also 
involves the governing through reason of the irrational parts of the soul and their 
aCfiVIty. 6 A true 'wisdom-lover' is, therefore, both united with the Logos and Wisdom 
of God, and makes manifest wisdom in action in accordance with the commandments. 
He loves both God and his neighbour as himself. Interestingly, deification, which can 
be said to be the goal of human existence, as the union with God through love, was 
defined in almost exactly the same words by Dionysius the Areopagite as the Platonists 
defined philosophy: 'Philosophy is likening to God to the extent this is possible to a 
human being. /Deification is likening and union to God to the extent this is possible. " 
As an example of the 'wisdom-lover's' diabasis to God, we could take Maximus' 
allegory on Zerubbabel the basic meaning of which according to Maximus is 'the 
wisdom-loving mind'. Maximus interprets this Hebrew name in a number of ways in 
his allegory and by doing so gives a direction for the mind's spiritual journey. He gives 
five different renderings of 'Zerubbabel': 8 'sowing of confusion', 'dawn of confusion', 
'dawn in confusion', 'dawn of dispersion' and 'he is rest. In each case, 'Zerubbabel' 
is a 'wisdom-loving mind', or a 'philosophical intellect' that brings about a change in 
the state of affairs. This is that of fall in which the nature is keeping the mind captive 
through the senses. Thus Zerubbabel in Maximus' interpretation becomes: 
1. a wisdom-loving mind 'sown' through repentance by virtue of righteousness in 
the confusion of the captivity to senses; 
2. a wisdom-loving mind, a 'dawn of confusion', which reveals the shame of 
confused passions; 
' See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, edited and with an introduction by A. I. Davidson, 
translated by M. Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, English ed. 1995). Parts of this work were 
first published 
in French as Exercices spirituelles et philosophie antique (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 
1987). 
Cf. Ambig. 10.1, PG 91,1108A- I 112A. 
Elias [? ], In Porphyrii Isagogen, Prolegotnena 7, CAG18/1,18: 3-4; Dionysius, EA 1.3, PTS 36, 
66: 12-13. 
' See Antoon Schoors, 'Biblical Onomastic in Maximus Confessor's Quaestiones ad Thalassium' 
in 
Philohist6r. Miscellanea in honorem Caroli Laga septuagenard, editedby A. Schoors and 
P. van Deun 
(Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1994), pp. 257-272. 
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3. a wisdom-loving mind, a 'dawn in confusion', which through knowledge gives 
light in the confusion (caused by the senses in their activity towards sensible 
things), and which does not allow the senses irrationally to be attached to the 
sensible; 
4. a wisdom-loving mind, a 'dawn of dispersion', which produces the dawn of 
deeds of righteousness to the powers of soul dispersed with sensible things. By 
virtue of this dawn, reasonable ITPdýL3 is put together. This has its share in 
'YVWCTTL" OEwpta which brings the dispersed powers [of soul] back to 
intelligible things. 
5. a wisdom-loving mind, and 'he is rest', for he made all peaceful by uniting the 
active aspect [of the soul] to that which is good by nature and the contemplative 
aspect to that which is truth by nature. ' 
Here already we can see the basic sequence of events. Repentance lays the 
foundations. A ray of the rising sun breaks the darkness, and one begins to see one's 
wretched state. The intellect takes control over the faculties of the soul and nourishes 
them through its contemplative activity. Gradually, the soul begins to move towards 
integration. In practical life, virtues emerge, and through prayer or contemplation one's 
spiritual powers are united and directed to God. In God, then, 'the wisdom-loving 
mind' finds its final repose. 
But let us not go too far yet. Detachment from the senses is the first step on the 
way to integration. The confusion needs to be sorted out and the hierarchical structure 
of the soul restored, and this can only take place when the intellect is lifted up out of the 
lower parts of the soul. The intellect must be freed from the irrational before there can 
be any restoration. Mount then my thoughts, here is for thee no dwelling, since Truth 
and Falsehood live like twins together: Believe not sense, eyes, ears, touch, taste, or 
stnelling, as Dowland reminds us. 
As we said in the previous chapter, passions came about through a wrong kind of 
union, a union with confusion, so to speak. The healing of passions, then, Maximus 
I Cf. Qu. Thal. 54, CCSG 7,443-445. 
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sees as depending on distinguishing between the confused elements: a sensible object, a 
sense faculty and a faculty of the soul. In his allegory on the 'molten calf', which we 
saw in the previous chapter, Maximus explains this process of distinction. 
Thus, if the intellect, as it investigates the final compound of these three 
interrelated factors, is able to distinguish each from the other two, and to refer each back to its speci ific natural function, if it is able, in other words, to view the sensible object in itself, apart from its relationship to the sense faculty, and the 
sense faculty in itself, apart from its connection with the sensible object, and the 
natural power-desire, for example-apart from its impassioned alliance with the 
sense faculty and the sensible object, the intellect in so doing 'grinds to powder' the constitution of the 'calf', that is, of whatever passion, and 'scatters it upon the 
water' of knowledge. The intellect has then made even the slightest imagination of passions completely to vanish by restoring each of its elements to its natural state. May we too 'grind to powder' the 'molten calf' of our soul and make it vanish, 
so that our souls may have in them the image of the divine unadulterated, and 
unblemished by any external thing whatsoever. 10 
Similar distinction is required between the different parts of the soul which have 
undergone an interchange with the fall. They must be first distinguished one from 
another (especially the intellect from the incensive and the desiring parts) and then 
restored to their proper places. " 'The molten calf', must be dealt with. 
The coming of the divine logos 'grinds [the irrational habit] to dust' and 'scatters 
it upon the water'. By means of the 'thinness' of contemplation, it 'grinds to 
dust' the 'thickness' of reason which it had in its superficial relation to the senses 
in virtue of passions, and it makes the distinction between the natural powers clear 
-powers which had suffered an interchange and confusion between one 
another- and it brings the mind to its proper source of knowledge. " 
It is impressive to notice how the principle of simultaneous unity and distinction, 
the master theme of this study, can be traced even in Maximus' psychology. And it is 
only natural that this should be so, since union without confusion is all about integrity 
and its restoration. In this case, we have the integrity of the soul both as a whole and 
parts. If the parts are confused, they lose their wholeness, and as a consequence the 
whole soul loses its integrity. The healing of a 'confused' soul, its salvation in other 
words, requires therefore both distinction and unification. " 
A different way of presenting the process of detachment from the senses can be 
found in Chapters on Love 111.38-44. Just as the whole treatise, so also this 
'0 Qu. Thal. 16: 75-93, CCSG 7,109. 
Cf. Qu. Thal. 16: 65-71, CCSG 7,109. 
Qu. Thal. 16: 26-32, CCSG 7,105-107. 
See also ch. 5 above. 
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presentation is distinctively Evagrian. " The three basic factors in this scheme are: a 
thing, its mental representation and a passion. A fourth one, the demons, is referred to 
in 111.41. Thus, in Maximus' words: 
Thing, representation, passion -all differ. A thing is, for instance, a man, woman, 
gold, and so on, a representation is a mere recollection of one of these things; 
passion is unreasonable affection or senseless hate for one of the foregoing, " 
Maximus is careful to point out that the spiritual warfare is not directed against the 
things or their images, but the passions and the demons who Instigate them. 
The God-loving mind does not war against things nor against their 
representations, but against the passions j oined with these representations. Thus he 
does not war against the woman, nor against him who offends him, nor against 
their images, but against the passions that are joined with the Images. " 
The monk's whole war is against the demons, that he may separate the passions 
from the reý. resentations. Otherwise he will not be able to look on things with 
detachment. 7 
Maximus calls the wrong kind of union 'an impassioned representation. What 
goes in the mind, and images one carries in one's mind are all right, as long as the mind 
does not 'get stuck' with the passions. If that happens, and it happens more often than 
not, the warfare against impassioned representations, or separating images from 
passions, becomes necessary: 
An impassioned representation is a thought compounded of passion and 
representation. Let us separate the passion from the representation: the thought 
alone will remain. If we but will, we make this separation by means of spiritual 
love and self-mastery. "' 
Unification 
But what role does detachment actually play with respect to unification? As we saw 
earlier on, fragmentation resulted from 'getting stuck' with the senses. The mind was 
led in different directions with things and unless the mind did something about its 
impassioned relationship with those objects, it was entirely torn into pieces. Since Truth 
and Falsehood live like twins together: Believe not sense, eyes, ears, touch, taste, or 
smelling, Both Art and Nature's forc'd: put trust in neither. Now, the pattern in 
" See especially his On Thoughts 2-3, SC 438,1-54-162. 
15Carit. 111.42, PG 90,1029A. 
16 Carit. J11.4o, pG go, 1028D-1029A. 
17 Carit. Ill. 41, PG 90,1029A. 
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spiritual life in Maximus' understanding, as we have been presenting it here, is really 
very symmetrical: fragmentation follows attachment; unification follows detachment. 
Detachment enables the mind to observe things simply, as they are. The 
fragmenting effect of attachment is thus removed. Moreover, detachment makes it 
possible for the mind to engage in what is called 'natural contemplation', to detect the 
natural logoi in the beings, without being distracted by their material usefulness, for 
example. In chapter five, we have briefly discussed how the contemplation of nature 
leads the soul to the source of the logoi and the source of unity, who is God himself. 
Natural contemplation is not a mystical union per se, but it certainly has a strong 
unifying effect on the soul. In Quaestiones et dubia 64, Maximus writes: 
We, too, must first be lifted up to God and having steeled the soul extend its whole 
desire to him and then, accordingly, descend to search after beings and regard 
each one in terms of its own nature, and through them, again be drawn up by 
contemplative knowledge to their creator. Such a person 'gathers the winds in his 
bosom, ' for he gathers into the bosom of his own heart the diverse logoi of 
beings-which are named figuratively as 'clouds'. Consequently, ... one ought to 
realize that in gathering the diverse logoi in the productive and contemplative part 
of the heart one brings to birth the one Word of God. For the many logoi of 
beings are gathered into one. 19 
In addition to the unifying effects of natural contemplation, detachment allows the 
intellect to establish itself as the sole governing principle of the soul. In this restored 
state, the soul is not moved by irrational impulses, but is instead navigated by the 
rational pilot which can, being detached from the desiring and the incensive parts of the 
soul, make use of these for the benefit of the whole being. 
Reason, instead of being ignorant, ought to move through knowledge to seek 
solely after God; and through the desiring power, pure of the passion of self-love, 
it ought to yearn for God alone; and through the incensive power, separated from 
tyranny, it ought to struggle to attain God alone. and from these [powers of soul] 
reason ought to create divine and blessed love for which they exist; love which 
unites a God-loving person to God and manifests him to be God. 
' 
Here again we see that the whole matter is about true Love and the realization of the 
twofold commandment of love. 'Love is, as Maximus defines it, 'a good disposition of 
the soul, according to which one prefers no creature to the knowledge of God. 
"' It is 
love that unites one to God and manifests him to be God. Deification is quite obviously 
Carit. 111.43, PG 90,1029B. 
Qu. ii4b. 64: 16-3 0, CCS G 10,50-5 1; translated by Adam 
Cooper. 
Ep. 2, PG 91,397AB. 
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the summit of the mind's journey, and this can be regarded as the end of the first half of 
the twofold commandment. What deification amounts to, could be summarized in the 
following. " 
Human nature in itself is not productive of deification, but rather the deification of 
man is effected by divine operation. It is something the human person undergoes or 
'suffers' (to use the literal meaning of the GreeklTd(TXELV), in other words, deification is 
something that happens to you. Man who is being deified, has become the receptacle of 
the divine activity, he has become the material on which God works. 
Participation in the divine by the human person, draws him beyond and above the 
confines of his own nature, which 'going beyond' is often characterized as an 
&ecstasy', an ecstasy out of one's nature. This is to be understood as an ecstasy out of, 
or going beyond, the limitations of the created being, since the participation that makes 
this possible is participation in the uncreated which is beyond those limitations. (No 
idea of 'person' emerging out of the necessity of nature can be included in Byzantine 
usage of the notion of 'ecstasy'. ) 
Deification is a union of God and man without confusion and without change in 
essence. Man participates in divine attributes by grace alone and his nature is not turned 
into the divine nature. The metaphors for deification Maximus makes use of are already 
familiar from Christology: air transfused by light and incandescent iron. 23 Deification 
according to the Greek Fathers is a process of transfiguration and sanctification, and not 
one of transubstantiation. If the Greek Fathers made use of the language of their 
ancestors- which is only natural - they certainly were quite clear about the difference in 
content of notions such as 06wcug. No Greek Father would claim that the Christian is to 
become God in the classical sense of becoming Hermas or Zeus from a mortal man, or 
becoming an object of worship. " 
21 Carit. 1.1, PG 90,69 IA. 
' Here I have drawn on Jean-Claude Larchet's extensive study on the topic, La divinisation de Phomme 
selon saint Maxime le Confiesseur (Paris: Les 1ýditions du Cerf, 1996), pp. 527-640. 
' See Ambig. 7, PG 91,1088D. Whether or not the logos-tropos distinction is applicable in this 
context, is discussedby Larchetin La divinisation, pp. 605-608. 
' Cf. Acts 14: 11-15. 
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When the movement of the human deification reaches its end, then, Maximus says, 
the infinite splendours inherent in this nourishment are revealed to the soul, and it becomes God by participation in divine grace, ceasing from all activity of Intellect 
and sense, and at the same time suspending all the natural operations of the body. 
For the body is deified along with the soul through its own corresponding 
participation in the process of deification. Thus God alone in made manifest 
through the soul and the body, since their natural properties have been overcome 
by the superabundance of his glory. ' 
Unity of Humanity 
The other half of the twofold commandment of love complements the first. It is the 
active counterpart accomplished through reason of the contemplative love for God of 
the intellect. Again, this is a matter of serious spiritual warfare: 'For the sake of love, 
the saints all resist sin continually, finding no meaning in this present life, and they 
endure many forms of death, that they may be gathered from this world to themselves 
and to God, and unite in themselves the fractures of nature. 726 Passions, individual 
desires, and sin, all divide the one humanity, and it will have become clear by now that 
true Love does not have its seat in reasons, looks, or passions never seeing, in men on 
earth, or women's minds partaking. But true Love, that cannot die and which this age 
expels, still remains the sole source of unity for the fragmented humanit Y. 27 
What, then, does this true Love consist in? In Letter 2, Maximus writes: 
These are the marks of love, which binds human beings to God and to one 
another. ... You, who 
have become blessed and most genuine lovers of this divine 
and blessed way, fight the good fight until you reach the end, clinging fast to 
those qualities that will assure your passage to love's goal. I mean: love of 
humankind, brotherly and sisterly love, love of the poor, compassion, mercy, 
humility, meekness, gentleness, patience, freedom from anger, long-suffering, 
perseverance, kindness, forbearance, goodwill, peace towards all. Out of these and 
through these the grace of love is fashioned, which leads one to God who delfies 
the human being that he himself fashioned. " 
Much of what love amounts to, therefore, has to do with what might be regarded as 
personal asceticism, consisting in struggle against passions, fasting, individual prayer, 
and so on. This is something that is often regarded as individualistic, as opposed to the 
ecclesial and eucharistic forms of devotion. Within the context of the twofold 
15Cap. theol. 11-89, PG 90,1169AB. 
' Ep. 2, PG 91,404D. 
' Dowland, 'Tell me', p. 20. 
' Ep. 2, PG 91,404D-405A; translation in Louth, Maximus, pp. 91-92. See also Carit. 11.9, 
PG 90, 
995CD, where Maximus enumerates the five causes for which human beings 
love one another. 
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commandment of love, however, it becomes an entirely necessary means for the re 
unification of humanity, and an expression of true Love. 
He who is perfect in love and has attained the summit of detachment knows no difference between 'mine and thine, ' between faithful and unfaithful, between 
slave and freeman, or indeed male and female. Having risen above the tyranny of the passions and looking to nature, one in all men, he considers all equally and is disposed equally towards all. For in him there is neither Greek nor Jew, neither 
male nor female, neither slave nor freeman, but everything and in all things Christ-29 
Eucharistic union is in no way in contrast to this but is, on the one hand, the source 
of invigorating power which becomes the dri i ing even one's enemies, iving force for lovi 
and one the other hand, it is an iconic fulfilment of the unity of all in Christ. In the 
Mystagogia, Maximus is especially concerned with what the divine grace, present in the 
Eucharist in a particular way, enables the individual soul to achieve and undergo, and in 
the Liber Asceticus he speaks of a 'power both to imitate Christ and to do well in all his 
commandments' which Christ gives to those who strive after detachment from the 
world. 
Ascetic struggle and the Eucharist are, we might say, the two poles -opposite war 
and isolation- between which the pendulum of the human deification oscillates. As 
long as the pendulum moves, there is time for the true Love to find space in those who 
are still in this world, and who struggle in truth to love God and their neighbour for the 
sanctification of both soul and body, as well as of the whole of the circumference that 
their actions cover. 
True Love, then, that which makes us able to love truly, cannot ultimately be but 
this power which makes us gods and which at the same time makes us one with God 
and with one another. It enables a union without confusion and without separation. 
Also the true philosopher can be no-one else but he whose 'intellectual journey' has led 
him to become the receptacle of this power. Ultimately, the philosopher becomes a 
lover of God, who is the only true Love and the source of the spiritual love for one's 
neighbour. The Philosopher is, then, a lover of true Love, and he becomes a source of 
love to his neighbours, a kind of luminous tree of Paradise on whose branches those 
29 Carit. 11.30, PG 90,993B. 
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who are weary shall find rest, whose fruits nourish and sustain them, and whose 
foliage gives them shelter and consolation. 
This is the Saint's mind with which Dowland closes his song on true Love: 
Ofairest mind, enrich'd with Love's residing, 
Retain the best; in hearts let some seeds fall, 
Instead of weeds Love's fruits may have abiding; 
At Harvest yo u shall reap increase of all. 
0 happy Love, more happy man thatfinds thee, 
Most happy Saint, thatkeeps, restores, unbinds thee. 30 
May the 'intellectual history' of humankind inherit even a fraction of the happiness 
of the Saint who unbinds the true Love, and may we, each and every one, become true 
philosophers, 'wisdom-loving minds', possessing and being possessed by the true 
Love, united with God and with one another in a union which knows no confusion or 
separation. 
Many have said much about love. Looking for it among the disciples of Christ 
will you find it for they alone held the true Love, the teacher of love, of which it is 
said: If I should have prophecy and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, 
... and 
have not love, it profits me nothing. He then that possesses love, possesses 
God himself, for God is Love. 'To Him be glory through the ages. Amen. 13l 
' Dowland, 'Tell me', p. 20. 
31 Carit. IV. 100, PG 90,1073A. 
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